Written by: Abdul Majid Eskandary
Leicester University
United Kingdom
September 2013
Afghanistan:
The Failure of ‘Nation and State’ Building
Content:
1) Introduction
2) Chapter 1: Conceptualisation (Nation, State,
Nation-State and Ethnicity)
3) Chapter 2: Nation Building in Afghan History- Modernity to Taliban
4) Chapter 3:Nation-State Building in Afghanistan: Post- Taliban
5) Chapter 4: The role of neighbors in peace, stability and state-building
in Afghanistan
6) Chapter 5: Looking to the future
7) Conclusion
Introduction:
In this paper, we shall examine the notion of nation-state building
in the context of Afghanistan: a state located in Southern central Asia, which
in the past three decades has seen one of the worst bloody wars mankind has
witnessed. The crux of our paper is to examine why it has been that in
Afghanistan, historically and even today, the process of building a true Afghan
nation and state has proven an extremely complex and at times illusive
task. As we shall see, the highly complex
inter-ethnic relationships within the country have been a major factor in
preventing the Afghan people from forming an overall national identity that is
harmonized and integrated, making talks of nation and building highly
controversial.
The structure of this paper shall be as follows. It warrants that
we must aim to define the key terms to this paper before going any further.
Primarily we shall focus on “nation” and “state” building; what do these terms
actually mean? As we shall see, this will prove to be somewhat a difficult task
because as with many other key international relations terms, these two
concepts have often been confused for one another and used indiscriminately,
referring more or less to the exact same thing today. After a brief
conceptualization, we shall turn to the ethnicity
factor in nation building. What relevance, if any, does ethnicity have in
nation building efforts? This is a very
question important because mutli-ethnicity is a socio-political reality in the
21st century and inter-ethnic polarisation and conflict have proven
more and more prevalent throughout the world. As we shall see in the case of
Afghanistan, the country’s deep and profound ethic cleavages have prevented its
people from forming a harmonious and
unified overall Afghan identity.
After examining the relevance of ethnicity in nation building, we
shall turn to Afghanistan’s ethnic composition. Thereafter, a trip will be made
through the history of Afghanistan, starting from the era of Abdur Rahman Khan
in 1880, all the way to the Taliban era. The purpose of this will be to examine
whether any state and nation building efforts have historically found place in
the country by those in power, and if so, whether these efforts have been
successful or not. As we shall see, efforts by those in power to unify the social
and political arenas of Afghanistan have been highly flawed and one-sided in
favour of one specific ethnic group. External influences and interferences particularly
have been a contributing factor to the further polarisation of the ethnic
groups within the country.
In the second half of the paper, we shall turn to Afghanistan as it
stands now. With the end of the Taliban reign, a new promising era entered
Afghanistan after the international coalitions made their grandiose promises of
bringing democracy, stability and peace to the country. One would have thought
that this task of nation building, which had until now proven elusive, would
become a more feasible undertaking. Yet, have the relevant actors of this “nation (and state) building” project
deprived themselves of a chance of success from the outset by failing to take
account of the historical realities of the Afghan country when developing the
new institutions of Afghanistan? It will be argued that given the long existing
deep ethnic divides within Afghanistan; the right policy choices were not made
in a number of areas, and therefore have consolidated the dangerous trend of
ethnic polarity in post-conflict Afghanistan. Most predominantly, the decision
to once again form a highly centralised political structure in this country was
a mistake and has turned our nation building dreams into something distant. I
will argue that alternative solutions, namely that of decentralisation of
political institutions, would better respond to the realities of the situation,
bring the Afghan state a step closer to stability and prosperity, and
consequently also to our “nation” or “state” building dreams.in the last part
of this paper we shall make a brief glance to the future after 2014 ,
withdrawal of international force and its consequences and end this
dissertation with the conclusion of our finding in this journey.
Chapter 1
Conceptualisation (Nation, State, Nation-State and Ethnicity):
Before we can aim to describe the concept of nation and state, it
seems right to first define what a “nation” is, and how this is different
from the notion of the “state”.
Regrettably, the world of international relations has been plagued with
improper usage of its key terminologies, with the terms of “nation” and “state”
being no exception to this occurrence, having often erroneously and
indiscriminately been inter-utilized so as to refer to the same concept.
Thus, one comparable politics textbook astonishingly states that “just about the entire surface of the world
today is covered by independent states. We call them states, or nations, or
nation states”.
Although the two terms are highly interlinked and mutually interdependent,
there are indeed fundamental differences between the two concepts.
While there is no single definition of a “state”, the most commonly
cited definition is that of Max Weber, whom described it as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory”. Connor also aptly describes it as “a legal concept describing a social group that
occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political
institutions and an effective government”.
The state is therefore described in politico-legal terms as a
sovereign entity which has a right to exclusively
govern its people,
to form domestic and external policies and to use legitimate force. “State building”, then, ought to refer to
the creation or restoration of those institutions necessary for the smooth
running of a state (political, economic, social). A “nation” on the other hand, is frequently described as a psycho-cultural concept, defining in its
most basic sense a particular group of people who share a common sense of
identity. Connor, in his highly influential article ‘Nation Building or Nation Destroying?’ maintains that a nation
exclusively refers to “self-differentiating
ethnic groups”,
discarding any other tangible particularities (language, custom or culture) of
these units as decisive as to the existence of nationhood.
In his view it the shared belief of a
common heritage and a “popularly held
awareness or belief that one’s own group is unique in most vital sense”
which separates a “nation” from any
other social groupings. Nations can in this sense be classified as “imagined”
or “mythical” communities.
Connor rightfully observes that a nation is often erroneously used to refer to political entities,
but from the above definition, it becomes clear that within a single “state”, multiple “nations” can in actual fact be in existence. Therefore, “what we have thus far been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups
are in fact nations”.
Afghanistan, then, is a state comprising of dozens of “nations” when we take account of its ethnic composition. The concept
of “nationalism”, then, should
logically be described as loyalty to one’s ethnic
group,
but instead it is most frequently referred to allegiance to the state instead. The hyphenate “nation state” is therefore in fact a mistake because in its most
correct definition, a “nation state”
only refers to those occurrences where the borders of a nation are approximate
to that of the state. This hyphenate can therefore only be applied to a very
small percentage of the world’s states. The “United Nations” is therefore also
an association of states rather than
one of nations. Gellner defines
nationalism a “political principle, which holds that political and national
unit should be congruent.”
Anthony D. Smith, a British professor of nationalism and ethnicity,
introduced the dichotomy of ‘ethnic
nationalism’ and ‘civic nationhood’
in late 1980s in his book The Ethnic
Origins of Nations.
He believed that the former described non-western conceptions of nationalism,
whereas the latter was used for western notions the same concept. While ethnic nationalism therefore more or
less accords to definitions of Connor and Anderson in that the nation is
defined in terms of a belief of ethnic ancestry, in civic nationalism on the other hand, a common identity between the
members of the group is based on citizenship.
Individuals can choose to become
members of the civic nation by simply deciding to adhere to the political
practices, institutions and values. In a civic nationalism, it is therefore the
state which creates the ‘nation’ and it is from this act of
politically participatory citizenry from which the state derives its political
legitimacy. Civic nationalism is seen by Western writers as the ideal type, because of its inherent
‘democratic’ nature.
The rise of the state centric nationalism has
been traced back to modernity and industrialisation in the Western world.
Early Deutschian theorists maintain that it was the demands of industrialism- namely that of increased and flexible labour
(as well as division thereof), continuous production and growth as well as
urbanisation- that led to the pursuit of the creation of newer homogenous
loyalties and languages.
It was therefore an expected occurrence for smaller “nations” to leave their distinct particularities aside to
assimilate into a larger universal and homogenous ‘national’ identity for the ‘common good’ of industrialisation and
the benefits that it was promised to bring.
Connor on the other hand, did not believe that modernization would inevitably
result in the dissolving of ethnic identification in favour of cultural
homogeneity: “if the process that
compromises modernisation led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favour
of identification with the state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic
disharmony would be on the decrease”.
And this was not the case in the world which in fact saw increased ethnic
awareness. Material increases could therefore
in certain circumstances increase
tension and particularity.
Arend Lijphart
furthered this argument by distinguishing the effects of modernity on
ethnically homogenous societies from ethnically heterogeneous ones. In his
view, in the former where one would merely be dealing with slight variations of
a single cultural group, increased contacts between the populace by means of
increased communication and transportation would almost always lead to
assimilation and unification, whereas in the latter, the pluralistic nature of
the society would make national assimilation a highly controversial and almost
impossible task as increased communication would create antagonism between the
‘lower’ cultures. Policies of ethnical segregation were best suited to these
situations, Lijphart argued.
Now we have given a brief overview of the notions a “state”, “nation” and “nationalism”, we are
in a better position to analyse the concept of “nation building”. Referring
back to the traditional rise of “nationhood”, “nation building” theory was
traditionally therefore “primarily used to describe the processes
of national integration and consolidation that
led up to the establishment of the modern nation-state--as distinct from
various form of traditional states, such as feudal and dynastic states, church
states, empires, etc.” in Kolsto’s words. Given that this process involved the dissolving of smaller
cultural groups into one larger one, Connor felt compelled to conclude that the
true goals were therefore one of “nation
destroying” rather than “nation
building”.
In post- world war II, the “nation building” had become one mostly defined in terms of civic nationalism.
In the post-cold war era, “nation building” discipline found
prominence in international relations, as a catchphrase for many disciplines.
Due to the increasing salience in “failed”
and “failing” states and an
understanding of the impact of such
occurrence on global security and stability (particularly post 9/11), the US saw that main threats to its
security came from such states (in the form of mass poverty and migration,
terrorism and AIDS). The US no longer saw it in its interest to ignore internal
chaos in even the farthest countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because it
was clear from the twin tower attacks that what was going on within the country of Afghanistan could
severely affect what would be going on in the United States.
