The failure of ‘Nation and State’ building in Afghanistan

Written by: Abdul Majid Eskandary
Leicester University
United Kingdom
September 2013

Afghanistan:

 The Failure of ‘Nation and State’ Building

Content:

1)    Introduction

2)    Chapter 1: Conceptualisation (Nation, State, Nation-State and Ethnicity)

3)    Chapter 2: Nation Building in Afghan History- Modernity to Taliban

4)    Chapter 3:Nation-State Building in Afghanistan: Post- Taliban

5)    Chapter 4: The role of neighbors in peace, stability and state-building in Afghanistan

6)    Chapter 5: Looking to the future

7)    Conclusion

Introduction:

In this paper, we shall examine the notion of nation-state building in the context of Afghanistan: a state located in Southern central Asia, which in the past three decades has seen one of the worst bloody wars mankind has witnessed. The crux of our paper is to examine why it has been that in Afghanistan, historically and even today, the process of building a true Afghan nation and state has proven an extremely complex and at times illusive task.  As we shall see, the highly complex inter-ethnic relationships within the country have been a major factor in preventing the Afghan people from forming an overall national identity that is harmonized and integrated, making talks of nation and building highly controversial.

The structure of this paper shall be as follows. It warrants that we must aim to define the key terms to this paper before going any further. Primarily we shall focus on “nation” and “state” building; what do these terms actually mean? As we shall see, this will prove to be somewhat a difficult task because as with many other key international relations terms, these two concepts have often been confused for one another and used indiscriminately, referring more or less to the exact same thing today. After a brief conceptualization, we shall turn to the ethnicity factor in nation building. What relevance, if any, does ethnicity have in nation building efforts?  This is a very question important because mutli-ethnicity is a socio-political reality in the 21^st century and inter-ethnic polarisation and conflict have proven more and more prevalent throughout the world. As we shall see in the case of Afghanistan, the country’s deep and profound ethic cleavages have prevented its people from forming a harmonious  and unified overall Afghan identity.

After examining the relevance of ethnicity in nation building, we shall turn to Afghanistan’s ethnic composition. Thereafter, a trip will be made through the history of Afghanistan, starting from the era of Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880, all the way to the Taliban era. The purpose of this will be to examine whether any state and nation building efforts have historically found place in the country by those in power, and if so, whether these efforts have been successful or not. As we shall see, efforts by those in power to unify the social and political arenas of Afghanistan have been highly flawed and one-sided in favour of one specific ethnic group. External influences and interferences particularly have been a contributing factor to the further polarisation of the ethnic groups within the country.

In the second half of the paper, we shall turn to Afghanistan as it stands now. With the end of the Taliban reign, a new promising era entered Afghanistan after the international coalitions made their grandiose promises of bringing democracy, stability and peace to the country. One would have thought that this task of nation building, which had until now proven elusive, would become a more feasible undertaking. Yet, have the relevant actors of this “nation (and state) building” project deprived themselves of a chance of success from the outset by failing to take account of the historical realities of the Afghan country when developing the new institutions of Afghanistan? It will be argued that given the long existing deep ethnic divides within Afghanistan; the right policy choices were not made in a number of areas, and therefore have consolidated the dangerous trend of ethnic polarity in post-conflict Afghanistan. Most predominantly, the decision to once again form a highly centralised political structure in this country was a mistake and has turned our nation building dreams into something distant. I will argue that alternative solutions, namely that of decentralisation of political institutions, would better respond to the realities of the situation, bring the Afghan state a step closer to stability and prosperity, and consequently also to our “nation” or “state” building dreams.in the last part of this paper we shall make a brief glance to the future after 2014 , withdrawal of international force and its consequences and end this dissertation with the conclusion of our finding in this journey. 

Chapter 1

Conceptualisation (Nation, State, Nation-State and Ethnicity):

Before we can aim to describe the concept of nation and state, it seems right to first define what a “nation” is, and how this is different from the notion of the “state”. Regrettably, the world of international relations has been plagued with improper usage of its key terminologies, with the terms of “nation” and “state” being no exception to this occurrence, having often erroneously and indiscriminately been inter-utilized so as to refer to the same concept[1]. Thus, one comparable politics textbook astonishingly states that “just about the entire surface of the world today is covered by independent states. We call them states, or nations, or nation states”[2]. Although the two terms are highly interlinked and mutually interdependent, there are indeed fundamental differences between the two concepts.

While there is no single definition of a “state”, the most commonly cited definition is that of Max Weber, whom described it as  “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”[3]. Connor also aptly describes it as “a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government”[4]. The state is therefore  described in politico-legal terms as a sovereign entity which has a right to exclusively govern its people[5], to form domestic and external policies and to use legitimate force. “State building”, then, ought to refer to the creation or restoration of those institutions necessary for the smooth running of a state (political, economic, social). A “nation” on the other hand, is frequently described as a psycho-cultural concept, defining in its most basic sense a particular group of people who share a common sense of identity. Connor, in his highly influential article ‘Nation Building or Nation Destroying?’ maintains that a nation exclusively refers to “self-differentiating ethnic groups”[6], discarding any other tangible particularities (language, custom or culture) of these units as decisive as to the existence of nationhood[7]. In his view it the shared belief of a common heritage and a “popularly held awareness or belief that one’s own group is unique in most vital sense”[8] which separates a “nation” from any other social groupings. Nations can in this sense be classified as “imagined” or “mythical” communities[9].

Connor rightfully observes that a nation is often erroneously used to refer to political entities[10], but from the above definition, it becomes clear that within a single “state”, multiple “nations” can in actual fact be in existence[11].  Therefore, “what we have thus far been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations”[12]. Afghanistan, then, is a state comprising of dozens of “nations” when we take account of its ethnic composition. The concept of “nationalism”, then, should logically be described as loyalty to one’s ethnic group[13], but instead it is most frequently referred to allegiance to the state instead.[14]  The hyphenate “nation state” is therefore in fact a mistake because in its most correct definition, a “nation state” only refers to those occurrences where the borders of a nation are approximate to that of the state. This hyphenate can therefore only be applied to a very small percentage of the world’s states. The “United Nations” is therefore also an association of states rather than one of nations. Gellner defines nationalism a “political principle, which holds that political and national unit should be congruent.”

Anthony D. Smith, a British professor of nationalism and ethnicity, introduced the dichotomy of ‘ethnic nationalism’ and ‘civic nationhood’ in late 1980s in his book The Ethnic Origins of Nations[15]. He believed that the former described non-western conceptions of nationalism, whereas the latter was used for western notions the same concept. While ethnic nationalism therefore more or less accords to definitions of Connor and Anderson in that the nation is defined in terms of a belief of ethnic ancestry, in civic nationalism on the other hand, a common identity between the members of the group is based on citizenship. Individuals can choose to become members of the civic nation by simply deciding to adhere to the political practices, institutions and values. In a civic nationalism, it is therefore the state which creates the ‘nation’ and it is from this act of politically participatory citizenry from which the state derives its political legitimacy. Civic nationalism is seen by Western writers as the ideal type, because of its inherent ‘democratic’ nature.[16]

The rise of the state centric nationalism has been traced back to modernity and industrialisation in the Western world[17]. Early Deutschian theorists maintain that it was the demands of industrialism- namely that of increased and flexible labour (as well as division thereof), continuous production and growth as well as urbanisation- that led to the pursuit of the creation of newer homogenous loyalties and languages[18]. It was therefore an expected occurrence for smaller “nations” to leave their distinct particularities aside to assimilate into a larger universal and homogenous ‘national’ identity for the ‘common good’ of industrialisation and the benefits that it was promised to bring[19]. Connor on the other hand, did not believe that modernization would inevitably result in the dissolving of ethnic identification in favour of cultural homogeneity: “if the process that compromises modernisation led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favour of identification with the state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease”[20]. And this was not the case in the world which in fact saw increased ethnic awareness. Material increases could therefore  in certain circumstances increase tension and particularity[21]. Arend Lijphart[22] furthered this argument by distinguishing the effects of modernity on ethnically homogenous societies from ethnically heterogeneous ones. In his view, in the former where one would merely be dealing with slight variations of a single cultural group, increased contacts between the populace by means of increased communication and transportation would almost always lead to assimilation and unification, whereas in the latter, the pluralistic nature of the society would make national assimilation a highly controversial and almost impossible task as increased communication would create antagonism between the ‘lower’ cultures. Policies of ethnical segregation were best suited to these situations, Lijphart argued.

Now we have given a brief overview of the notions  a “state”, “nation” and “nationalism”, we are in a better position to analyse the concept of “nation building”. Referring back to the traditional rise of “nationhood”, “nation building” theory was traditionally therefore “primarily used to describe the processes of national integration and consolidation that led up to the estab­lishment of the modern nation-state--as distinct from various form of traditional states, such as feudal and dynastic states, church states, empires, etc.”[23] in Kolsto’s words. Given that this process involved the dissolving of smaller cultural groups into one larger one, Connor felt compelled to conclude that the true goals were therefore one of “nation destroying” rather than “nation building”[24]. In post- world war II, the “nation building” had become one  mostly defined in terms of civic nationalism.

In the post-cold war era, “nation building” discipline found prominence in international relations, as a catchphrase for many disciplines. Due to the increasing salience in “failed” and “failing” states and an understanding of the impact of such occurrence on global security and stability (particularly post 9/11), the US saw that main threats to its security came from such states (in the form of mass poverty and migration, terrorism and AIDS). The US no longer saw it in its interest to ignore internal chaos in even the farthest countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because it was clear from the twin tower attacks that what was going on within the country of Afghanistan could severely affect what would be going on in the United States[25]. Nation building then became coterminous with various disciplines such as “peace building” “post conflict reconstruction” “democratisation”, “good governance”; i.e. post conflict military intervention by the international community to aid in the “remedying” of these “failed” states. The logic behind this is the belief that “good” states would not readily make wars, preserving international harmony[26]. Carolyn Stephenson states that “The latest conceptualization is essentially that nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or failed states or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability”[27]. Nation building today has therefore merged the concept of “state” (ie governmental and economic apparatus) building into its definition. Another example is the definition by Schmidth whom describes nation building as “restoration of law and order in the absence of government authority, the reconstruction of infrastructure and security forces, and the facilitation of the transfer of power from the interim authority to an indigenous government.”[28] Regardless of this merging of two distinct concepts, it is fair to say that the creation of a strong, peaceful and unified nation (in its holistic sense) cannot be attained where key state institutions (political, economic and social) are non-existent, or are corrupt.