Nation building then became coterminous with various disciplines such as “peace
building” “post conflict reconstruction” “democratisation”, “good governance”; i.e.
post conflict military intervention by the international community to aid in
the “remedying” of these “failed” states. The logic behind this is the belief
that “good” states would not readily
make wars, preserving international harmony.
Carolyn Stephenson states that “The latest conceptualization is
essentially that nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or
unstable or failed states or economies are given assistance in the development
of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms,
as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability”. Nation
building today has therefore merged the concept of “state” (ie governmental and economic apparatus) building into its
definition. Another example is the definition by Schmidth whom describes nation
building as “restoration of law and order
in the absence of government authority, the reconstruction of infrastructure
and security forces, and the facilitation of the transfer of power from the
interim authority to an indigenous government.”
Regardless of this merging of two distinct concepts, it is fair to say that the
creation of a strong, peaceful and unified nation (in its holistic sense)
cannot be attained where key state institutions (political, economic and
social) are non-existent, or are corrupt.
The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama describes nation
building as a three stage process in his book titled “State-building:
Governance and World Order in the 21st Century”. Firstly, the international community invading a failed state
after conflict must embark on ‘post conflict reconstruction’ missions to try
and immediately restore stability and security, and fulfils the basic needs of
the population. Secondly, the international community must commit to aiding the
host state to develop self-sustaining state institutions which are capable of
provision of long-term security and stability and lastly, the weak state must
be strengthened.
What is interesting in contemporary descriptions of ‘nation building’ is that the ethnicity
factor is too frequently disregarded completely. .
State and nation building- whatever we take these to mean- are highly complex
and time consuming activities, but arguably a new layer of complexity is added
in those states which see a high level of ethnic heterogeneity as often
internal conflicts have exacerbated ethnic consciousness and created heightened
levels of animosity between the various ethnic groups.
Chapter 2
Nation Building in
Afghan History- Modernity to Taliban:
I) Afghanistan and its Ethnic
Composition
Some Afghan and foreign historians believe that
the modern state of “Afghanistan” came to existence in 1747 when the Ahmad shah
Durrani established his Kingdom in Kandahar, but in reality it is when Ahmad Shah
was the King and later the Emperor of Khorasan. In fact the modern Afghanistan
with today’s boundaries took shape in 1893 when Amir Abul Rahman Khan signed
the treaty with British India. When Elphinstone, a prominent British diplomat and
historian, met the King of Kabul (Shah Shuja 1819) he wrote that “ they have
no name for their own country; but apply the Persian name of Afghanistan…the
name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is Khorasan…”[31] the
name of Khorasan changed to Afghanistan during the rule of Amir Abul Rahman
(1880- 1901)[32]
Afghanistan, a country which
today holds a population of approximately 27-31 million,
has a highly ethnically heterogeneous
composition, as dozens different ethnic groups co-exist in this country. Since
none of these groups represent a majority of the total population,
Afghanistan is in essence the land of the minorities.
The various groups within this region now called Afghanistan lived
together in harmony for hundreds of years prior to the creation of the state,
showing major sense of oneness when gathering in the fight against invaders.
Perhaps we can say that the lack of sufficient contact between the ethnic
groups which warranted their peaceful co-existence
as distinct small nations. From the 20th century onwards with
increased state and nation building efforts by various rulers, tension and
cleavages between the different cultural groups intensified and reached its
peak right after the civil war between Mujahidin factions. Before we turn to a
historical overview of Afghanistan and the efforts which took place to
assimilate the “Afghans” into one nation and state, I wish to give a brief
overview of the four largest ethnic groups which have predominantly shaped
(modern) Afghanistan’s state of affairs; namely, the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, and
Hazaras and Uzbeks.
Due to the absence of an official census in Afghanistan for
decades, it is difficult to provide exact figures of the ethnic composition of
the country. Nevertheless, various estimations have been put forward by
different organisations in recent years. One of the most recent ones is that by
the CIA World Fact Book (2013), which provides that the Pashtun comprise
42% of the total population, making it the largest ethnic group within
Afghanistan.
They live mostly in the Southern and Eastern parts of Afghanistan, and there
are various differing theories with regards to the Pashtun’s ethnic origins as
some believe these people are of Jewish origin, while others believe they have
Arian ancestry. Whatever their origin, the Pashtun are “one of the largest tribal societies in the world”.
They are also highly complex in structure, starting with the two chief tribes
of Ghizali and Durrani, which then sub-divide into dozens of sub-tribes.
From its inception as a state during the Durrani era, Afghanistan has been
predominantly led by Pashtun powers. This fact has given the Pashtun a sense
that exclusive rights to govern Afghanistan lies with them, and the resulting
sense of self-entitlement and superiority and this has reflected in the manner
in which nation and state building has been carried out. The
majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan. The Pashtun speak their own language of Pashtu, they have their own way of life based on strict
moral and legal codes of Pashtunwali.
The second largest ethnic group within Afghanistan consists of the Tajiks
whom represent about 27% of the total population. They live mainly in the
northern, north eastern, Kabul and surrounding provinces and western parts of
Afghanistan, and the majority of them lives in the neighbouring countries of
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Tajiks have no tribal structure like the
Pashtuns. They speak the Farsi language (which is one of the two the official
national language and spoken by the majority, nearly 75% of the population) and
are much less conservative than the Pashtuns in their way of life. The Tajiks
have been the main rivals of the Pashtun in the quest for power in Afghan
politics for over two centuries long,.
To many historians’ beliefs, the Tajiks are the aboriginal peoples of
Afghanistan.
The Hazara and Uzbek are the third and fourth largest
ethnic groups of Afghanistan, comprising of11 and 9% of the total population
each. Although having played lesser of a role in Afghan politics in the past,
Hazara, having been subjected to great unspeakable levels of discrimination,
oppression and violence in Afghan history. Mostly Hazaras are Shiite Muslims.
Some have argued the Hazara to be of Mongolian descent
although this is subject to much controversy. The Uzbeks have Turkic origin,
and like the Hazara, their level of participation in Afghan politics has been
highly limited. Other ethnic groups include Aimak (4%), Turkman (3%), Balcho
(2%) and dozens of other groups totalling to 4% of the total population.
II) Attempts to Build a “ Nation–State”
To provide an outline of the major developments in relation to
nation and state building in Afghan history, we must aim to define what the
main phases of major developments are. They can be defined loosely as: 1) from
the reign of King Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 until People Democratic Party
takeover in 1978, 2) the mujahideen
insurgency that followed until 1992 3) the Rabanni Government from 1992 until 1996, and 4) and the Taliban
era from 1996 to 2001.
Starting from 1747 when the Durrani monarchy came to existence, the
Afghan state from its inception saw a clear Pashtun majority, creating a sense
of exclusive entitlement to the political sphere when they became the real
rulers, it paved way for this ethnic group to hold control of Afghan national
policy and shape the national identity for centuries to come. Many agree that
the first serious internal attempts to build a modern Afghan nation was by King
Amir Abdur Rahman
when he started his reign in 1880. This king was dubbed “Iron Amir”, for he had a strong determination to radically shift
Afghanistan from tribalism and feudalism towards a centralised political system
in his quest for nation building.
He saw political unification as being an important step towards a stronger and
more unified Afghanistan. In his own words ; his job was one of setting “in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and
cut throats…..This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and
substituting one grand community under one law and one rule”.
Having had to deal with a society that was left
devastated and in chaos due to numerous previous conflicts and foreign
interferences, he took some serious politically repressive measures to reach
his goals. Being of Pashtun origin, he knew that he would see great resistance
from his own people, but Amir largely won Pashtun hearts by making persuasive religious arguments and giving these
people substantive rights and privileges over the other ethnic groups.
For example, he authorised (or rather ordered)
a large number of Pashtun nomads from the South of the country to invade
areas of other ethnic minority groups (particularly that of the Hazara, Tajik
and Uzbeks ) and settle, turning regions
that were before a threat to his power into effective instruments to legitimise
and strengthen his power in these areas. Any ethnic group which proved
resistant, Amir would readily conduct ethnic cleansing campaigns against or
alternatively punish them in untold ways and political opponents were also banished
without much thought.
There are some whom conclude that Amir’s policies in the social,
political, administrative and economic arena were successful in the sense that
he more or less succeeded to at least politically bring Afghanistan to greater
unification. Dr Bashir Shakhawarz for example provides that “While Amir Abdur Rahman Khan
had very little time to modernise Afghanistan and pay attention to education,
nevertheless his success in uniting Afghanistan, defeating the warlords,
creating a standing army and establishing an administration system to rule the
country directly contributed to the ambition of his successors”. Others, however,
paint a different picture. Gregorian’s view is that Amir failed in his goals,
an important factor being “the
overwhelming number of divisive forces within Afghanistan itself- the ethnic
differences, the religious animosity between Shia and Sunni Muslims, the tribal
jealousies, the feudal obligations and prerogatives, the conflict of regional
interests and traditional values” and “the
lack of resources, both material and human, that a successful and sudden leap
into modernity required” .
Although he was advised by his followers
of the importance of modernism for Afghan nationalism, but his
scepticism of the introduction of modern communication and transportation
systems which were suggested by the Western world at the time saw him reject
any such possible offers.
Given that we have observed above the school of Deutsch which links increased
modernity and national assimilation, under this theory we could conclude
(although with caution) that the King deprived Afghanistan from a golden chance
to greater cultural assimilation and political unity. Also, in my view his
attempt to create a nationhood was too exclusory for it to be a genuine project
as it solely reflected the Pashtun culture.
Amir not only failed in his single biggest mission of uniting the
country, but in fact forever set a negative tone in Afghanistan history. It was
now when ethnic consciousness had heightened to precarious levels. Whilst
previously the population of this area showed great teamwork and unity in
rising up against major British and other powers, now one’s ethnicity became
either their reason for death and persecution, or for rights and privileges.
After King Amir Abdur Rahman descended from his throne in 1901, he
was replaced by his son Habibullah (1901-1919) and thereafter Habibullah’s son
Amanullah took reign (1919-1929). Both
kings proved to be a less authoritarian and more tolerating and humane leader
than their father and had a common aim of instilling “a sense of loyalty and
identification”
into the country.
After Amanullah Khan finally declared independence from British
influence in 1919, this was finally the right time to really seriously start
thinking about “nation” and “state”
building. Although the mission of establishing an “Afghan Nationalism” was
put into further. King Amanullah took drastic steps toward modernising the
country, abolishes slivery, Approved constitution, made a reform in education
system and give the right for female to attended official schools, made a
modern government and introduced Afghanistan as an independent state in the
rank of world nations. But because of his unbalanced foreign policies and
opposition of religious and reactionary forces to his untimely and to some
extent unreasonable reforms was failed, in fact “it was the rise of nationalism that tragically led to its fall.”it was the golden time for Afghanistan to
build a nation, but ended with tragedy.
In 1929 after a brief 10 month reign by the only Tajik king in Afghanistan
(Amir Habib-Allah Kalakani), Nader Shah ascended to the throne until 1933. He
took some steps towards state building, by improving roads, communication
methods, initiating a banking system and building a national army of 40,000 man
from scratch. However, again backed by the Brits in terms of money, arms and
political support, he “plunged the
country back into a dark abyss of tribalism, racism, and regionalism, and again
abused Islam in order to bolster the “legitimacy” and continuity of their
kinship and sovereignty over a subject population”.
Afghanistan was back to being a highly diversified entity. After Nader Shah was
assassinated in 1933, the last monarch was his son Zahir Shah who reigned for
forty years. This was largely the most stable and peaceful period Afghanistan
had witnessed and the king received the title “father of the nation”.(which
was not really deserved) He furthered the economic, communication and
transportation initiatives of the previous king. He had a clear aim of unifying
Afghanistan as a whole, which was evidential from his decision to adopt a new
constitution in 1964, relatively freedom of press and demanded greater equality
between genders and ethnic groups. The rights of women in particular, were
increased to unseen before levels in political, educational and professional
sphere. Primary school availability was increased to an extent that over 50% of
children under 12 attended school, and secondary and higher educational
institutions were also improved a lot.
In 1973, Daoud Khan remove the King from his throne in a coup d’état,
transforming the country into the Republic
of Afghanistan,
with himself as the president.
The pro soviet regime instilled in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards to
1989, was an attempt
at instilling soviet-style nationality policies into the Afghan politics. Although from 1979 to 1989 there were more
progress in education, health, Women's rights , agriculture and economy and
reinforcement of Afghanistan armed forces but as far as the pro soviet regime lacked the traditional legitimacy which were
Islam and nationalism soon faced with the resistance of Afghans and international opposition and finally
collapsed and failed its attempt to
make Soviet style of state- nation.
Once the Soviets were out of the country, the
various resistance groups no longer had a common overarching goal and soon
started fighting each other in their quest for control of the Kabul government.
Although the Tajik Mujahideen group led by Ahmad Shah Massoud managed to hold control of the Kabul and some parts of Afghanistan
with Rabanni as head of state from 1992 to 1996, the various factions were
continuously fighting among each other. The desire for “nation” or “state”
building was now lost not only because of the extensive damage caused to the
various state apparatus by the war (not to mention the exhaustion and fatigued
people who were preoccupied with grief and pain), but also because the various
non-pashtun groups especially were all extremely eager to obtain political
control of Kabul for the first time now and were ready to fight each other with
gun and sword. It was finally their chance to push forward their particular identity as the “national” identity of
Afghanistan. Ethnicity was now a “prime
factor in a political actor’s claim to legitimacy”.
The rise of the Taliban in 1996 was a reaction to
the continuous conflict in Kabul between the factions and the total chaos in
the rest of the country. The Taliban were aiming to speedily reunify the
country by establishing a centralised “Islamic” state of Afghanistan. Amin
Saikal says that the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in 1996 “clearly changed the conflict into an ethnic
power struggle of Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns”
because although the Taliban
initially were reluctant to admit their ethnic composition (arguing that Islam
was their main element of unification), it soon became clear that their
composition was predominantly that of Pashtun. Initially Afghans were receptive
to the Taliban, as over 99% of the people practice the Islamic religion.
However, the Afghan populace once more failed to relate to the version of an
Afghan “identity” that the Taliban
had tried to impose on the people, as it was based on an extremist interpretation of the Qur’an, denying women from a right
to education and education, for example.The Taliban were driven out of force in
2001 when the United States instigated “war against terror” in Afghanistan
following the 9 11 attacks by the Al Qaeda. Although the primary aim of the US
and its forces were merely military, it became clear that post conflict
reconstruction was necessary for this country. We will look at nation building
post-9 11 in the next part of this paper.
Chapter 3
Nation-State Building in Afghanistan: Post-
Taliban
As we have mentioned, to Max Weber a state is a “human
community that ( successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory.”[59] from here one can see that a state is on
institution that keeps law and order by the use of force. State Building means
establishing new governmental institutions or improving those already existed.
In the past it was considered the responsibility of every individual nation to
build up their own states and set up its institutions; but in the contemporary
world the existence of numerous ‘failed’, fragile and weak state are
recognised as a source of instability, civil wars, epidemic diseases, mass-killings,
genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, which endanger the international
security. For these reasons state building changed from a domestic to
international issue.
In considering
genocides in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia Kofi Annan the
general secretary of the UN asked all the member nations in his Report (2000); “If
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic
violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”[60]
By passing the resolution on ‘humanitarian
intervention’ and ‘ responsibility to protect’ the very corner stone
of international relations which was the principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other country was changed. “the principle of
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” .[61] According to Fukuyama in the case of
countries like Somalia and Afghanistan speaking of State Sovereignty is like a
“bad joke”. So, under such circumstances, “outside powers, acting in
the name of human rights and democratic legitimacy, had not just the right but
the obligation to intervene”[62].
Afghanistan never had a true ‘modern state’.
Practically it was always like a confederation of tribes, regardless of the
many state or nation building efforts that took place in history as we have
seen. The governments had never control over the whole country except Kabul and
some big cities.
In 2001 the Afghanistan was “Stateless” in
reality it “ was hijacked by a
non-state actors, the terrorist organization, Al-Qaida and served as a base of
global terrorist operation”.[63]
It was right under the pretext of Humanitarian intervention that the United
States and allies invaded the Afghanistan and rolled out the Taliban’s barbaric
regime. In case of Afghanistan it is not the improving or repairing of governmental
institutions; it is rebuilding from “zero ground” because during three
decades of civil war and warlord ism, all
basements of a state were ruined to the ground. The international community
took the responsibility to set up or bring about the four components of
state-building: coercion or Armed Forces, capital or Economic Aids,
legitimacy by setting up governmental
organs and legal institutions and finally make leadership for Afghanistan.
In this chapter, we shall discus about these four
essential element of state building in Afghanistan. But first we should make
clear that what was the reasons for
intervention and how it went on?
The Reason for Intervention in Afghanistan
The horrific terrorist
attack of September 2001 not just changed the destiny of Afghanistan but
brought a new era in an international relations and world politics. The
Al-Qaida and its leader Bin Laden whom was hosted by Taliban regime in
Afghanistan were blamed for this barbaric act.
Soon after 9/11 Gorge W.
Bush the president of the United states declared ‘war on terror’ and strongly
stated that “every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with terrorists”[64].
It was for the first time that Afghanistan after a decade came back to the
attention of the international community and media. After soviet withdrawal and
seizing of power by the Mujahidin, in contradiction to the suffering of Afghans
from factional war by mujahidin groups and atrocities, mass-killings and ethnic
cleansing by Taliban, the country was practically forgotten by democratic world
specially the US. But when the Taliban denied to surrender Bin Laden and other
Al-Qaida leaders, the united states made Afghanistan as the first battle ground
in ‘war on terror’.[65] British Prime Minister
Tony Blair went further, on 16 September 2001 and said: “the fact is that we
are at war with terrorism … it is a war, if you like, between the civilised
world and fanaticism”[66]. The UN
and its Security Council showed its support in war against terror. in fact it
was for the first time in the history that the whole world were supporting the
invasion of a super power to a small independent country.
The Major combat in
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001.[67] United States not just enjoyed the support of
anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan ( Northern Alliance) but the support of the
absolute majority of Afghan people.
A) Coercion
i) Military
campaign and Military Build- up:
On the 20thDecember
the UN Security Council passed the resolution No. 1386 which stationed
International Security Assistance Forces( ISAF) in Afghanistan. Their mission
was like peace keeping forces to secure stability in Kabul city and surrounding
areas and help the Afghan Interim Authority to function normally. In 2002 their
number was about 3,000 and mostly from NATO and EU member countries but
gradually, their numbers rose up to
100,000 in 2010. [68]
See
map no.1 from BBC news
Map No.1
According to Katzman, in 2010 there were
About 145.000 foreign troops in Afghanistan of which about 104,000 were U.S.
and 41,000 non-U.S. partner forces (this included 2,830 from Canada, 3,750
French, 4,665 Germans, 3,300 Italians and 9,500 British forces and the rest
from more than 40 NATO and non NATO allied countries. [69]
ii) The inability to
form a central stable army
Historical
experience shows that “coercion” is one of the essential component on
any state building effort. Each country or nation needs effective Armed Forces
to defend its national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Armies
without having to consider the political systems of their country always have a
decisive role in the defense of their territory. The tragic fall of the only
modernist king of Afghanistan
King Amanullah was partly a failure of legitimacy and empty
treasury, but partly due to not having sufficient coercive force to ‘compensate
for his flagging authority when his enemies mobilized in the name of Islam.
Having military power or coercive force was essential for him to put his
modernist project in practice, but the Afghan young king had ignored the advice
of Kemal Ataturk that during their first meeting : ‘first, build an army’.[71]
There are many debates about the
capability of the Afghan army to defend
the "sovereignty" and ‘territorial integrity’ of the country.