The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama describes nation building as a three stage process in his book titled “State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century”. Firstly, the international community invading a failed state after conflict must embark on ‘post conflict reconstruction’ missions to try and immediately restore stability and security, and fulfils the basic needs of the population. Secondly, the international community must commit to aiding the host state to develop self-sustaining state institutions which are capable of provision of long-term security and stability and lastly, the weak state must be strengthened[29]. What is interesting in contemporary descriptions of ‘nation building’ is that the ethnicity factor is too frequently disregarded completely. [30]. State and nation building- whatever we take these to mean- are highly complex and time consuming activities, but arguably a new layer of complexity is added in those states which see a high level of ethnic heterogeneity as often internal conflicts have exacerbated ethnic consciousness and created heightened levels of animosity between the various ethnic groups.

Chapter 2

Nation Building in Afghan History- Modernity to Taliban:

I)   Afghanistan  and its Ethnic Composition

Some Afghan and foreign historians believe that the modern state of “Afghanistan” came to existence in 1747 when the Ahmad shah Durrani established his Kingdom in Kandahar, but in reality it is when Ahmad Shah was the King and later the Emperor of Khorasan. In fact the modern Afghanistan with today’s boundaries took shape in 1893 when Amir Abul Rahman Khan signed the treaty with British India. When Elphinstone, a prominent British diplomat and historian, met the King of Kabul (Shah Shuja 1819) he wrote that “ they have no name for their own country; but apply the Persian name of Afghanistan…the name most generally applied to the whole country by its inhabitants is Khorasan…”^[31] the name of Khorasan changed to Afghanistan during the rule of Amir Abul Rahman (1880- 1901)^[32]

 Afghanistan, a country which today holds a population of approximately 27-31 million[33], has a highly  ethnically heterogeneous composition, as dozens different ethnic groups co-exist in this country. Since none of these groups represent a majority of the total population[34], Afghanistan is in essence the land of the minorities[35].

The various groups within this region now called Afghanistan lived together in harmony for hundreds of years prior to the creation of the state, showing major sense of oneness when gathering in the fight against invaders. Perhaps we can say that the lack of sufficient contact between the ethnic groups which warranted their peaceful co-existence[36] as distinct small nations. From the 20^th century onwards with increased state and nation building efforts by various rulers, tension and cleavages between the different cultural groups intensified and reached its peak right after the civil war between Mujahidin factions. Before we turn to a historical overview of Afghanistan and the efforts which took place to assimilate the “Afghans” into one nation and state, I wish to give a brief overview of the four largest ethnic groups which have predominantly shaped (modern) Afghanistan’s state of affairs; namely, the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, and Hazaras and Uzbeks.

Due to the absence of an official census in Afghanistan for decades, it is difficult to provide exact figures of the ethnic composition of the country. Nevertheless, various estimations have been put forward by different organisations in recent years. One of the most recent ones is that by the CIA World Fact Book (2013), which provides that the Pashtun comprise 42% of the total population, making it the largest ethnic group within Afghanistan[37]. They live mostly in the Southern and Eastern parts of Afghanistan, and there are various differing theories with regards to the Pashtun’s ethnic origins as some believe these people are of Jewish origin, while others believe they have Arian ancestry. Whatever their origin, the Pashtun are “one of the largest tribal societies in the world”[38]. They are also highly complex in structure, starting with the two chief tribes of Ghizali and Durrani, which then sub-divide into dozens of sub-tribes[39]. From its inception as a state during the Durrani era, Afghanistan has been predominantly led by Pashtun powers. This fact has given the Pashtun a sense that exclusive rights to govern Afghanistan lies with them, and the resulting sense of self-entitlement and superiority and this has reflected in the manner in which nation and state building has been carried out[40]. The majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan. The Pashtun speak their own language of Pashtu, they  have their own way of life based on strict moral and legal codes of Pashtunwali.

The second largest ethnic group within Afghanistan consists of the Tajiks whom represent about 27% of the total population. They live mainly in the northern, north eastern, Kabul and surrounding provinces and western parts of Afghanistan, and the majority of them lives in the neighbouring countries of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Tajiks have no tribal structure like the Pashtuns. They speak the Farsi language (which is one of the two the official national language and spoken by the majority, nearly 75% of the population) and are much less conservative than the Pashtuns in their way of life. The Tajiks have been the main rivals of the Pashtun in the quest for power in Afghan politics for over two centuries long,[41]. To many historians’ beliefs, the Tajiks are the aboriginal peoples of Afghanistan[42].

The Hazara and Uzbek are the third and fourth largest ethnic groups of Afghanistan, comprising of11 and 9% of the total population each. Although having played lesser of a role in Afghan politics in the past, Hazara, having been subjected to great unspeakable levels of discrimination, oppression and violence in Afghan history. Mostly Hazaras are Shiite Muslims. Some have argued the Hazara to be of Mongolian descent[43] although this is subject to much controversy. The Uzbeks have Turkic origin, and like the Hazara, their level of participation in Afghan politics has been highly limited. Other ethnic groups include Aimak (4%), Turkman (3%), Balcho (2%) and dozens of other groups totalling to 4% of the total population.

II)   Attempts to Build a “ Nation–State”

To provide an outline of the major developments in relation to nation and state building in Afghan history, we must aim to define what the main phases of major developments are. They can be defined loosely as: 1) from the reign of King Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 until People Democratic Party takeover in 1978, 2) the  mujahideen insurgency that followed until 1992 3) the Rabanni Government  from 1992 until 1996, and 4) and the Taliban era from 1996 to 2001.

Starting from 1747 when the Durrani monarchy came to existence, the Afghan state from its inception saw a clear Pashtun majority, creating a sense of exclusive entitlement to the political sphere when they became the real rulers, it paved way for this ethnic group to hold control of Afghan national policy and shape the national identity for centuries to come. Many agree that the first serious internal attempts to build a modern Afghan nation was by King Amir Abdur Rahman[44] when he started his reign in 1880. This king was dubbed “Iron Amir”, for he had a strong determination to radically shift Afghanistan from tribalism and feudalism towards a centralised political system in his quest for nation building[45]. He saw political unification as being an important step towards a stronger and more unified Afghanistan. In his own words ; his job was one of setting “in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and cut throats…..This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule”[46].  Having had to deal with a society that was left devastated and in chaos due to numerous previous conflicts and foreign interferences, he took some serious politically repressive measures to reach his goals. Being of Pashtun origin, he knew that he would see great resistance from his own people, but Amir largely won Pashtun hearts by making persuasive religious arguments and giving these people substantive rights and privileges over the other ethnic groups. For example, he authorised (or rather ordered) a large number of Pashtun nomads from the South of the country to invade areas of other ethnic minority groups (particularly that of the Hazara, Tajik and Uzbeks  ) and settle, turning regions that were before a threat to his power into effective instruments to legitimise and strengthen his power in these areas. Any ethnic group which proved resistant, Amir would readily conduct ethnic cleansing campaigns against or alternatively punish them in untold ways and political opponents were also banished without much thought.

There are some whom conclude that Amir’s policies in the social, political, administrative and economic arena were successful in the sense that he more or less succeeded to at least politically bring Afghanistan to greater unification. Dr Bashir Shakhawarz for example provides that  “While Amir Abdur Rahman Khan had very little time to modernise Afghanistan and pay attention to education, nevertheless his success in uniting Afghanistan, defeating the warlords, creating a standing army and establishing an administration system to rule the country directly contributed to the ambition of his successors”[47]. Others, however, paint a different picture. Gregorian’s view is that Amir failed in his goals, an important factor being “the overwhelming number of divisive forces within Afghanistan itself- the ethnic differences, the religious animosity between Shia and Sunni Muslims, the tribal jealousies, the feudal obligations and prerogatives, the conflict of regional interests and traditional values” and “the lack of resources, both material and human, that a successful and sudden leap into modernity required” [48]. Although he was advised by his followers  of the importance of modernism for Afghan nationalism, but his scepticism of the introduction of modern communication and transportation systems which were suggested by the Western world at the time saw him reject any such possible offers.[49] Given that we have observed above the school of Deutsch which links increased modernity and national assimilation, under this theory we could conclude (although with caution) that the King deprived Afghanistan from a golden chance to greater cultural assimilation and political unity. Also, in my view his attempt to create a nationhood was too exclusory for it to be a genuine project as it solely reflected the Pashtun culture.  Amir not only failed in his single biggest mission of uniting the country, but in fact forever set a negative tone in Afghanistan history. It was now when ethnic consciousness had heightened to precarious levels. Whilst previously the population of this area showed great teamwork and unity in rising up against major British and other powers, now one’s ethnicity became either their reason for death and persecution, or for rights and privileges.

After King Amir Abdur Rahman descended from his throne in 1901, he was replaced by his son Habibullah (1901-1919) and thereafter Habibullah’s son Amanullah took reign  (1919-1929). Both kings proved to be a less authoritarian and more tolerating and humane leader than their father and had a common aim of instilling “a sense of loyalty and identification”[50] into the country.

After Amanullah Khan finally declared independence from British influence in 1919, this was finally the right time to really seriously start thinking about “nation” and “state” building. Although the mission of establishing an “Afghan Nationalism” was put into further. King Amanullah took drastic steps toward modernising the country, abolishes slivery, Approved constitution, made a reform in education system and give the right for female to attended official schools, made a modern government and introduced Afghanistan as an independent state in the rank of world nations. But because of his unbalanced foreign policies and opposition of religious and reactionary forces to his untimely and to some extent unreasonable reforms was failed, in fact “it was the rise of nationalism that tragically led to its fall.”[51]it was the golden time for Afghanistan to build a nation, but ended with tragedy.