In this section
we will briefly review the history of afghan army and discuss the following:
the Afghan army's role in the country's political independence and territorial
integrity, the Afghan army's role in the coups and regime changes. Afghanistan's geo-political
situation and its economic ability and
the necessity of having a strong military, or vice versa. And finally, Is
Afghanistan able to build a strong army at present situation?
The first cores
of Afghan armed forces were built by Amir Sher Ali khan in 1860s, but the first organized army of Afghanistan (in
the modern sense) was established after the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1880
when the country was ruled by Emir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901).[72]
The modern Afghan national army was
practically established after the 3rd Afghan-Anglo war during king
Amanullah Khan in 1919 when Afghanistan received its full independence from
Great Britain. During the time of king Zahir Shah and president Daoud khan, the
ties between the Afghan army and Soviet Red army became much more closer. When
Daoud khan (1953-1963) served as prime minister (in considering his Pashunistan policy and rivalry with
Pakistan), he hardly tried to enhance the capability of Afghanistan army.
During this time, the Afghan army of 44,000 with antique weapons in hand in
1956 grown up to 100,00 strong army in 1978, will equipped with modern Soviet
weaponry.[73]
When Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Afghanistan had strong Air
forces with over 400 military aircraft, including over 200 Soviet-made fighter
jets, Suu-22 Attack planes and bullet-perforated Mi-6 heavy lift helicopters.[74]
With the fall of Dr. Najibullan and the
consequent seizing of power by Mujahidin, the 250,000 men strong army of
Afghanistan which had been built in 100 years was disintegrated and this was
largely the result of Mujahidin rivalry and their foreign supporter’s plans to
make this happen.[75]
Most Afghan politicians and military experts believe that there was the hand of
Pakistan in the dissolution of the Afghan
National Army.
The Afghan Army never encountered its foreign aggressors
effectively. During the three Anglo-Afghan wars, Afghanistan did not have a
regular strong Army and it was not the army units but the People's Volunteer
militias that resisted against the British Army. During soviet invasion
(1979-1989), the Afghan Army welcomed soviet forces and again, it was the
people of Afghanistan that stood against aggression and defended their
homeland. All Afghan regimes instead used the Army for suppressing people’s
uprisings. The only achievement of the Afghan National Army is the imposing of
two military coups in 1973 and 1978, which saw Afghanistan lose its relative
stability, introducing in a new era of instability, conflicts, foreign
aggressions and internal civil wars. [76]
As we mentioned above, the
responsibility of any army is to safeguard the official borders and to defend
the homeland against foreign aggression and is the job of the national police
forces to keep order inside the country. Now let’s see; from where are the possible
threats of invasions coming? Normally from our neighbouring countries like
Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Russia and its allies in central Asia; of course
the current invasion led by US and NATO is very exceptional and to some extent
it is not threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. If
we count the newly emerged Central Asia
independent countries as sphere of the influence of Russian, in this case our four neighbouring countries,
China, India, Pakistan and Russia are nuclear
powers, and Iran is also in the way to become a nuclear power.
Both in terms of size and population, Afghanistan is the smallest and
poorest country in the region (of US$964 annual GDP per capita.[77]
Can we say that it can build an Army strong enough to defend its homeland in case of possible aggression by the strong armies of
its neighbouring countries? I strongly believe that it is impossible.
Table 1: Sizes of Other Military Forces
SOURCE: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.NOTE: The figure for Afghanistan is an
estimate. To date, there are no reliable
estimates of Afghan population. This
table clearly show that Afghanistan cannot make a strong Army Equivalent to its powerful neighbors.
iii) Rebuilding the
Afghan National Army with foreign Aids:
When in 2001 US
troops invaded Afghanistan and swiftly removed the Taliban with the help of Northern
Alliance militias and heavy aerial bombardments, they may have mistakenly
thought that reconstruction and state building projects to keep Afghanistan
together was just as easy. With this in mind, it was clear that the Americans
didn’t have any serious plans to rebuild the Afghan Army at least to its
original shape and size. The US was concentrating more in rebuilding the Afghan
national police and security forces, but with the passing of time and the
obvious returning of the Taliban and other insurgency groups, the US changed
the policy and gradually attempted to rebuild the Afghan National Army. According
to Katzman, the Afghan national army has been “built from the scratch” as its today’s form is not
a direct continuation or enhanced version of the national army that existed
from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That army disintegrated entirely during
the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the1996-2001 Taliban period.[78]
The total force of ANA in 2005 was only 22,000 men strong and by 2008 the
Afghan army reached 88,000. By 2010, the goal was further lifted to 122,000 and
by October 2011 reached 171,600. [79]
The Afghan Air Force which existed from previous Afghan regimes was virtually eliminated in the
2001-2002 during U.S. combat against the
Taliban. It is now has about over 3,000 personnel, including 400 pilots,
as well as a total of about 46 aircraft.[80]
Gradually the Armed forces of Afghanistan were expanded from 22,000
to 300,000 which consist of 171,000 ANA and 134,000 Afghan National
Police forces.
Table 2 shows the rapid expansion of the
Afghan Army
At present time, the US and
EU are paying afghan military expanses including the salaries, training and equipment. The
question arising here is for how long will they pay these expenses? And
secondly with this dependency whom will
serve this army? And can such an Army be regarded as a National army? In
addition it would create deep imbalances in relations between the military and
civilian authorities, having in mind the weakness of civil institutions in
Afghanistan and the experiences from the
past two military coups and the fact
that “few of Afghanistan’s armies have successfully monopolized the
legitimate use of force.”[81]The
new Afghan Army will be a power broker. Another problem is keeping the unity of
army in a very ethnically fragmented
country. Right now the Afghan Army divided in ethnic lines and Jehadi
groups and obviously far from a unified
national character; if in future the Taliban reconcile, their forces should
also join the Army , in such case who
and how can guarantee the unity of Afghan Army? With high probability, after
the withdrawal of international forces the Army factions will fight each other
and not just disintegrate the army but
the country.[82]
Considering the above mentioned facts, I argue that in contrary to the
theoretical aspects and also other nations’ experiences in “nation- state
building” projects, in Afghanistan creating strong army in the way that it
has been done is not helping the process of ‘nation building’ nor ‘state building.’ In short, I think we
cannot build a strong national army and do not have the ability to financing
and equipping such on army independently . What we need is a strong
national police and Border forces to
provide internal security and prevent drug trafficking and border violations . Spending
the annual 4 to 5 billion dollars instead to, agriculture, education, health
and other civic institutions will surely speed up the process of ‘nation- state
building’ in Afghanistan.
iv) Building
Institutions:
The Bon conference ( on December
5, 2001) was called immediately after the fall of the Taliban by UN which was
represented by Lakhdar Brahimi to bring Afghani factions together and make a so
called ‘broad based, transitional Authority’. the Bon Agreement was
signed by December 5 2001. It was the first and very essential step by the international
community and Afghani factions toward rebuilding a state. The talks were mainly
between United Front (Northern Alliance ) And Afghans living outside the
country, mainly represented by the Rome Group which were the latest King’s
loyalists. Another two small groups were there in the name of Peshawar and
Cyprus Group, which to some extent were under the influence of Pakistan and Iran. During the Taliban rule
there were just two main forces which were fighting each other: the Taliban and
Northern Alliance. Some analysts believe that it was a mistake to exclude ”moderate Taliban” from the Bon process.
The bon Conference was due to appoint the head of Interim Afghan Authority and draw a road map for transition and state
building. The talks were sponsored by UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi , but
in fact the stronger side was the USA delegation headed by James Dobbins and Zalmai Khalilzad. During
the talks, the representative of the United Front ruled itself out from leadership,
and the majority of delegates voted for
Abdul Satar Sirat, whom was representing the former king Zahir Shah. Lakhdar
Brahimi , Kalilzad and Qaanoni ( the head of Northern Alliance negotiating
team) opposed that proposal, just because Mr Sirat was not Pashtun but from the
Uzbek ethnic group.[83] Then
Hamid Karzai who was Pashtun by ethnicity and had closer ties with Khalilzad
and the United States security circles, was elected as the head of Interim
Afghan Authority With three votes against eleven for. This decision was not
just undemocratic but also in contrary with
the United Nations Security Council Agreement over Afghanistan which among
others says: it’s “the right of
the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in
accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social
justice”.[84] The Bon accord established
the so called ‘broad based’ interim government and by the first January 2002
Karzai took the office in Kabul. According with provisions of the Bon Accord in
June 2002, an Emergency Loya Jirga ( Grand
Assembly) was held and the Transitional administration was chosen with Karzai
again as head . The Transitional Administration
was due to prepare the draft Constitution and call for another Loya
Jirga to ratify the Constitution. The Constitutional
Loya Jirga met in December 2003-January 2004 and ratified the new Constitution.
Elections: In October
2004 after four months delay, the Presidential
Election happened; people went to
ballot polls to elect their president freely and fairly, and again
Karzai came out as first supposedly Democratically and fairly Elected
president. The Parliamentary Elections were postponed until September 2005.[85](see Fig.1 below) Unfortunately
both presidential and parliamentary
election were very far from democratic and fair. In both parliamentary elections,
just a small portion of parliament members were chosen by free will of the people, mostly were
selected by fraud and force. Some of them
are either belong to drug trafficking mafia or Taliban or other insurgent
groups. The presidential elections were much more worse. In 2004 Karzai was elected
directly by US rather than Afghans. Election
of 2009 was full of fraud and irregularity in favour of Karzai. Karzai won
54.62% (1.5 million fraud votes) and the final results 49.67% for Karzai and 30.59 % for Abdullah
(his rival). It was due to go to the second round of voting, But Abdullah
announced that he “will not participate” in the runoff election because despite
of his complaints and demands regarding changing the head of the Election Committee, Karzai denied to bring
any change in the Election Committee, so he was forced to withdraw from the
election runoff.[86] So, legally the second term
of President Karzai seems to be unlawful and illegitimate.