In 1929 after a brief 10 month reign by the only Tajik king in Afghanistan (Amir Habib-Allah Kalakani), Nader Shah ascended to the throne until 1933. He took some steps towards state building, by improving roads, communication methods, initiating a banking system and building a national army of 40,000 man from scratch. However, again backed by the Brits in terms of money, arms and political support, he “plunged the country back into a dark abyss of tribalism, racism, and regionalism, and again abused Islam in order to bolster the “legitimacy” and continuity of their kinship and sovereignty over a subject population”[52]. Afghanistan was back to being a highly diversified entity. After Nader Shah was assassinated in 1933, the last monarch was his son Zahir Shah who reigned for forty years. This was largely the most stable and peaceful period Afghanistan had witnessed and the king received the title “father of the nation”.[53](which was not really deserved) He furthered the economic, communication and transportation initiatives of the previous king. He had a clear aim of unifying Afghanistan as a whole, which was evidential from his decision to adopt a new constitution in 1964, relatively freedom of press and demanded greater equality between genders and ethnic groups. The rights of women in particular, were increased to unseen before levels in political, educational and professional sphere. Primary school availability was increased to an extent that over 50% of children under 12 attended school, and secondary and higher educational institutions were also improved a lot.[54] In 1973, Daoud Khan remove the King from his throne in a coup d’état, transforming the country into the Republic of Afghanistan[55], with himself as the president.

The pro soviet regime instilled in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards to 1989, was  an attempt at instilling soviet-style nationality policies into the Afghan politics. Although from 1979 to 1989 there were more progress in education, health, Women's rights , agriculture and economy and reinforcement of Afghanistan armed forces but as far as the pro soviet regime  lacked the traditional legitimacy which were Islam and nationalism soon faced with the resistance of Afghans and  international opposition and finally collapsed  and failed its attempt to make  Soviet style of state- nation.

Once the Soviets were out of the country, the various resistance groups no longer had a common overarching goal and soon started fighting each other in their quest for control of the Kabul government. Although the Tajik Mujahideen group led by Ahmad Shah Massoud managed to hold control of the Kabul and some parts of Afghanistan with Rabanni as head of state from 1992 to 1996, the various factions were continuously fighting among each other. The desire for “nation” or “state” building was now lost not only because of the extensive damage caused to the various state apparatus by the war (not to mention the exhaustion and fatigued people who were preoccupied with grief and pain), but also because the various non-pashtun groups especially were all extremely eager to obtain political control of Kabul for the first time now and were ready to fight each other with gun and sword. It was finally their chance to push forward their particular identity as the “national” identity of Afghanistan. Ethnicity was now a “prime factor in a political actor’s claim to legitimacy”[56]. The rise of the Taliban in 1996 was a reaction to the continuous conflict in Kabul between the factions and the total chaos in the rest of the country. The Taliban were aiming to speedily reunify the country by establishing a centralised “Islamic” state of Afghanistan. Amin Saikal says that the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in 1996 “clearly changed the conflict into an ethnic power struggle of Pashtuns against non-Pashtuns”[57] because although the Taliban initially were reluctant to admit their ethnic composition (arguing that Islam was their main element of unification), it soon became clear that their composition was predominantly that of Pashtun. Initially Afghans were receptive to the Taliban, as over 99% of the people practice the Islamic religion[58]. However, the Afghan populace once more failed to relate to the version of an Afghan “identity” that the Taliban had tried to impose on the people, as it was based on an extremist interpretation of the Qur’an, denying women from a right to education and education, for example.The Taliban were driven out of force in 2001 when the United States instigated “war against terror” in Afghanistan following the 9 11 attacks by the Al Qaeda. Although the primary aim of the US and its forces were merely military, it became clear that post conflict reconstruction was necessary for this country. We will look at nation building post-9 11 in the next part of this paper.

Chapter 3

Nation-State Building in Afghanistan: Post- Taliban

As we have mentioned, to Max Weber a state is a “human community that ( successfully) claims the monopoly  of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”^[59]  from here one can see that a state is on institution that keeps law and order by the use of force. State Building means establishing new governmental institutions or improving those already existed. In the past it was considered the responsibility of every individual nation to build up their own states and set up its institutions; but in the contemporary world the existence of numerous ‘failed’, fragile and weak state are recognised as a source of instability, civil wars, epidemic diseases, mass-killings, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, which endanger the international security. For these reasons state building changed from a domestic to international issue.

In considering  genocides in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia Kofi Annan the general secretary of the UN asked all the member nations in his Report (2000); “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”^[60]

By passing the resolution on ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘ responsibility to protect’ the very corner stone of international relations which was the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other country was changed. “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” .^[61]  According to Fukuyama in the case of countries like Somalia and Afghanistan speaking of State Sovereignty is like a “bad joke”. So, under such circumstances, “outside powers, acting in the name of human rights and democratic legitimacy, had not just the right but the obligation to intervene”^[62].

Afghanistan never had a true ‘modern state’. Practically it was always like a confederation of tribes, regardless of the many state or nation building efforts that took place in history as we have seen. The governments had never control over the whole country except Kabul and some big cities.

In 2001 the Afghanistan was “Stateless” in reality  it “ was hijacked by a non-state actors, the terrorist organization, Al-Qaida and served as a base of global terrorist operation”.^[63] It was right under the pretext of Humanitarian intervention that the United States and allies invaded the Afghanistan and rolled out the Taliban’s barbaric regime. In case of Afghanistan it is not the improving or repairing of governmental institutions; it is rebuilding from “zero ground” because during three decades  of civil war and warlord ism, all basements of a state were ruined to the ground. The international community took the responsibility to set up or bring about the four components of state-building: coercion or Armed Forces, capital or Economic Aids, legitimacy  by setting up governmental organs and legal institutions and finally make leadership for Afghanistan.

In this chapter, we shall discus about these four essential element of state building in Afghanistan. But first we should make clear that what was the reasons for  intervention and how it went on?

The Reason for Intervention in Afghanistan

The horrific terrorist attack of September 2001 not just changed the destiny of Afghanistan but brought a new era in an international relations and world politics. The Al-Qaida and its leader Bin Laden whom was hosted by Taliban regime in Afghanistan were blamed for this barbaric act.

Soon after 9/11 Gorge W. Bush the president of the United states declared ‘war on terror’ and strongly stated that “every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with terrorists”^[64]. It was for the first time that Afghanistan after a decade came back to the attention of the international community and media. After soviet withdrawal and seizing of power by the Mujahidin, in contradiction to the suffering of Afghans from factional war by mujahidin groups and atrocities, mass-killings and ethnic cleansing by Taliban, the country was practically forgotten by democratic world specially the US. But when the Taliban denied to surrender Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders, the united states made Afghanistan as the first battle ground in ‘war on terror’.^[65] British Prime Minister Tony Blair went further, on 16 September 2001 and said: “the fact is that we are at war with terrorism … it is a war, if you like, between the civilised world and fanaticism”^[66]. The UN and its Security Council showed its support in war against terror. in fact it was for the first time in the history that the whole world were supporting the invasion of a super power to a small independent country.

The Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001.^[67]  United States not just enjoyed the support of anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan ( Northern Alliance) but the support of the absolute majority of Afghan people.

A) Coercion

i)   Military campaign and Military Build- up:

On the 20^thDecember the UN Security Council passed the resolution No. 1386 which stationed International Security Assistance Forces( ISAF) in Afghanistan. Their mission was like peace keeping forces to secure stability in Kabul city and surrounding areas and help the Afghan Interim Authority to function normally. In 2002 their number was about 3,000 and mostly from NATO and EU member countries but gradually, their numbers  rose up to 100,000 in 2010. ^[68] 

See map no.1 from BBC news

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11795066

Map No.1

According to Katzman, in 2010 there were About 145.000 foreign troops in Afghanistan of which about 104,000 were U.S. and 41,000 non-U.S. partner forces (this included 2,830 from Canada, 3,750 French, 4,665 Germans, 3,300 Italians and 9,500 British forces and the rest from more than 40 NATO and non NATO allied countries. ^[69]

ii) The inability to form a central stable army

Historical experience shows that “coercion” is one of the essential component on any state building effort. Each country or nation needs effective Armed Forces to defend its national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Armies without having to consider the political systems of their country always have a decisive role in the defense of their territory. The tragic fall of the only modernist  king of Afghanistan King  Amanullah  was partly a failure of legitimacy and empty treasury, but partly due to  not having  sufficient coercive force to ‘compensate for his flagging authority when his enemies mobilized in the name of Islam[70]. Having military power or coercive force was essential for him to put his modernist project in practice, but the Afghan young king had ignored the advice of Kemal Ataturk that during their first meeting : ‘first, build an army’.^[71] There are many debates about  the capability of the Afghan army to defend  the "sovereignty" and ‘territorial integrity’ of the country.

In this section we will briefly review the history of afghan army and discuss the following: the Afghan army's role in the country's political independence and territorial integrity, the Afghan army's role in the coups and  regime changes. Afghanistan's geo-political situation and its economic ability  and the necessity of having a strong military, or vice versa. And finally, Is Afghanistan able to build a strong army at present situation?

The first cores of Afghan armed forces were built by Amir Sher Ali khan in 1860s, but  the first organized army of Afghanistan (in the modern sense) was established after the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1880 when the country was ruled by Emir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901).^[72] The  modern Afghan national army was practically established after the 3^rd Afghan-Anglo war during king Amanullah Khan in 1919 when Afghanistan received its full independence from Great Britain. During the time of king Zahir Shah and president Daoud khan, the ties between the Afghan army and Soviet Red army became much more closer. When Daoud khan (1953-1963) served as prime minister (in considering  his Pashunistan policy and rivalry with Pakistan), he hardly tried to enhance the capability of Afghanistan army. During this time, the Afghan army of 44,000 with antique weapons in hand in 1956 grown up to 100,00 strong army in 1978, will equipped with modern Soviet weaponry.^[73] When Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Afghanistan had strong Air forces with over 400 military aircraft, including over 200 Soviet-made fighter jets, Suu-22 Attack planes and bullet-perforated Mi-6 heavy lift helicopters.^[74] With the fall of Dr. Najibullan and the consequent seizing of power by Mujahidin, the 250,000 men strong army of Afghanistan which had been built in 100 years was disintegrated and this was largely the result of Mujahidin rivalry and their foreign supporter’s plans to make this happen.^[75] Most Afghan politicians and military experts believe that there was the hand of Pakistan in the dissolution of the Afghan  National Army.

The Afghan Army never encountered its foreign aggressors effectively. During the three Anglo-Afghan wars, Afghanistan did not have a regular strong Army and it was not the army units but the People's Volunteer militias that resisted against the British Army. During soviet invasion (1979-1989), the Afghan Army welcomed soviet forces and again, it was the people of Afghanistan that stood against aggression and defended their homeland. All Afghan regimes instead used the Army for suppressing people’s uprisings. The only achievement of the Afghan National Army is the imposing of two military coups in 1973 and 1978, which saw Afghanistan lose its relative stability, introducing in a new era of instability, conflicts, foreign aggressions and internal civil wars. ^[76]

As we mentioned above,  the responsibility of any army is to safeguard the official borders and to defend the homeland against foreign aggression and is the job of the national police forces to keep order inside the country. Now let’s see; from where are the possible threats of invasions coming? Normally from our neighbouring countries like Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Russia and its allies in central Asia; of course the current invasion led by US and NATO is very exceptional and to some extent it is not threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. If we count  the newly emerged Central Asia independent countries as sphere of the influence of Russian,  in this case our four neighbouring countries, China, India, Pakistan  and Russia are nuclear powers, and Iran is also in the way to become a nuclear power. 

Both in terms of size and population, Afghanistan is the smallest and poorest country in the region (of US$964 annual GDP per capita.^[77] Can we say that it can build an Army strong enough  to defend its homeland in case of  possible aggression by the strong armies of its neighbouring countries? I strongly believe that it is impossible.

Table 1: Sizes of Other Military Forces

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.NOTE: The figure for Afghanistan is an estimate. To date, there are no reliable

estimates of Afghan population. This table clearly show that Afghanistan cannot make a strong Army  Equivalent to its powerful neighbors.

iii)       Rebuilding the Afghan National Army with foreign Aids:

When in 2001 US troops invaded Afghanistan and swiftly removed the Taliban with the help of Northern Alliance militias and heavy aerial bombardments, they may have mistakenly thought that reconstruction and state building projects to keep Afghanistan together was just as easy. With this in mind, it was clear that the Americans didn’t have any serious plans to rebuild the Afghan Army at least to its original shape and size. The US was concentrating more in rebuilding the Afghan national police and security forces, but with the passing of time and the obvious returning of the Taliban and other insurgency groups, the US changed the policy and gradually attempted to rebuild the Afghan National Army. According to Katzman, the Afghan national army has been “built  from the scratch” as its today’s form is not a direct continuation or enhanced version of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That army disintegrated entirely during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the1996-2001 Taliban period.^[78] The total force of ANA in 2005 was only 22,000 men strong and by 2008 the Afghan army reached 88,000. By 2010, the goal was further lifted to 122,000 and by October 2011 reached 171,600. ^[79] The Afghan Air Force which existed from previous Afghan regimes  was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002  during U.S. combat against the Taliban. It is now has about over 3,000 personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as a total of about 46 aircraft.^[80]

Gradually the Armed forces of Afghanistan were expanded from 22,000 to 300,000 which consist  of 171,000 ANA and 134,000 Afghan National Police forces.

Table 2 shows the rapid expansion of the Afghan Army

 At present time, the US and EU are paying afghan military expanses including  the salaries, training and equipment. The question arising here is for how long will they pay these expenses? And secondly with this dependency  whom will serve this army? And can such an Army be regarded as a National army?  In addition it would create deep imbalances in relations between the military and civilian authorities, having in mind the weakness of civil institutions in Afghanistan and  the experiences from the past two military coups  and the fact that “few of Afghanistan’s armies have successfully monopolized the legitimate use of force.”^[81]The new Afghan Army will be a power broker. Another problem is keeping the unity of army in a very ethnically  fragmented country. Right now the Afghan Army divided in ethnic lines and Jehadi groups and obviously  far from a unified national character; if in future the Taliban reconcile, their forces should also join the Army , in such case  who and how can guarantee the unity of Afghan Army? With high probability, after the withdrawal of international forces the Army factions will fight each other and not just disintegrate the army  but the country.^[82] Considering the above mentioned facts, I argue that in contrary to the theoretical aspects and also other nations’ experiences in “nation- state building” projects, in Afghanistan creating strong army in the way that it has been done is not helping the process of ‘nation building’  nor ‘state building.’ In short, I think we cannot build a strong national army and do not have the ability to financing and equipping  such on  army independently . What we need is a strong national police and Border  forces to provide internal security and prevent drug trafficking and border violations . Spending the annual 4 to 5 billion dollars instead to, agriculture, education, health and other civic institutions will surely speed up the process of ‘nation- state building’ in Afghanistan.

iv)   Building Institutions:

The Bon conference ( on December 5, 2001) was called immediately after the fall of the Taliban by UN which was represented by Lakhdar Brahimi to bring Afghani factions together and make a so called ‘broad based, transitional Authority’. the Bon Agreement was signed by December 5 2001. It was the first and very essential step by the international community and Afghani factions toward rebuilding a state. The talks were mainly between United Front (Northern Alliance ) And Afghans living outside the country, mainly represented by the Rome Group which were the latest King’s loyalists. Another two small groups were there in the name of Peshawar and Cyprus Group, which to some extent were under the influence of  Pakistan and Iran. During the Taliban rule there were just two main forces which were fighting each other: the Taliban and Northern Alliance. Some analysts believe that it was a mistake to exclude ”moderate Taliban” from the Bon process. The bon Conference was due to appoint the head of Interim Afghan Authority  and draw a road map for transition and state building. The talks were sponsored by UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi , but in fact the stronger side was the USA delegation headed  by James Dobbins and Zalmai Khalilzad. During the talks, the representative of the United Front ruled itself out from leadership, and the majority of  delegates voted for Abdul Satar Sirat, whom was representing the former king Zahir Shah. Lakhdar Brahimi , Kalilzad and Qaanoni ( the head of Northern Alliance negotiating team) opposed that proposal, just because Mr Sirat was not Pashtun but from the Uzbek ethnic group.^[83] Then Hamid Karzai who was Pashtun by ethnicity and had closer ties with Khalilzad and the United States security circles, was elected as the head of Interim Afghan Authority With three votes against eleven for. This decision was not just undemocratic but also in contrary  with the United Nations Security Council Agreement over Afghanistan which among others says: it’s “the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice”.^[84] The Bon accord established the so called ‘broad based’ interim  government and by the first January 2002 Karzai took the office in Kabul. According with provisions of the Bon Accord in June 2002, an Emergency  Loya Jirga ( Grand Assembly) was held and the Transitional administration was chosen with Karzai again as head . The Transitional Administration  was due to prepare the draft Constitution and call for another Loya Jirga to ratify the Constitution. The Constitutional Loya Jirga met in December 2003-January 2004 and ratified the new Constitution.

Elections: In October 2004 after four months delay, the Presidential  Election happened; people went to  ballot polls to elect their president freely and fairly, and again Karzai came out as first supposedly Democratically and fairly Elected president. The Parliamentary Elections were postponed until September 2005.^[85](see Fig.1 below) Unfortunately both  presidential and parliamentary election were very far from democratic and fair. In both parliamentary elections, just a small portion of parliament members were chosen  by free will of the people, mostly were selected  by fraud and force. Some of them are either belong to drug trafficking mafia or Taliban or other insurgent groups. The presidential elections were much more worse. In 2004 Karzai was elected directly by  US rather than Afghans. Election of 2009 was full of fraud and irregularity in favour of Karzai. Karzai won 54.62% (1.5 million fraud votes) and the final results  49.67% for Karzai and 30.59 % for Abdullah (his rival). It was due to go to the second round of voting, But Abdullah announced that he “will not participate” in the runoff election because despite of his complaints and demands regarding changing the head of the  Election Committee, Karzai denied to bring any change in the Election Committee, so he was forced to withdraw from the election runoff.^[86] So, legally the second term of President Karzai seems to be unlawful and illegitimate.

Fig1: Bon Process

Source: Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war , by: THOMAS H. JOHNSON ,available on line: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA484141

In this section of this paper I would like to concentrate more about Constitution because it is the main pillar in nation- State building. An Afghan prominent scholar Prf. Dr M .Nazif  Shahrani from Indiana University, USA called this election SHAME rather than Democracy^[87]

Is this constitution helping Afghan people to create a solid nation and state or does it in fact hinder this process? 

Afghanistan’s Constitution: (Is it Suitable bas for Nation- State Building ?)

The constitution is a National Convention and not a petition to legitimize a leadership, but in the case Afghanistan’s new constitution, it seems that it serves the Karzai’s team rather  State-Nation building . It was not the first time that Afghans through a Loya Jirga ratified  a constitution. Afghanistan already had five constitutions from King Amanullah  up to doctor Najibullah’s time (1923, 1931, 1964, 1977, and 1987)^[88]

According to the Bon Accord the “Constitutional Loya Jirga(CLJ) shall be convened within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan”. From December 13 ,2003 to January 2004, the CLJ with more than 500 delegates met in Kabul; the Jirga was chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadedd who later became the chairman of the  Mushrano Jirga or the upper house of the National Assembly.^[89]

During the CLJ several controversial issues were raised, like the role of Islam, the status of the languages, type of political system (should it be a Unitary centralized system or decentralized , semi federal or federal system), form of the government (should it be presidential, parliamentary or a mix of both with the post of prime minister). The debates quickly took an ethnic character. The Pashtuns delegations as always were strongly supporting Unitary centralized state and presidential system of government while Tajiks ,Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minority groups demanded a decentralized system of power and parliamentary governing system.^[90]

Barnett Rubin’s assessment is very accurate and reasonable  as he says that the “debate over these issues reflected historical realities as well as current dilemmas.” He goes further and says “even today the ethnic question in its plainest form asks whether the state is to be the instrument of a mostly Pashtun elite, or a mechanism through which all citizens may equally take part in self-government”^[91]

Despite the dissatisfaction of  non-Pashtun representatives, they were more or less forced by US envoy Zalmai khalizad to accept the draft which already was designed by Pashtun ethno-centrist group. The interesting thing is the fact that during last hundred years of Afghan history, we never had such strong centralized and mono-ethnic oriented government. During the monarchy and until the fall of Najibullah government there was always the post of prime minister and the prime minister received a confidential vote from the parliament. This constitution is a copy of 1946 constitution during King Zahir shah just with this difference; the right and responsibilities of both the King and prime minister were transferred to one person, ‘the President’. Based on this constitution the president  is similar  to “Emperor “ rather than a representative of the people.^[92]

Afghan people experienced decades of war and conflict, jihad and resistance, so now they have a  higher political awareness then any time in the past. In a country which is dispersed badly by religion, tribes, languages, ethnics and region, it is difficult rule it with the old system. The supporter of centralised presidential system argument is also the same: to bring peace and stability to the war-torn country and build a strong state we need strong presidential government with unitary system, but they forget that if this system was working, it would have worked up to now. In addition they forget the simple fact that all our today’s problems come from our wrong system of governance in the past. Indeed, “the painful lesson of Afghanistan’s history has been that strong centralized government in any form will only lead to hegemony by one group, whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious, and abuse by the ruling group at the expense of justice for all citizens ”.^[93]Even during the Soviet instilled regime, Afghanistan had been administrated in a semi-decentralized system; beside the central organs and  governors in the provinces there were the Zones Directorates.