Fig1: Bon Process
In this section of this paper I would like to
concentrate more about Constitution because it is the main pillar in nation-
State building. An
Afghan prominent scholar Prf. Dr M .Nazif
Shahrani from Indiana University, USA called this election SHAME
rather than Democracy[87]
Is this constitution helping
Afghan people to create a solid nation and state or does it in fact hinder this
process?
Afghanistan’s Constitution: (Is it Suitable bas for
Nation- State Building ?)
The constitution is a
National Convention and not a petition to legitimize a leadership, but in the
case Afghanistan’s new constitution, it seems that it serves the Karzai’s team
rather State-Nation building . It was
not the first time that Afghans through a Loya Jirga ratified a constitution. Afghanistan already had five
constitutions from King Amanullah up to
doctor Najibullah’s time (1923, 1931, 1964, 1977, and 1987)[88]
According to the Bon
Accord the “Constitutional Loya Jirga(CLJ) shall be convened within eighteen
months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a
new constitution for Afghanistan”. From December 13 ,2003 to January 2004, the
CLJ with more than 500 delegates met in Kabul; the Jirga was chaired by
Sibghatullah Mojadedd who later became the chairman of the Mushrano Jirga or the upper house of the
National Assembly.[89]
During the CLJ several
controversial issues were raised, like the role of Islam, the status of the
languages, type of political system
(should it be a Unitary centralized system or decentralized , semi federal or
federal system), form of the government (should it be presidential,
parliamentary or a mix of both with the post of prime minister). The debates
quickly took an ethnic character. The Pashtuns delegations as always were
strongly supporting Unitary centralized state and presidential system of
government while Tajiks ,Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minority groups demanded a
decentralized system of power and parliamentary governing system.[90]
Barnett Rubin’s
assessment is very accurate and reasonable as he says that the “debate
over these issues reflected historical realities as well as current dilemmas.” He
goes further and says “even today the ethnic
question in its plainest form asks whether the state is to be the instrument of
a mostly Pashtun elite, or a mechanism through which all citizens may equally
take part in self-government”[91]
Despite
the dissatisfaction of non-Pashtun
representatives, they were more or less forced by US envoy Zalmai khalizad to accept the
draft which already was designed by Pashtun ethno-centrist group. The
interesting thing is the fact that during last hundred years of Afghan history,
we never had such strong centralized and mono-ethnic oriented
government. During the monarchy and until the fall of Najibullah government there was
always the post of prime minister and the prime minister received a confidential
vote from the parliament. This constitution is a copy of 1946 constitution
during King Zahir shah just with this difference; the right and responsibilities
of both the King and prime minister were transferred to one person, ‘the
President’. Based on this constitution the president is similar
to “Emperor “ rather than a representative of the people.[92]
Afghan people experienced
decades of war and conflict, jihad and resistance, so now they have a higher political awareness then any time in
the past. In a country which is dispersed badly by religion, tribes, languages,
ethnics and region, it is difficult rule it with the old system. The supporter
of centralised presidential system argument is also the same: to bring peace
and stability to the war-torn country and build a strong state we need strong
presidential government with unitary system, but they forget that if this
system was working, it would have worked up to now. In addition they forget the
simple fact that all our today’s problems come from our wrong system of
governance in the past. Indeed, “the painful lesson of Afghanistan’s history
has been that strong centralized government in any form will only lead to
hegemony by one group, whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious, and abuse by
the ruling group at the expense of justice for all citizens ”.[93]Even
during the Soviet instilled regime, Afghanistan had been administrated in a semi-decentralized
system; beside the central organs and
governors in the provinces there were the Zones Directorates.
In short according in the
words of one scholar what the constitutional loya Jirga produced was “not a
constitution for all time, but a constitution for Karzai”.[94]
B) Legitimacy:
Traditionally in the
whole history of Afghanistan, Islam and nationalism were the source of
legitimacy for all Afghan governments except during so called “communist”
regime and soviet occupation. The post-Taliban government were careful to
recognize the centrality of Islam. The renamed Afghanistan as “Islamic state”
and introduced Islamic Sharia in the Afghan legal system and constitution, but
still “the relation between Karzai government, its foreign supporters and
Afghan religious authorities
remained complicated and at times strained”.[95] While Taliban and other
insurgent groups fighting against Karzai government, US and international
forces first of all with the slogan of “Defending Islam” so it seems difficult for
Karzai’s regime to enjoy from Islamic legitimacy. Obviously in presence of
hundred thousand of foreign troops and total dependency in foreign capital
Afghan regime cannot invoke nationalism as a legitimizing ideology. Rubin
believes that the intervention “enjoyed international legitimacy”
because all nations including UN and international organizations supported this and enjoyed substantial
support inside Afghanistan, “where Afghans saw it less as destroying
sovereignty than as potentially restoring it after years of interference by
neighbouring countries”. [96]
Other sources of
legitimacy are building state and legal institutions, fair and democratic
elections, keeping law and order, good governance, mobilising of economic and financial
resources and particularly “the
struggle over the budget, which is at the centre of the process of state
formation and legitimation”,[97] and fair and proportionate
presence of the representatives of ethnics and region in the local and
central institutions (judicial,
executive and legislative). In a country like Afghanistan with its ethnic
diversity and problems, this is very important. Otherwise “without regional
and ethnic balance, legitimacy would be
non-existent and elections are useless”.[98]
Fukuyama believes that “while there have historically been many forms of
legitimacy, in today’s world the only serious source of legitimacy is
democracy.”[99]
From the above analysis
we can see that Afghanistan state enjoys “dual legitimacy”, it is internationally recognized
as a sovereign state and its government is legitimate internationally; the
presence of international forces are under the permission UN Security Council
and confirmation the General Assembly, so their presence will not endanger the
Legitimacy of the Afghan present
government. Generally the legitimacy of the present Afghan government lies in
Bon Conference, Loya Jirgas, constitution, presidential and parliamentary
elections and establishment of central and local organs of power.
From the other side, corruption, bad governance, weakness of judiciary and law
enforcement organs,
instability, presence of insurgencies and their fight in the name of Islam and
Afghan Nationalism reduces the
Afghanistan’s government legitimacy considerably.
C) Capital (The economic Dimension State Building post-Taliban Era)
A
strong economy is the most important component in the process of Nation-State
building which Afghanistan does not benefit from. Afghanistan is among five of
the poorest countries in the world with lowest income per capita. The majority
of Afghans are living under the poverty
line, just 23% of the people have access to safe drinking water, 12% to
snatation,6% to electricity. The child mortality rate is 115 per 1,000 which is
the highest rate in the world and highest maternal mortality in the world as
well and 71% illiteracy rate.[100]Afghanistan
has never been self-sufficient economically, but always been as a ‘Rentier
state’. Rentier state refers to those countries where their income relies heavily
on foreign aids or exporting natural resources instead of internal production,
revenues, export and services. Rentier states have the following weakness: “First,
they inhibit democratic accountability; Secondly, they are unlikely to develop
effective administration; thirdly, they are vulnerable to external shocks over
which they have little or no control”.[101]
The table below shows that the economy of Afghanistan has always relied in
foreign aids or debts.
Note: For 2004-05, converted from $US at rate of
1:48. The additional ‘external budget’ controlled by the donors was established
in 2004.[102]
From
this table we can see that in President Daoud’s time ( 1973-77) the domestic
revenues was just over 60 per cent of the total state budget, from 1978 to 1982
or soviet invasion it was between 50 to 70% by comparison three years after
American invasion it is 31% of the national budget.
In
first years of intervention, the international aids were modest: $1.5 billion
in ( 2002-2003),and $2.5 billion in (2003-2004) but later it had been doubled and
by mid-decade, reached $5 billion per year. from 2002 to 2009 international
community delivered Aid package of $46.1billion to Afghanistan.[103]According
to CIA fact book international community pledged over $67 billion during nine
donors' conferences between 2003-10. In Tokyo conference of July 2012, $16
billion civilian conditional aid was pledged, which quid pro quo the
Afghanistan Government to combat against “corruption weak governance, low
revenue collection, unemployment, poor public infrastructure and poppy trade
and cultivation”.[104]
Based on IMF and world Bank reports, Afghanistan GDP shows slow
but steady growth. It was $5.1 billion in 2006/07 and increased to $19.6 in
2012/13. The GDP per capita also shows a growth from $528 in 2010 to $612 in
2012.[105]
Afghanistan export shows the Figure of$ 376 million, instead the import valued
$ 6.39 billion.[106] If we
do not consider the illegal trade and narcotics however, just five percent of
Afghan GDP is from domestic product and revenues; the rest comes from foreign
aids. The interesting thing is the Afghan government is not able to pay the
salary of its officials. By 2010 donors paid the monthly salary of6,600 Afghan
officials in different ministries(it does not include security and Armed
forces) round $45 million a year.[107]Not
just the officials in the different
ministries, but the president Karzai office and himself receiving money the
from the donors but from intelligent circles of different countries Including Iran, CIA and
MI6. Karzai acknowledged during interviews that he received and still receiving
money from Iranian intelligent circles
and CIA. [108]
Afghan Government complains that, nearly 70%
of aids were spent through NGOs and International Organizations which are not
accountable to Afghan authorities. Although Afghan government is weak and
corrupt but still these generous
international Aids hade brought enormous change in Afghans life specially in
health, Education, Media, Communication etc.