In short according in the words of one scholar what the constitutional loya Jirga produced was “not a constitution for all time, but a constitution for Karzai”.^[94]

B) Legitimacy:

Traditionally in the whole history of Afghanistan, Islam and nationalism were the source of legitimacy for all Afghan governments except during so called “communist” regime and soviet occupation. The post-Taliban government were careful to recognize the centrality of Islam. The renamed Afghanistan as “Islamic state” and introduced Islamic Sharia in the Afghan legal system and constitution, but still “the relation between Karzai government, its foreign supporters and Afghan religious authorities remained complicated and at times strained”.^[95] While Taliban and other insurgent groups fighting against Karzai government, US and international forces first of all with the slogan of “Defending Islam” so it seems difficult for Karzai’s regime to enjoy from Islamic legitimacy. Obviously in presence of hundred thousand of foreign troops and total dependency in foreign capital Afghan regime cannot invoke nationalism as a legitimizing ideology. Rubin believes that the intervention “enjoyed international legitimacy” because all nations including UN and international organizations supported this and enjoyed substantial support inside Afghanistan, “where Afghans saw it less as destroying sovereignty than as potentially restoring it after years of interference by neighbouring countries”. ^[96]

Other sources of legitimacy are building state and legal institutions, fair and democratic elections, keeping law and order, good governance, mobilising of economic and financial resources and particularly  “the struggle over the budget, which is at the centre of the process of state formation and legitimation”,^[97] and fair and proportionate presence of the representatives of ethnics and region in the local and central  institutions (judicial, executive and legislative). In a country like Afghanistan with its ethnic diversity and problems, this is very important. Otherwise “without regional and ethnic balance, legitimacy  would be non-existent and elections are useless”.^[98] Fukuyama believes that “while there have historically been many forms of legitimacy, in today’s world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy.”^[99]

From the above analysis we can see that Afghanistan state enjoys “dual legitimacy”, it is internationally recognized as a sovereign state and its government is legitimate internationally; the presence of international forces are under the permission UN Security Council and confirmation the General Assembly, so their presence will not endanger the Legitimacy of  the Afghan present government. Generally the legitimacy of the present Afghan government lies in Bon Conference, Loya Jirgas, constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections and establishment of central and local organs of power. From the other side, corruption, bad governance, weakness of judiciary and law enforcement organs, instability, presence of insurgencies and their fight in the name of Islam and Afghan Nationalism reduces the  Afghanistan’s government legitimacy considerably.

C) Capital (The economic Dimension State Building post-Taliban Era)

A strong economy is the most important component in the process of Nation-State building which Afghanistan does not benefit from. Afghanistan is among five of the poorest countries in the world with lowest income per capita. The majority of Afghans  are living under the poverty line, just 23% of the people have access to safe drinking water, 12% to snatation,6% to electricity. The child mortality rate is 115 per 1,000 which is the highest rate in the world and highest maternal mortality in the world as well and 71% illiteracy rate.^[100]Afghanistan has never been self-sufficient economically, but always been as a ‘Rentier state’. Rentier state refers to those countries where their income relies heavily on foreign aids or exporting natural resources instead of internal production, revenues, export and services. Rentier states have the following weakness: “First, they inhibit democratic accountability; Secondly, they are unlikely to develop effective administration; thirdly, they are vulnerable to external shocks over which they have little or no control”.^[101] The table below shows that the economy of Afghanistan has always relied in foreign aids or debts.

Note: For 2004-05, converted from $US at rate of 1:48. The additional ‘external budget’ controlled by the donors was established in 2004.^[102]

From this table we can see that in President Daoud’s time ( 1973-77) the domestic revenues was just over 60 per cent of the total state budget, from 1978 to 1982 or soviet invasion it was between 50 to 70% by comparison three years after American invasion it is 31% of the national budget.

In first years of intervention, the international aids were modest: $1.5 billion in ( 2002-2003),and $2.5 billion in (2003-2004) but later it had been doubled and by mid-decade, reached $5 billion per year. from 2002 to 2009 international community delivered Aid package of $46.1billion to Afghanistan.^[103]According to CIA fact book international community pledged over $67 billion during nine donors' conferences between 2003-10. In Tokyo conference of July 2012, $16 billion civilian conditional aid was pledged, which quid pro quo the Afghanistan Government to combat against “corruption weak governance, low revenue collection, unemployment, poor public infrastructure and poppy trade and cultivation”.^[104]

 Based on IMF and  world Bank reports, Afghanistan GDP shows slow but steady growth. It was $5.1 billion in 2006/07 and increased to $19.6 in 2012/13. The GDP per capita also shows a growth from $528 in 2010 to $612 in 2012.^[105] Afghanistan export shows the Figure of$ 376 million, instead the import valued $ 6.39 billion.^[106] If we do not consider the illegal trade and narcotics however, just five percent of Afghan GDP is from domestic product and revenues; the rest comes from foreign aids. The interesting thing is the Afghan government is not able to pay the salary of its officials. By 2010 donors paid the monthly salary of6,600 Afghan officials in different ministries(it does not include security and Armed forces) round $45 million a year.^[107]Not just  the officials in the different ministries, but the president Karzai office and himself receiving money the from the donors but from intelligent circles  of different countries Including Iran, CIA and MI6. Karzai acknowledged during interviews that he received and still receiving money from  Iranian intelligent circles and CIA. ^[108]  

 Afghan Government complains that, nearly 70% of aids were spent through NGOs and International Organizations which are not accountable to Afghan authorities. Although Afghan government is weak and corrupt but still these  generous international Aids hade brought enormous change in Afghans life specially in health, Education, Media, Communication etc.

Health: In 2001 only 8% of Afghanistan people had access to health services, now it is round 80%. Vaccination for  children under five year age reached about 77%. More than 4000 medical centers were set up newly and the rate of child and maternal mortality fall down dramatically. (see table 1)

Education: in 2001 about 1.2 million children attended schools, and girls were  near completely out of school, now more than 7 million children go to school, which round 50% of them are girls. Hundreds of schools built or re constructed, 45,000 teachers have been trained and more than 20 state and private universities been reactivated or newly established.^[109](see table 2)

Communication and press: after 2001 there is a very rapid growth in media and communication in Afghanistan. Prior to 2001 there was just Afghanistan radio television and a few governmental newspapers but now there  are more the 76 radio and TV channels and more than hundreds magazines and new papers countrywide. At present time 85%  of country is covered by mobile telephone networks like: MTN, Roshan, Afghan Wireless and Etisalat  companies.^[110] 

Table 2

Tab 1 and 2, from: BBC news, Life in Afghanistan

Besides these achievements there are some progress in transportation, roads reconstruction and highway maintenance, but this paper argues that in  comparison to huge amount of aids (more the $50 Billions) there is no significant visible progress in Afghanistan economy, in agricultural and industrial infrastructures. Afghanistan is an agricultural country and round 80%  of Afghans income comes from agricultural production. From all the huge Aids, just $270 million was invested in Agriculture and $ 300 million in rural development projects.^[111]According to Afghanistan central statistic organization, the “arable and permanent cropland area in Afghanistan is 8.5 million hectors, from which the areas with irrigation facilities are about one million hectors”^[112]. From this, just 40% of are properly irrigated because during the internal conflicts even the traditional irrigation system is also badly suffered and 154,000hectars are poppy yards in southern province of Helmand, Kandahar, Urozgan and Farah.^[113]  Before soviet invasion there were some irrigation projects and hydroelectric power plants and dams like  Salma Dam, Kajaki, Dehla, and Bandi Sardeh dams, and also, Naghlu, Darunta, Jabalsirag hydroelectric power station, Jalalabad agricultural irrigation plant and Kockcha irrigation and power plants were functioning including some industrial sights and Factories like Spinzar cotton Factory in Kunduz and Jangalk Automotive factory and Kabul House-Building Factory , Baghlan Sugar Factory etc.^[114] During 30 years of invasions and civil war all these agricultural and industrial infrastructures were ruined to the ground.

The irony is American and its allies spent  $2.3 to $2.7Trillion in ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and may reach to $4.4 trillion^[115], but yet they didn’t rebuild any of these infrastructures. Maybe they would argue that in this unsecure condition of Afghanistan they cannot invest and run such projects but it seems a void argument, because three-quarter of Afghanistan (north, north-east, west and central parts) are safe and secure, yet we don’t see any agricultural or industrial project there.

Afghanistan has two major source for its development.

1. Water resources: the majority of rivers in the region originate from Afghanistan, but we cannot use them and as a result Afghanistan’s lands are dry or un-irrigated and Afghans are thirsty and living in the dark and obliged to import electricity from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
2. Mines and Minerals: Afghanistan is rich of mines and minerals like gold, emerald, gems, copper, Iron ore, gas and oil. In some estimates, worth $1-3 Trillion^[116]. Unfortunately, Afghanistan doesn’t have the features of extraction.

One of the main reasons for growing insurgencies is unemployment. Over 80% of young people in Afghanistan are unemployed; when the Taliban and other insurgent groups or the local warlords or Norco-trader  mafias offer them money, normally the will join them. State building without Capital or strong Economical infrastructures is impossible. If the international community honestly and without any hypocrisy like to make nation- state in Afghanistan and win the war against terror, beside institution building, Human rights and democracy they should invest more money in education, health care, Agriculture, building or rebuilding power plants, dams, traditional industries and mining industry.

D) Leadership (Narco-Mafia State and Poor Governance):

Narco-trade: UNDOC  survey shows that Afghanistan is the main producer of opium and narcotics in the world, producing over 90% of world opium. UN reports show that in 2011 and 2012 there were 231,000 to 154,000 Hectare land  were poppy cultivation which produced from which  3,7000 to 5800 ton opium.^[117]Poppy cultivation is not just the main funding source for insurgencies, local warlords and terrorist group but it causes hindered ‘good governance’ as well because most senior government officials including high ranking military personals including Karzai’s brother and his deputy family members are suspected to be involved in narco trafficking .^[118]Even former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her written statement to the Congress during her confirmation was heard calling Afghanistan a "narco-state" that was "plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption".^[119]Poppy cultivation and narcotics in addition of its bad effect in the country economy and security, badly effects Afghans social life as well. At present time there are more than 1.5 million (mostly youth) people addicted with opium and heroin.^[120] Fukuyama rightly says that “overcoming corruption  and nepotism is of the major hurdles facing nation-state builders. Both problems are endemic to Afghanistan and have intensified with the injection of foreign assistance Capital”.^[121]

Generally “good governance” means enforcing law and order, effectively managing the resources, representing the people and caring about their rights and welfare. These criteria are completely missing in Afghan government under the leadership of Karzai. In 2011 the cost of corruption in Afghanistan was amounted $3.9Billion. People are settling their legal issues with bribed judges, attorney, police and other governmental organs twice the country's domestic revenue. That’s why in countrysides people prefer to refer to The Taliban for solving their legal disputes rather than the government officials. It is evident that “there are a strong and symbiotic relationship between building peace and addressing the demands of a people who want justice”.^[122]

In Short, the Afghan legal authorities seems to be more robber then lawyer and the ”police are predators rather than protectors”^[123] and “reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or go to pay short –contract Western consultants.”^[124] Corruption costs Afghanistan its future.

Leadership:

As we said before one of the  momentous prerequisite for state- nation building is the existence of strong and charismatic leaders. Afghanistan government is lacking such personalities. For instance president Karzai himself is neither educated and experienced politician, never was a leader of any political party, nor tribal chieftain. During Soviet occupation he joined Mujadadi Jihadi group and later during Rabani Government for a while was the third Deputy for the foreign minister of the Mujahidin government, later he joined the Taliban. Then he turned down the Taliban’s offer to become their ambassador to the UN, preferring to work for the UNOCAL oil company. Here he backed up khalilzad,.^[125]In 2011 during Bon conference he was unjustly selected (with Three votes against eleven votes from Satar Sirat) with the support of Khalizad and lakhdar Brahimi from UN as the head of Afghan interim Authority and permanently supported by US to keep the presidential position up to now. During this year his relation with the US is deteriorating. He doesn’t enjoy either the support of his Karz villagers, he is neither charismatic nor strong or intellectual leader. Simply a puppet leader. His deputies and most of his cabinet ministers and provinces governors are either the warlords, former mujahidin group including Hikmatyar party including or some repatriate from West that most of them lived for long time in western countries and does have a little knowledge about today’s Afghanistan simply went to fill their pockets from international aids. However, among them there are some intellectuals and patriotic individuals. with such Incompetent and corrupt leadership it seems impossible to  build nation-state even with spending trillions of dollars.

Chapter 4

The role of neighbours in peace, stability and state-building in Afghanistan

State building needs peace and stability. No country can be peaceful and stable without having good and friendly relations with its neighbours.

India and china: with India Afghanistan has traditionally good relation, no matter which kind of regime ruled Afghanistan ( except the Taliban regime ) Kabul and new Delhi enjoyed good relations. India has already invested  more than$2 billion in Afghanistan infrastructures like higher education, highways maintenance, health services,  and rural development projects.^[126] In October 2011 India and Afghanistan signed 'strategic partnership' agreement which was ratified by both Parliaments; “helping the Afghan government to rebuild its police forces, training judiciary and diplomatic services’ are some provision of that agreement”.^[127]

China: Afghanistan and China have a small border in “Wakhan Corridor” in  Badakhshan province of Afghanistan  and  always had good relations from king’s time up to now. China already in 1960s helped Afghanistan in some irrigation plans and poultry projects. China from beginning supported ‘war on terror’. From 2001 until 2010 allocated it total of $1billion aid to Afghanistan.^[128] In November 2007 China and Afghanistan signed  contract on Ainak Copper mine in Lougar province south of Kabul worth of $3.4 billion. In 2010 export and import of china to Afghanistan reached $704.00million and $11.70 million.^[129] In October 2012 China and Afghanistan signed 25 years contract for extracting oil and gas in Amu Darya project in northern Afghanistan.^[130]  China seems genuine in helping Afghanistan in process of peace and stability and state building.

Central Asian Republic: Afghanistan established diplomatic relation with central Asian republic right after their independence on 1992.  Central Asian republics Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan see their security and stability in the security  and stability of Afghanistan. Except Turkmenistan, the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan supported the national salvation front (northern Alliance) during resisting time against the Taliban . These countries from the beginning supported ‘war on terror’ and either some of them rendered their territory and air fields in the service of collation forces. They are all under the threat of exporting Islamic radicalism and narco-trade from Afghanistan.^[131]  In September 2007 a deal signed between Afghanistan and Tajikistan to  transfer Electrical energy to Afghanistan $500million, On 24 April 2008 TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) was signed. From Turkmenistan it pass through Afghanistan and goes to Pakistan and India and is estimated to bring an annual revenue of over $200 million to Afghanistan and to be completed by 2018^[132]. Besides that, these countries have ethnic and linguistic ties with Afghanistan ethnic groups. Peace and Stability in Afghanistan means the same in in central Asian Republics. That is why they are supporting peace, stability and Nation-state  building in Afghanistan.

IRAN: Afghanistan and Iran (Persia)relationship goes through the history.

Afghanistan and Iran had established diplomatic relation in 1935. Besides the historical and religious ties, the countries share the same culture and language. Farsi is the native language of  majority of Iranians as well as the majority of Afghanistan people. The two countries always had good and friendly relation except during Taliban rule. The only dispute was over the Helmand river which was settled by a treaty to share water rights, signed in 1973 by the prime ministers of the two country.^[133] During soviet occupation Iran helped Afghan Mujahidin specially dose from Shia sect. In this time more than two million of Afghans  took refuge in Iran. However when the Taliban came in power and after the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar e Sharif, their relation became tense. In this period of time Iran supported anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.^[134]

After American invasion Afghanistan became strategically more important for Iranian diplomacy, because from one side they are happy to see Taliban and Al-Qaida out of Afghanistan and to this end their policy is parallel to ‘war on terror’, but from other side considering their rivalry with US they are suspicious to American’s policy in the region and opposing strongly US and NATO permanent station in Afghanistan. Iran took part in aids and rebuilding Afghanistan in road  and school reconstruction specially in western part of Afghanistan. Iran support international efforts in stabilising and state building, because Taliban, al-Qaida, Sunni and   Wahabi extremist as well an narco-trade mafia is their common enemy. Unstable Afghanistan de-stabilizes Iran as well.

Bilateral trade between two country is also improved. An estimate from European Commission shows the figure of $11 million in 2010 but president Karzai claimed  bilateral trade totalled more than $1.5 billion.’’^[135] At present there are more than one million Afghan refugees in Iran of which according to UNHCR just 818,910 are registered^[136]in August 2013 Iran and Afghanistan signed strategic agreement.^[137]

In short: Iran’s long term interests are in same line with Afghanistan and international community interests and surly  doesn’t like have unstable , insecure and extremist state on its eastern border.^[138]

Pakistan:  Pakistan with having 183 million population is the sixth most populated country in the world. It is the 6^th strongest nuclear power holder and its army is among the most powerful armies in the world. Numbers of its troops “steadily grew to 80,000 and drastically changed the region, which had been under “indirect rule” for more than a century”.^[139] The British Empire before withdrawal from India had divided  Indian subcontinent in the two separate countries Pakistan and India.  Afghan-Pakistan relation was from the beginning fluctuating and the root of this misunderstanding lies in the history. When Pakistan became independent in 1947 Afghanistan voted against its membership  in United nation with the pretext that Pashtuns problem. Although Afghanistan withdrew its objections and sent Marshal Shah Wali khan (the most power full man in the monarchy) as ambassador to Islamabad  became one of the first nation to establish diplomatic relation with Pakistan.^[140] The roots of so called Pashtunistan issue is lies in the other controversial issue which is the question of the “Duurand line”. This a  border agreement drawn and signed between British India and Afghanistan in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and king Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893.^[141]

Afghan Pashtun Nationalist (may be better to say tribalists) claim that they don’t recognise this  border because :1) coercion: It was imposed by force on Amir, 2) legitimacy: It was between Britain and Afghanistan, Pakistan is not the successor of the great Britan ,3) Time bounded: it was for 100 years, 4) dividing Pashtun tribes. It seems that none of these arguments are logical or accept able. Firstly it was completely with the will of Abdul Khan. After signing that treaty  British  government doubled his subsidy Allowance. Beside that after Abdul Rahman five other Afghan Amir and kings  with signing of new treaties (in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930) accepted  and renewed the Durand treaty. It is recognised as an international border by all countries over the world including Islamic countries an UN as well. If Pashtun nationalists argue that Pakistan cannot be legitimate successor of great Britain, respectively  they must accept that Tasjikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan should not be the legitimate successors of former soviet Union. Regarding the division of the Pashtun ethnic in two countries, they are not alone. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kurds and a lot of other ethnics are also divided by colonial borders^[142]. In addition, if Afghans doesn’t accept the borders which were drawn by Britain then they should make a claim over whole of Pakistan except Panjab.^[143] 

 The issue of Pashtunistan was risen with the dream of making great Pashtunistan from all Pashtunes in both side of the Durand line. This issue raised during Daoud Khan premiership (1953-1963), he was encouraged by Soviet Union and India because this issue was in line with their policies toward Pakistan. From that time Afghan- Pakistan relation have been deteriorating by every passing year. Pakistan likes to see a weak but friendly Afghanistan and seek strategic depth in case of war with India. Pakistan like to see the puppet regime in Afghanistan otherwise it support the opposition of Kabul regime to destabilize Afghanistan.

During president Daoud, Pakistan supported his opponents, during pro- soviet regime in Kabul Pakistan supported Mujahidin; when mujahidin came in power Masoud and did not obey Pakistan orders, they brought up  the Taliban. One should not blame the Pakistan; when Afghanistan claim about one third of their territory , they have the right to respond it and destabilize Afghanistan.