Health: In 2001 only 8% of Afghanistan people had access to
health services, now it is round 80%. Vaccination for children under five year age reached about
77%. More than 4000 medical centers were set up newly and the rate of child and
maternal mortality fall down dramatically. (see table 1)
Education: in 2001 about 1.2 million children attended schools,
and girls were near completely out of
school, now more than 7 million children go to school, which round 50% of them
are girls. Hundreds of schools built or re constructed, 45,000 teachers have
been trained and more than 20 state and private universities been reactivated
or newly established.[109](see
table 2)
Communication and press: after 2001 there is a very rapid growth in
media and communication in Afghanistan. Prior to 2001 there was just
Afghanistan radio television and a few governmental newspapers but now
there are more the 76 radio and TV
channels and more than hundreds magazines and new papers countrywide. At
present time 85% of country is covered
by mobile telephone networks like: MTN, Roshan, Afghan Wireless and
Etisalat companies.[110]
Tab
1 and 2, from: BBC news, Life in Afghanistan
Besides
these achievements there are some progress in transportation, roads
reconstruction and highway maintenance, but this paper argues that in comparison to huge amount of aids (more the
$50 Billions) there is no significant visible progress in Afghanistan economy,
in agricultural and industrial infrastructures. Afghanistan is an agricultural
country and round 80% of Afghans income comes
from agricultural production. From all the huge Aids, just $270 million was
invested in Agriculture and $ 300 million in rural development projects.[111]According
to Afghanistan central statistic organization, the “arable and
permanent cropland area in Afghanistan is 8.5 million hectors, from which the
areas with irrigation facilities are about one million hectors”[112]. From
this, just 40% of are properly irrigated because during the internal conflicts
even the traditional irrigation system is also badly suffered and
154,000hectars are poppy yards in southern province of Helmand, Kandahar,
Urozgan and Farah.[113] Before soviet invasion there were some
irrigation projects and hydroelectric power plants and dams like Salma Dam, Kajaki, Dehla, and Bandi Sardeh
dams, and also, Naghlu, Darunta, Jabalsirag hydroelectric power station,
Jalalabad agricultural irrigation plant and Kockcha irrigation and power plants
were functioning including some industrial sights and Factories like Spinzar
cotton Factory in Kunduz and Jangalk Automotive factory and Kabul
House-Building Factory , Baghlan Sugar Factory etc.[114]
During 30 years of invasions and civil war all these agricultural and
industrial infrastructures were ruined to the ground.
The irony is American and its allies spent $2.3 to $2.7Trillion in ‘war on terror’
in Afghanistan and may reach to $4.4 trillion[115],
but yet they didn’t rebuild any of these infrastructures. Maybe they would
argue that in this unsecure condition of Afghanistan they cannot invest and run
such projects but it seems a void argument, because three-quarter of
Afghanistan (north, north-east, west and central parts) are safe and secure,
yet we don’t see any agricultural or industrial project there.
Afghanistan has two major source for its development.
- Water resources: the majority
of rivers in the region originate from Afghanistan, but we cannot use them
and as a result Afghanistan’s lands are dry or un-irrigated and Afghans
are thirsty and living in the dark and obliged to import electricity from
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
- Mines and
Minerals: Afghanistan is rich of mines and minerals like gold, emerald, gems,
copper, Iron ore, gas and oil. In some estimates, worth $1-3 Trillion[116].
Unfortunately, Afghanistan doesn’t have the features of extraction.
One of the main reasons
for growing insurgencies is unemployment. Over 80% of young people in
Afghanistan are unemployed; when the Taliban and other insurgent groups or the
local warlords or Norco-trader mafias
offer them money, normally the will join them. State building without Capital
or strong Economical infrastructures is impossible. If the international
community honestly and without any
hypocrisy like to make nation- state in Afghanistan and win the war against
terror, beside institution building, Human rights and democracy they should
invest more money in education, health care, Agriculture, building or
rebuilding power plants, dams, traditional industries and mining industry.
D) Leadership (Narco-Mafia State and Poor
Governance):
Narco-trade: UNDOC survey shows that Afghanistan is the main
producer of opium and narcotics in the world, producing over 90% of world
opium. UN reports show that in 2011 and 2012 there were 231,000 to 154,000 Hectare
land were poppy cultivation which
produced from which 3,7000 to 5800 ton
opium.[117]Poppy
cultivation is not just the main funding source for insurgencies, local
warlords and terrorist group but it causes hindered ‘good governance’ as well
because most senior government officials including high ranking military personals
including Karzai’s brother and his deputy family members are suspected to be
involved in narco trafficking .[118]Even
former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her written statement to the
Congress during her confirmation was heard calling Afghanistan a "narco-state"
that was "plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption".[119]Poppy
cultivation and narcotics in addition of its bad effect in the country economy
and security, badly effects Afghans social life as well. At present time there
are more than 1.5 million (mostly youth) people addicted with opium and heroin.[120]
Fukuyama rightly says that “overcoming corruption and nepotism is of the major hurdles facing
nation-state builders. Both problems are endemic to Afghanistan and have intensified
with the injection of foreign assistance Capital”.[121]
Generally “good
governance” means enforcing law and order, effectively managing the resources,
representing the people and caring about their rights and welfare. These
criteria are completely missing in Afghan government under the leadership of
Karzai. In 2011 the cost of corruption in Afghanistan was amounted $3.9Billion.
People are settling their legal issues with bribed judges, attorney, police and
other governmental organs twice the country's
domestic revenue. That’s why in countrysides people prefer to refer to The
Taliban for solving their legal disputes rather than the government officials.
It is evident that “there are a strong and symbiotic relationship between
building peace and addressing the demands of a people who want justice”.[122]
In Short, the Afghan
legal authorities seems to be more robber then lawyer and the ”police are
predators rather than protectors”[123]
and “reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or go to pay short
–contract Western consultants.”[124]
Corruption costs Afghanistan its future.
Leadership:
As we said before one of
the momentous prerequisite
for state- nation building is the existence of strong and charismatic leaders.
Afghanistan government is lacking such personalities. For instance president
Karzai himself is neither educated and experienced politician, never was a leader
of any political party, nor tribal chieftain. During Soviet occupation he
joined Mujadadi Jihadi group and later during Rabani Government for a while was
the third Deputy for the foreign minister of the Mujahidin government, later he
joined the Taliban. Then he turned down the
Taliban’s offer to become their ambassador to the UN, preferring to work for
the UNOCAL oil company. Here he backed up
khalilzad,.[125]In 2011
during Bon conference he was unjustly selected (with Three votes against eleven
votes from Satar Sirat) with the support of Khalizad and lakhdar Brahimi from
UN as the head of Afghan interim Authority and permanently supported by US to
keep the presidential position up to now. During this year his relation with
the US is deteriorating. He doesn’t enjoy either the support of his Karz
villagers, he is neither charismatic nor strong or intellectual leader. Simply
a puppet leader. His deputies and most of his cabinet ministers and provinces
governors are either the warlords, former mujahidin group including Hikmatyar
party including or some repatriate from West that most of them lived for long
time in western countries and does have a little knowledge about today’s
Afghanistan simply went to fill their pockets from international aids. However,
among them there are some intellectuals and patriotic individuals. with such
Incompetent and corrupt leadership it seems impossible to build nation-state even with spending
trillions of dollars.
Chapter
4
The role of neighbours in peace, stability and
state-building in Afghanistan
State building needs
peace and stability. No country can be peaceful and stable without having good
and friendly relations with its neighbours.
India and china: with India Afghanistan has
traditionally good relation, no matter which kind of regime ruled Afghanistan (
except the Taliban regime ) Kabul and new Delhi enjoyed good relations. India
has already invested more than$2 billion
in Afghanistan infrastructures like higher education, highways maintenance,
health services, and rural development
projects.[126] In
October 2011 India and Afghanistan signed 'strategic partnership' agreement
which was ratified by both Parliaments; “helping the Afghan government to rebuild
its police forces, training judiciary and diplomatic services’ are some
provision of that agreement”.[127]
China: Afghanistan and China
have a small border in “Wakhan Corridor” in
Badakhshan province of Afghanistan
and always had good relations
from king’s time up to now. China already in 1960s helped Afghanistan in some
irrigation plans and poultry projects. China from beginning supported ‘war on
terror’. From 2001 until 2010 allocated it total of $1billion aid to
Afghanistan.[128] In
November 2007 China and Afghanistan signed
contract on Ainak Copper mine in Lougar province south of Kabul worth of
$3.4 billion. In 2010 export and import of china to Afghanistan reached $704.00million
and $11.70 million.[129] In
October 2012 China and Afghanistan signed 25 years contract for extracting oil
and gas in Amu Darya project in northern Afghanistan.[130] China seems genuine in helping Afghanistan in
process of peace and stability and state building.
Central Asian Republic: Afghanistan established diplomatic
relation with central Asian republic right after their independence on
1992. Central Asian republics Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan see their security and
stability in the security and stability
of Afghanistan. Except Turkmenistan, the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan supported
the national salvation front (northern Alliance) during resisting time against
the Taliban . These countries from the beginning supported ‘war on terror’ and
either some of them rendered their territory and air fields in the service of
collation forces. They are all under the threat of exporting Islamic radicalism
and narco-trade from Afghanistan.[131] In September 2007 a deal signed between
Afghanistan and Tajikistan to transfer
Electrical energy to Afghanistan $500million, On 24 April 2008 TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) was signed. From Turkmenistan it pass through
Afghanistan and goes to Pakistan and India and is estimated to bring an annual revenue of over
$200 million to Afghanistan and to be completed by 2018[132].
Besides that, these countries have ethnic and linguistic ties with Afghanistan
ethnic groups. Peace and Stability in Afghanistan means the same in in central
Asian Republics. That is why they are supporting peace, stability and
Nation-state building in Afghanistan.
IRAN: Afghanistan and Iran (Persia)relationship goes
through the history.
Afghanistan and Iran had
established diplomatic relation in 1935. Besides the historical and religious
ties, the countries share the same culture and language. Farsi is the native
language of majority of Iranians as well
as the majority of Afghanistan people. The two countries always had good and
friendly relation except during Taliban rule. The only dispute was over the
Helmand river which was settled by a treaty to share water rights, signed in
1973 by the prime ministers of the two country.[133]
During soviet occupation Iran helped Afghan Mujahidin specially dose from Shia
sect. In this time more than two million of Afghans took refuge in Iran. However when the Taliban
came in power and after the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar e Sharif, their
relation became tense. In this period of time Iran supported anti-Taliban
Northern Alliance.[134]
After American invasion
Afghanistan became strategically more important for Iranian diplomacy, because
from one side they are happy to see Taliban and Al-Qaida out of Afghanistan and
to this end their policy is parallel to ‘war on terror’, but from other side
considering their rivalry with US they are suspicious to American’s policy in
the region and opposing strongly US and NATO permanent station in Afghanistan.
Iran took part in aids and rebuilding Afghanistan in road and school reconstruction specially in
western part of Afghanistan. Iran support international efforts in stabilising
and state building, because Taliban, al-Qaida, Sunni and Wahabi
extremist as well an narco-trade mafia is their common enemy. Unstable
Afghanistan de-stabilizes Iran as well.
Bilateral trade between
two country is also improved. An estimate from European Commission shows the
figure of $11 million in 2010 but president Karzai claimed
bilateral trade totalled more than $1.5 billion.’’[135]
At present there are more than one million Afghan refugees in Iran of which
according to UNHCR just 818,910 are registered[136]in
August 2013 Iran and Afghanistan signed strategic agreement.[137]
In short: Iran’s long
term interests are in same line with Afghanistan and international community
interests and surly doesn’t like have
unstable , insecure and extremist state on its eastern border.[138]
Pakistan: Pakistan with having 183
million population is the sixth most populated country in the world. It is the
6th strongest nuclear power holder and its army is among the most
powerful armies in the world. Numbers of its troops “steadily grew to 80,000
and drastically changed the region, which had been under “indirect rule” for
more than a century”.[139] The
British Empire before withdrawal from India had divided Indian subcontinent in the two separate
countries Pakistan and India.
Afghan-Pakistan relation was from the beginning fluctuating and the root
of this misunderstanding lies in the history. When Pakistan became independent
in 1947 Afghanistan voted against its membership in United nation with the pretext that
Pashtuns problem. Although Afghanistan withdrew its objections and sent Marshal
Shah Wali khan (the most power full man in the monarchy) as ambassador to
Islamabad became one of the first nation
to establish diplomatic relation with Pakistan.[140]
The roots of so called Pashtunistan issue is lies in the other controversial
issue which is the question of the “Duurand line”. This a border agreement drawn and signed between
British India and Afghanistan in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and king Amir
Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893.[141]
Afghan Pashtun
Nationalist (may be better to say tribalists) claim that they don’t recognise
this border because :1) coercion: It was
imposed by force on Amir, 2) legitimacy: It was between Britain and
Afghanistan, Pakistan is not the successor of the great Britan ,3) Time
bounded: it was for 100 years, 4) dividing Pashtun tribes. It seems that none
of these arguments are logical or accept able. Firstly it was completely with
the will of Abdul Khan. After signing that treaty British
government doubled his subsidy Allowance. Beside that after Abdul Rahman
five other Afghan Amir and kings with
signing of new treaties (in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930) accepted and renewed the Durand treaty. It is
recognised as an international border by all countries over the world including
Islamic countries an UN as well. If Pashtun nationalists argue that Pakistan
cannot be legitimate successor of great Britain, respectively they must accept that Tasjikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan should not be the legitimate successors of former soviet Union.
Regarding the division of the Pashtun ethnic in two countries, they are not
alone. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kurds and a lot of other ethnics are also
divided by colonial borders[142]. In
addition, if Afghans doesn’t accept the borders which were drawn by Britain
then they should make a claim over whole of Pakistan except Panjab.[143]
The issue of Pashtunistan was risen with the
dream of making great Pashtunistan from all Pashtunes in both side of the
Durand line. This issue raised during Daoud Khan premiership (1953-1963), he
was encouraged by Soviet Union and India because this issue was in line with
their policies toward Pakistan. From that time Afghan- Pakistan relation have
been deteriorating by every passing year. Pakistan likes to see a weak but friendly
Afghanistan and seek strategic depth in case of war with India. Pakistan like
to see the puppet regime in Afghanistan otherwise it support the opposition of
Kabul regime to destabilize Afghanistan.
During president Daoud,
Pakistan supported his opponents, during pro- soviet regime in Kabul Pakistan
supported Mujahidin; when mujahidin came in power Masoud and did not obey
Pakistan orders, they brought up the
Taliban. One should not blame the Pakistan; when Afghanistan claim about one
third of their territory , they have the right to respond it and destabilize
Afghanistan.
After 9/11 an ‘war on
terror’ Pakistan apparently supports US
and allies but never been honest on their pledges. It is not mystery that
Pakistan supported Taliban ,Hikmatyar ,Haqqani Faction and other Afghan
insurgent groups. The leader of all these terrorist networks live in Pakistan.
Without Pakistan cooperation, peace and
stability would never come to Afghanistan. If Afghanistan demands Pakistan to
render help for peace and state building process, then reciprocally Afghanistan
has to give up its territorial claim over Pakistan soil. Indeed, “Kabul and
Islamabad must formulate policies to promote a peaceful and prosperous future
rather than remaining hostages to the bitter disputes of the past”.[144]US and
NATO should encourage both sides to reach to this end. The key of Afghanistan’s
peace and stability lays somewhere in Islamabad palaces , not in Afghanistan’s
rigid terrains.
Chapter 5
Looking to the future;
------------------------------------
Afghanistan after 2014 (withdrawal): In
year 2014 we expect to witness the withdrawal of international forces from
Afghanista,; although the Americans did expressed their willingness of long
term station of their limited military force under pretext of “Strategic
Partnership”. The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed By US and
Afghanistan on the 2nd May 2012 and it was due to be followed by
“Bilateral Security Agreement” which is not signed yet because of some
differences in partners views.[145]
After 12 years of fierce
fighting , killing, capturing, America has come to the end that they cannot
defeat Afghan insurgences by military means, so the entered in negotiation with
the Taliban. After some years of secret talks between The Taliban and US
officials, they opened the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, although they faced
angry reaction by Karzai Government and political parties inside Afghanistan.
It was not like an office or address for a rebel group but like an embassy, not
under the name of Taliban but with the name and risen flag of so called “Afghanistan
Islamic Emirate”. With this they ought to enjoy from some kind of diplomatic
recognition. After two days the office had been closed and the Taliban withdrew
from negotiation.[146] Most analyses
don’t see any prospect in such negotiations either by Karzai regime or by
Americans because despite the names like “moderate Taliban” or “good Taliban”,
the Taliban has not shown much change by deed or deem. Ideologically they are as fanatic as they were and indeed
the are more vicious and cruel than before. They are still the active “Afghani
branch of Al-Qaida”.
Karzai and Americans demand from Taliban to: “1) cease fighting, 2)
accept the Afghan constitution, and 3) break any ties to Al
Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The Taliban demands from USA:1) all foreign
troops leave Afghanistan; 2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and 3)
Islamic law should be imposed”.[147] From here one can see that the stand of both side is
so completely opposite the other that reconciliation seems illusive.
Of course it is difficult
to believe the demagogical statements
from white house regarding complete withdrawal or “option zero” because it is very clear that and Americans
and NATO didn’t come to Afghanistan for the sake of “democratization and
good governance”. They have their strategic interests in the region. See
for example NATO’s secretary-general J.d.H. Scheffer’s statement at the
Brookings Institution in February 2009: “a permanent NATO presence
in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran and Pakistan was
too good to miss”.’[148]
Regarding the withdrawal
of US and NATO forces one can discuss it in three scenarios:
1. Rapid withdrawal or option Zero: in this condition not
just the military forces will withdraw
in 2014 but at the same time economical aids from donor countries (which are
mostly sharing military in Afghanistan)
will be ceased. Kabul government will find itself under huge military and economic pressure
which surely will collapse in week or month and the result is not a stabile fanatic-extremist government
but an ethnic rivalry, civil war and “statelessness”; and once
again Afghan becomes a safe haven for
international terrorism and narco-trade mafias, and a source of danger
for regional and international security.
[149] That
is why despite the fact that regional powers like China Iran, Russia are
opposing permanent station of the American and NATO Forces in
Afghanistan, they are supporting the presence of these forces in present time
and until Afghanistan become a stable country. The majority of Afghan people
including political parties and civic societies also opposing Rapid Withdrawal
Plan.
From the other side rapid
withdrawal means the defeat of US, and NATO will bring unprecedented consequences for US
and allies.
2.The
second scenario could be “win the war”
by strengthening Forces and inflict decisive defeat to insurgents then
withdraw. In this case the Kabul regime will survive. This scenario has
supporters among military men ( Afghans and American), but 12 year of war
experience shows that it is not working.
3.The third scenario can be “gradual withdrawal”: Gradual reduction of military forces by gradually
improving Afghanistan’s economy or “gradual paring down of the rentier
state, it should go together with negotiation to find political way end to the
insurgency”. [150]
Since the Afghanistan
problem is not a local but it is rather regional and international problem, the
key to solve this problem is in the region. The wars in Afghanistan have been a
type of “proxy wars” being funded and directed by some neighbouring countries
of Afghanistan or the regional countries,. Bringing stability to Afghanistan
and safe withdrawal depends on the
cooperation all countries in the region. Before the withdrawal UN should
mediate regional countries (Pakistan, Iran, Indi and China) for reaching an
agreement to guarantee that will not interfering in Afghanistan affairs, but rather
help Afghan people to create a functioning a broad based government (ethnically,
religiously and regionally), respecting its sovereignty and territorial
integrity .[151] Prior
to this, it is also needed to urge and mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan
to settle their border and historical problems down peace fully in an accordance
with international law and norms, through the United Nation.
In 2014 besides
withdrawal another important event will happen which is the third Presidential
Election in Afghanistan. This is very important; because, first of all for the
first time the transfer of power is due to happen peacefully and in a
democratic and civilized way. Secondly if the election goes fairly and in a
democratic way, the elected president will enjoy more legitimacy than the running one and can
do more to bring peace and stability to the country. Americans and NATO
countries should focus in coming Afghan Election rather to hasten
withdrawal.
Conclusion:
The central purpose of
this Dissertation was to illustrate the difficulty of the process of
Nation-State building in an under developed country like Afghanistan. Through the
pages of this paper we see that
Afghanistan suffers from two syndromes: unjust Internal politics and
un-balanced foreign policy. The whole text is in direction to find the answer
for the question why “Nation-State Building” failed in Afghanistan?
In chapter one we
concentrated on theoretical aspects of the Nation-State building and discussed
about different theories. In chapter two we went shortly through Afghanistan’s
history and its ethnic composition, the effects on Ethnic diversity in nation-
state building in Afghanistan as well an attempt made by different rulers( from
Amir Abdl Rahan to Talin era) of Afghanistan to create nation- state . In
chapter three we enlightened by detail the post-Taliban era of nation state
building in Afghanistan. It included the international intervention and why
they intervened? We looked at their achievements and failures in nation-state
building in Afghanistan in this era. In chapter four we paid attention to the
rule of Afghanistan neighbouring countries in bringing peace stability and
state building and vice versa. In chapter five we made a glance in the future
of the process of nation state building in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of
international forces and its consequences and different scenarios of withdrawal and some suggestions for more
riskless withdrawal.
As a result of our
research, this paper reached to the following conclusion: Afghanistan has
attempted to build a strong central state from Abul Raman time up to now, but
failed. As for “nation building there
were two golden opportunities, once in During King Amanullah after independence
of Afghanistan and the second during national resistance against former Soviet
union, but the first one turned to chaos and barbaric dictatorship and the
second one ended to civil war and ethnic split.”[152]
But why?
a.
Afghanistan is located in
a very sensitive and important geo-political and geo- strategic loation in the
middle Asia. During the history it was invaded by all powerful empires of the
world beginning from Alexander the Great, Amawids Khalifat , Mongols, British and Russian, Soviet empire and now US Empire. During 19th century as a
result of the Great Game and rivalry between British and Russian, the new
Afghanistan with today’s boundaries as a “Buffer State” and neutral country
emerged in world map. From that time onward in 20th century and Cold War, whenever Afghanistan’s
governments tried to deviate from the country neutrality Status and make
orientation to East or West faced with negative reaction from opposite side and
resulted the collapse of the Afghan
regimes. The collapse of king Amanullh, Daoud Khan, pro-Soviet (Taraki, Amin,
Karmal and Najibullah)regime and Mujahidin Government are the examples of the
rivalry of East and West and Regional Powers. Afghanistan cannot be absolute
Foe or absolute Friend with any regional and International Power. So the logic
commands that: if the international community like to see a peaceful and stable
Afghanistan, they should help it and let it to come back to its historical “Buffer zone” and “neutral
status”.[153]
b.
Afghanistan is the land
of Ethnic Minorities , none of the ethnics living in Afghanistan makes 51% of the country population. Besides
that the major bulk of bigger minorities( Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen,
Baluch) reside in neighbouring countries. This is one of main obstacle on the
path of “Nation Building” process. During last two century Pashtun Aristocracy
which ruled the country, they tried hard to assimilate other ethnics in Pashtun
ethnicity and make Pashtu the national language of Afghanistan, but always
failed. The last century experience proves the fact that Pashtun dominated
mono-ethnic centralized statesmanship doesn’t work in Afghanistan.
It seems that the theory
of “assimilation nation building” doesn’t work, so Afghanistan’s Statesmen and Intellectuals
should consider the “integration” or civic “nationalization” theories in
building a nation. Years of war against soviet union not only raised the
political awareness of all Afghanistan’s ethnics but Armed all of them (before
soviet invasion just Pashtun tribes had the right to carry guns), now any
individual ethnic has enough arms to defend itself. Two decades of civil war
and ethnic rivalry have passed but we cannot see any promising horizon for
peace and stability. People cannot fight each other for ever, finally they
should find a way out. There is just two possibilities:
1. Disintegration: If the international
forces pull out suddenly and completely without stabilising the situation and
reinforcing Afghanistan’s government it would lead to a renewal of inter-ethnic conflicts, civil war and
destruction. In such a case Afghanistan neighbouring countries surely interfere
and organise proxy wars in Afghanistan
and as a result the Afghanistan will be “Balkanized.”( although in the past
as well as at the time being there is no political party or social
organisations in favour of disintegration) This is the worst scenario, very
dangerous and horrible. Firstly because Disintegration of Afghanistan will
endanger the peace and stability in the region and will open the way for
disintegration of other countries in the region. Secondly, disintegration will
not solve Afghanistan Ethnic Problems. Afghanistan is not like former
Yugoslavia which every ethnic had its own recognised boundary. In Afghanistan
ethnics are mixed in all part of the country and impossible to draw border line
and the base ethnicity. May be Afghanistan is more or less similar with
“Bosnia-Herzegovina.” We are witness to how difficult it was to bring peace and
stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2.Civic integration: Afghanistan’s political
parties, social organizations, ethnic and tribal leader should calm down and
with the help of neighbourly countries, international community and UN should
find a way out for ethnic crisis in the
country. It can take place through a loya Jirga or Referendum to amend the
constitution, and lay out the basement for a multi ethnic, multi- religion ,
multi-lingual and multi-culture civic and democratic country; With a
decentralized or semi Federal system and
parliamentary governing body which, where all leading official (head of
districts, governors of the provinces and president of the country) should be
elected by direct vote of the people.[154]
This paper is also argues that the federal system in Afghanistan cannot be a
copy of any other country and cannot be made purely according to Ethnicity; it
rather should be also Regional, but at the same time all historical, cultural,
linguistic and ethnicity should be in consideration. In this way Afghans will change from Raiyat (vassal)
to Shahrwand (citizen) and from ethnics and tribes to a “Nation”.[155]
c.
Permanent military bases: there
are rumours that the USA is looking for Permanent military bases in
Afghanistan; although the US officials never stated it openly, from their
insistence for signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, one can come to this
conclusion that really the US intended to do so. This paper argues that
permanent station of the US military forces is a very dangerous game which
endanger s peace and stability in Afghanistan. Americans should learn from the
history of Afghanistan and realize the fact that Afghanistan is not Japan or
south Korea or Qatar and Saudi Arab. Afghanistan is just Afghanistan. Firstly
Afghan people traditionally oppose foreign troops presence in their soil and
secondly all regional powers (India, Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia) will
oppose it. In such a case Afghanistan will turn again as a battle field for
regional and international powers. As I mentioned before the only way to see
stable and peaceful Afghanistan is to leave it and help it to become a neutral
and de-militarized country, to become a centre of trade and transportation
rather the centre of international politics and military rivalries.[156]
As a conclusion one can
emphasize the fact that the solution for the Afghanistan crisis are more a
political rather than military and that the key for success that is in
Afghanistan and in the region, not in Washington or Brussels.[157] “Nation-State Building” is fundamentally a national
issue but the international community with their social, humanitarian,
economical and even military Aids can facilitate and accelerate it.
*******
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i.e. those who live within the legal borers
of the territory.
Although these factors can intensify a
sense of nationhood
Describing the total populace of a country
without regard for any cultural or ethnic particularities.
Smith, A.
1987. The ethnic origins of
nations. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell
In a ‘civic’ nation, all citizens agree to
be bound by the political and legal institutions of the state. The state, in
return, shall provide protection and legal rights to the citizen. This is based
on the “social contract” theory. Britain and the US are ‘’civic’’ nations as
their populations are not linked by ethnicity, but rather citizenship.
We can for example refer to Gellner who
provides that “the age of transition to
industrialism was bound…also to be the age of nationalism” in Gellner, E.
2006. Nations and nationalism.
Oxford: Blackwell. Gellner, E. 2006. Nations
and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.p. 36
See: “Since
most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the
transfer of primary allegiance from these nations to the state is generally
considered the sine qua non of successful integration, the true goal is not
"nation-building" but "nation-destroying”” in Connor, W. 1972. Nation-building or
nation-destroying?. World
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Dempsey G. T. 2002. Old Folly in a New
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Schmidt, A. 1998. Thesaurus and Glossary of Early
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( 2000). p. 19–21.
For Deutschian theorists, ethnicity is
irrelevant because it will wither away anyway once modernisation has kicked in,
but as we have seen above, there are many who object to this optimistic
standpoint.
Analysis from CIA World Fact Book of 2013
on Afghanistan (Ibid).
Going back to Connor’s assertion that in
ethnically homogenous societies, the lesser the contact, the greater the
peacefulness.
Pashtuns also live in the neighbouring
country Pakistan, where they constitute the majority of population.
Mazhar, M.,
Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies,
19 (2), p. 100.
Mazhar, M.,
Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies,
19 (2), p. 101.
For example, Gregorian,
V. 1969. The emergence of
modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 33
He was incentivised to do so by the British
(who had their own agenda in this), who would grant him with money and arms in
return. See Shir J. 2010. Afghan Nationalism:
State-Elites and Historiography: 1901-1929. History
Department of James Madison University, p. 2. Available at:
http://www.jmu.edu/mecm/files/bkapapers/Jawan%20Shir%20Nationalism%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf
[Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].
Wilber, D.
1962. Afghanistan, Its People,
Its Society Its Culture. New Haven: Graf Press, p. 19.
He rejected EU plans to connect A to
international railway system despite the advice telling him of importance of
modern communication and transportation. See Gregorian,
V. 1969. The emergence of
modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p.153
Simonsen, S.
2013. Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and exclusion in post-Bonn institution
building. Third World
Quarterly, 25 (4), p. 710.
Afghan troop map: US and Nato deployments. 2010. BBC News, [online]
19 November. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11795066
[Accessed: 27 August 2013]. Kenneth Katzman, 2010,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457