After 9/11 an ‘war on terror’ Pakistan apparently supports US and allies but never been honest on their pledges. It is not mystery that Pakistan supported Taliban ,Hikmatyar ,Haqqani Faction and other Afghan insurgent groups. The leader of all these terrorist networks live in Pakistan. Without Pakistan cooperation, peace  and stability would never come to Afghanistan. If Afghanistan demands Pakistan to render help for peace and state building process, then reciprocally Afghanistan has to give up its territorial claim over Pakistan soil. Indeed, “Kabul and Islamabad must formulate policies to promote a peaceful and prosperous future rather than remaining hostages to the bitter disputes of the past”.^[144]US and NATO should encourage both sides to reach to this end. The key of Afghanistan’s peace and stability lays somewhere in Islamabad palaces , not in Afghanistan’s rigid terrains.

Chapter 5

Looking to the future;
------------------------------------

Afghanistan after 2014 (withdrawal): In year 2014 we expect to witness the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanista,; although the Americans did expressed their willingness of long term station of their limited military force under pretext of “Strategic Partnership”.  The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed By US and Afghanistan on the 2^nd May 2012 and it was due to be followed by “Bilateral Security Agreement” which is not signed yet because of some differences in partners views.^[145]

After 12 years of fierce fighting , killing, capturing, America has come to the end that they cannot defeat Afghan insurgences by military means, so the entered in negotiation with the Taliban. After some years of secret talks between The Taliban and US officials, they opened the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, although they faced angry reaction by Karzai Government and political parties inside Afghanistan. It was not like an office or address for a rebel group but like an embassy, not under the name of Taliban but with the name and risen flag of so called “Afghanistan Islamic Emirate”. With this they ought to enjoy from some kind of diplomatic recognition. After two days the office had been closed and the Taliban withdrew from negotiation.^[146] Most analyses don’t see any prospect in such negotiations either by Karzai regime or by Americans because despite the names like “moderate Taliban” or “good Taliban”, the Taliban has not shown much change by deed or deem. Ideologically  they are as fanatic as they were and indeed the are more vicious and cruel than before. They are still the active “Afghani branch of Al-Qaida”.

Karzai and Americans demand  from Taliban to: “1) cease fighting, 2) accept the Afghan constitution, and 3) break any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The Taliban demands from USA:1) all foreign troops leave Afghanistan; 2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and 3) Islamic law should be imposed”.^[147] From  here one can see that the stand of both side is so completely opposite the other that reconciliation seems illusive.

Of course it is difficult to believe the  demagogical statements from white house regarding complete withdrawal or “option zero”  because it is very clear that and Americans and NATO didn’t come to Afghanistan for the sake of “democratization and good governance”. They have their strategic interests in the region. See for example NATO’s secretary-general J.d.H. Scheffer’s statement at the Brookings Institution in February 2009: “a permanent NATO presence in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran and Pakistan was too good to miss”.’^[148]

Regarding the withdrawal of US and NATO forces one can discuss it in three scenarios:

1. Rapid withdrawal or option Zero: in this condition not just the military forces  will withdraw in 2014 but at the same time economical aids from donor countries (which are mostly sharing military  in Afghanistan) will be ceased. Kabul government will find itself  under huge military and economic pressure which surely will collapse in week or month and the result is not  a stabile fanatic-extremist government but an ethnic rivalry, civil war and “statelessness”; and once again Afghan becomes a safe haven for  international terrorism and narco-trade mafias, and a source of danger for regional and  international security. ^[149] That is why despite the fact that regional powers like China Iran, Russia  are  opposing permanent station of the American and NATO Forces in Afghanistan, they are supporting the presence of these forces in present time and until Afghanistan become a stable country. The majority of Afghan people including political parties and civic societies also opposing Rapid Withdrawal Plan.

From the other side rapid withdrawal means the defeat of US, and NATO  will bring unprecedented consequences for US and allies.  

2.The second scenario could be “win the war” by strengthening Forces and inflict decisive defeat to insurgents then withdraw. In this case the Kabul regime will survive. This scenario has supporters among military men ( Afghans and American), but 12 year of war experience shows that it is not working. 

3.The third scenario can be “gradual withdrawal”:  Gradual reduction of military forces by gradually improving Afghanistan’s economy or “gradual paring down of the rentier state, it should go together with negotiation to find political way end to the insurgency”. ^[150]

Since the Afghanistan problem is not a local but it is rather regional and international problem, the key to solve this problem is in the region. The wars in Afghanistan have been a type of “proxy wars” being funded and directed by some neighbouring countries of Afghanistan or the regional countries,. Bringing stability to Afghanistan and safe withdrawal  depends on the cooperation all countries in the region. Before the withdrawal UN should mediate regional countries (Pakistan, Iran, Indi and China) for reaching an agreement to guarantee that will not interfering in Afghanistan affairs, but rather help Afghan people to create a functioning a broad based government (ethnically, religiously and regionally), respecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity .^[151] Prior to this, it is also needed to urge and mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan to settle their border and historical problems down peace fully in an accordance with international law and norms, through the United Nation.

In 2014 besides withdrawal another important event will happen which is the third Presidential Election in Afghanistan. This is very important; because, first of all for the first time the transfer of power is due to happen peacefully and in a democratic and civilized way. Secondly if the election goes fairly and in a democratic way, the elected president will enjoy  more legitimacy than the running one and can do more to bring peace and stability to the country. Americans and NATO countries should focus in coming Afghan Election rather to hasten withdrawal.  

Conclusion:

The central purpose of this Dissertation was to illustrate the difficulty of the process of Nation-State building in an under developed country like Afghanistan. Through the pages of this paper  we see that Afghanistan suffers from two syndromes: unjust Internal politics and un-balanced foreign policy. The whole text is in direction to find the answer for the question why “Nation-State Building” failed in Afghanistan?

In chapter one we concentrated on theoretical aspects of the Nation-State building and discussed about different theories. In chapter two we went shortly through Afghanistan’s history and its ethnic composition, the effects on Ethnic diversity in nation- state building in Afghanistan as well an attempt made by different rulers( from Amir Abdl Rahan to Talin era) of Afghanistan to create nation- state . In chapter three we enlightened by detail the post-Taliban era of nation state building in Afghanistan. It included the international intervention and why they intervened? We looked at their achievements and failures in nation-state building in Afghanistan in this era. In chapter four we paid attention to the rule of Afghanistan neighbouring countries in bringing peace stability and state building and vice versa. In chapter five we made a glance in the future of the process of nation state building in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of international forces and its consequences and different scenarios  of withdrawal and some suggestions for more riskless withdrawal.

As a result of our research, this paper reached to the following conclusion: Afghanistan has attempted to build a strong central state from Abul Raman time up to now, but failed. As  for “nation building there were two golden opportunities, once in During King Amanullah after independence of Afghanistan and the second during national resistance against former Soviet union, but the first one turned to chaos and barbaric dictatorship and the second one ended to civil war and ethnic split.”^[152] But why?

a.    Afghanistan is located in a very sensitive and important geo-political and geo- strategic loation in the middle Asia. During the history it was invaded by all powerful empires of the world beginning from Alexander the Great, Amawids Khalifat , Mongols, British  and Russian, Soviet empire and now US  Empire. During 19^th century as a result of the Great Game and rivalry between British and Russian, the new Afghanistan with today’s boundaries as a “Buffer State” and neutral country emerged in world map. From that time onward in 20^th century  and Cold War, whenever Afghanistan’s governments tried to deviate from the country neutrality Status and make orientation to East or West faced with negative reaction from opposite side and resulted  the collapse of the Afghan regimes. The collapse of king Amanullh, Daoud Khan, pro-Soviet (Taraki, Amin, Karmal and Najibullah)regime and Mujahidin Government are the examples of the rivalry of East and West and Regional Powers. Afghanistan cannot be absolute Foe or absolute Friend with any regional and International Power. So the logic commands that: if the international community like to see a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, they should help it and let it to come back to its  historical “Buffer zone” and “neutral status”.^[153]

b.    Afghanistan is the land of Ethnic Minorities , none of the ethnics living in Afghanistan  makes 51% of the country population. Besides that the major bulk of bigger minorities( Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch) reside in neighbouring countries. This is one of main obstacle on the path of “Nation Building” process. During last two century Pashtun Aristocracy which ruled the country, they tried hard to assimilate other ethnics in Pashtun ethnicity and make Pashtu the national language of Afghanistan, but always failed. The last century experience proves the fact that Pashtun dominated mono-ethnic centralized statesmanship doesn’t work in Afghanistan. 

It seems that the theory of “assimilation nation building” doesn’t work, so Afghanistan’s Statesmen and Intellectuals should consider the “integration” or civic “nationalization” theories in building a nation. Years of war against soviet union not only raised the political awareness of all Afghanistan’s ethnics but Armed all of them (before soviet invasion just Pashtun tribes had the right to carry guns), now any individual ethnic has enough arms to defend itself. Two decades of civil war and ethnic rivalry have passed but we cannot see any promising horizon for peace and stability. People cannot fight each other for ever, finally they should find a way out. There is just two possibilities:

1. Disintegration: If the international forces pull out suddenly and completely without stabilising the situation and reinforcing Afghanistan’s government it would lead to a renewal  of inter-ethnic conflicts, civil war and destruction. In such a case Afghanistan neighbouring countries surely interfere and organise proxy wars  in Afghanistan and as a result the Afghanistan will be “Balkanized.”( although in the past as well as at the time being there is no political party or social organisations in favour of disintegration) This is the worst scenario, very dangerous and horrible. Firstly because Disintegration of Afghanistan will endanger the peace and stability in the region and will open the way for disintegration of other countries in the region. Secondly, disintegration will not solve Afghanistan Ethnic Problems. Afghanistan is not like former Yugoslavia which every ethnic had its own recognised boundary. In Afghanistan ethnics are mixed in all part of the country and impossible to draw border line and the base ethnicity. May be Afghanistan is more or less similar with “Bosnia-Herzegovina.” We are witness to how difficult it was to bring peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2.Civic integration: Afghanistan’s political parties, social organizations, ethnic and tribal leader should calm down and with the help of neighbourly countries, international community and UN should find a way out for ethnic crisis  in the country. It can take place through a loya Jirga or Referendum to amend the constitution, and lay out the basement for a multi ethnic, multi- religion , multi-lingual and multi-culture civic and democratic country; With a decentralized  or semi Federal system and parliamentary governing body which, where all leading official (head of districts, governors of the provinces and president of the country) should be elected by direct vote of the people.^[154] This paper is also argues that the federal system in Afghanistan cannot be a copy of any other country and cannot be made purely according to Ethnicity; it rather should be also Regional, but at the same time all historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnicity should be in consideration. In this  way Afghans will change from Raiyat (vassal) to Shahrwand (citizen) and from ethnics and tribes to a “Nation”.^[155]

           c. Permanent military bases: there are rumours that the USA is looking for Permanent military bases in Afghanistan; although the US officials never stated it openly, from their insistence for signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, one can come to this conclusion that really the US intended to do so. This paper argues that permanent station of the US military forces is a very dangerous game which endanger s peace and stability in Afghanistan. Americans should learn from the history of Afghanistan and realize the fact that Afghanistan is not Japan or south Korea or Qatar and Saudi Arab. Afghanistan is just Afghanistan. Firstly Afghan people traditionally oppose foreign troops presence in their soil and secondly all regional powers (India, Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia) will oppose it. In such a case Afghanistan will turn again as a battle field for regional and international powers. As I mentioned before the only way to see stable and peaceful Afghanistan is to leave it and help it to become a neutral and de-militarized country, to become a centre of trade and transportation rather the centre of international politics and military rivalries.^[156]

As a conclusion one can emphasize the fact that the solution for the Afghanistan crisis are more a political rather than military and that the key for success that is in Afghanistan and in the region, not in Washington or Brussels.^[157]  “Nation-State Building” is fundamentally a national issue but the international community with their social, humanitarian, economical and even military Aids can facilitate and accelerate it.

*******

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Shelala, R. M. et. Al. 2013. US and Iranian Strategic Competition. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130626_AfPak_Asia.pdf

Simonsen, S. 2013. Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and exclusion in post-Bonn institution building. Third World Quarterly, 25 (4), p. 710.

Smith, A. 1987. The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell

Strategic Partnership Agreement between US and Afghanistan, available on line: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf

 Suhkar, A. 2010. Upside Down Nation Building: The Contradictions of the International Project in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. Available online: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3684-upside-down-state-building.pdf

Suhkar, A. 2010. Upside Down Nation Building: The Contradictions of the International Project in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. Available online: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3684-upside-down-state-building.pdf

Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Suhrke, A. 2011. When more is less. New York: Columbia University Press

Sultanpoor, M. 2006. Afghan Army and Defending Territorial Integrity. Ariana Net [Online] March. Available at: http://www.ariananet.com/modules.php?name=Artikel&op=view&sid=4202#.UiuEApQ1iM8

The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan. National Democratic Institute (2009). Available PDF: http://www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009.pdf

The costs of war at least 3.7 Trillion and Counting. 2011. Reuters, [online] 29 June. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629

The Politics of Water Security between Afghanistan and Iran. Future Directors International 2012.  Available online:  http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/416-the-politics-of-water-security-between-afghanistan-and-iran.html

Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. 2013. ISW institute for study of war. Available online:  http://www.understandingwar.org/turkmenistan-and-afghanistan 

UK to give Afghanistan £10m to fund mining programme. 2013. BBC News, [online] 7 March. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21695037

United States Institute of Peace, SPECIAL REPORT, Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate, by Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, available on line: www.usip.org

USA, China and Afghanistan, a  report of centre for strategic and international studies. CSIS 2012 Available online: http://csis.org/files/publication/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf

Wilber, D. 1962. Afghanistan, Its People, Its Society Its Culture. New Haven: Graf Press

---

[1] Barrington, L. 1997. " Nation" and" Nationalism": The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science. PS: Political Science and Politics, 30 (4), pp. 712—716, 712

[2] Almond, G. and Powell, G. 1996. Comparative Politics Today. New York: Harper Collins, p. 2.

[3] H.Gert and C.W. Mills. 1958. From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press. P, 78.

[4] Connor, W. 1972. Nation-building or nation-destroying?. World politics, 24 (3), pp. 319--355., p. 333.

[5] i.e. those who live within the legal borers of the territory.

[6] Supra, note 4, p. 337

[7] Although these factors can intensify a sense of nationhood

[8] Supra, note 4, p. 337

[9] Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined communities. New York: Verso

[10] Describing the total populace of a country without regard for any cultural or ethnic particularities.

[11] Supra, note 4, p. 334

[12] Ibid

[13] Supra, note 4, p. 337

[14] Supra, note 4, p. 334

[15] Smith, A. 1987. The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell

[16] In a ‘civic’ nation, all citizens agree to be bound by the political and legal institutions of the state. The state, in return, shall provide protection and legal rights to the citizen. This is based on the “social contract” theory. Britain and the US are ‘’civic’’ nations as their populations are not linked by ethnicity, but rather citizenship.

[17] We can for example refer to Gellner who provides that “the age of transition to industrialism was bound…also to be the age of nationalism”  in Gellner, E. 2006. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Gellner, E. 2006. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.p. 36

[18]  Deutsch, K. 1966. Nationalism and social communication. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.

[19] Ibid, p. 118

[20] Supra, note 4, p. 327

[21] Supra, note 4, p. 328

[22] Lijphart, A. 1977. Democracy in plural societies. New Haven: Yale University Press., p. 88

[23] Kolstø, P. 1999. Nation-building and ethnic integration in post-Soviet societies. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. p. 56

[24]See: “Since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the transfer of primary allegiance from these nations to the state is generally considered the sine qua non of successful integration, the true goal is not "nation-building" but "nation-destroying”” in Connor, W. 1972. Nation-building or nation-destroying?. World politics, 24 (3), pp. 319--355., p. 336

[25] Dempsey G. T. 2002. Old Folly in a New Disguise. Nation Building to Combat Terrorism. Policy Analysis. No 429. p. 1. Available at: http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/BerilDedeoglu.pdf[Accessed: 1 Sep 2013]

[26] Dempsey G. T. 2002. Old Folly in a New Disguise. Nation Building to Combat Terrorism. Policy Analysis. No 429. p. 1. Available at: http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/BerilDedeoglu.pdf[Accessed: 1 Sep 2013]

[27] Carolyn Stephenson . 2005 Nation Building  Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Available : http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation-building

 [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013]

[28] Schmidt, A. 1998.  Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. edited by S. B. Anderlini for FEWER ( 2000). p. 19–21.

[29] Fukuyama, F. 2004. State-building. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press., p 135-136

[30]For Deutschian theorists, ethnicity is irrelevant because it will wither away anyway once modernisation has kicked in, but as we have seen above, there are many who object to this optimistic standpoint.

[31] Mountstuart, E.H. 1819.  Account of the Kingdom of CAUBUL. Afghanistan. (vol2(2) p. 242-43

[32] Lalza, A. Afghanistan Amrozy Dar Naqsha Hay Derozy (Today’s Afghanistan in yesterday’s maps). 2013. Available: http://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/pdf/alalzad04.pdf  [Accessed: 15/08/2013]

[33] Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). The World Factbook on Afghanistan. Retrieved September 1, 2013, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

[34] Analysis from CIA World Fact Book of 2013 on Afghanistan (Ibid).

[35] Badakshani, O. 2010. Nation Building in Afghanistan. [PDF] Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. p.9. Available through: khorasanzameen.net http://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/en/pdf/Nation%20Building%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf  [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].

[36] Going back to Connor’s assertion that in ethnically homogenous societies, the lesser the contact, the greater the peacefulness.

[37] Pashtuns also live in the neighbouring country Pakistan, where they constitute the majority of population.

[38] Mazhar, M., Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies, 19 (2), p. 100. 

[39] Mazhar, M., Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies, 19 (2), p. 101.

[40] As we shall see below.

[41] Mazhar, M., Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies, 19 (2), p. 100. 

[42] See Gregorian, V. 1969. The emergence of modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Page 32 and Farhang, M. 1994. Afghanistan in the Past Five Centuries. Peshawar: Sanai Publishing, p. 15.

[43] For example, Gregorian, V. 1969. The emergence of modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 33

[44]Badakshani, O. 2010. Nation Building in Afghanistan. [PDF] Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. p. 13. Available through: khorasanzameen.net http://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/en/pdf/Nation%20Building%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf  [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013]. And Mazhar, M., Khan, S. and Goraya, N. 2012. Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan. Journal of Political Studies, 19 (2), p. 100. 

[45] He was incentivised to do so by the British (who had their own agenda in this), who would grant him with money and arms in return. See Shir J. 2010. Afghan Nationalism: State-Elites and Historiography: 1901-1929. History Department of James Madison University, p. 2. Available at: http://www.jmu.edu/mecm/files/bkapapers/Jawan%20Shir%20Nationalism%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].

[46] Wilber, D. 1962. Afghanistan, Its People, Its Society Its Culture. New Haven: Graf Press, p. 19.

[47] Sakhawarz B. 1996. The Role of Afghan Intellectuals in Modernisation and Independence from Britain. Available at:  http://www.goftaman.com/daten/en/articles/article47.htm [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].

[48] Gregorian, V. 1969. The emergence of modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 160

[49] He rejected EU plans to connect A to international railway system despite the advice telling him of importance of modern communication and transportation. See Gregorian, V. 1969. The emergence of modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p.153

[50] Gellner, E. 1973. Scale and Nations. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3, 1 (1), p. 1-2.

[51] Badakshani, O. 2010. Nation Building in Afghanistan. [PDF] Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit. p. 24. Available through: khorasanzameen.net http://www.khorasanzameen.net/php/en/pdf/Nation%20Building%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf  [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].

[52] Mccenzy, R. 2005. King Aman-Allah of Afghanistan's Failed Nation-Building Project and Its Aftermath Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-29.Iranian Studies, 38 (4), pp. 674-675. 

[53] Under the current constitution of Afghanistan.

[54]  Library of Congress Federal Research Division (August 2008). Country Profile Afghanistan: Retrieved September 1, 2013 from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf

[55] As opposed to the monarchy of Afghanistan, which Zahir Shah introduced in his 1964 constitution

[56] Simonsen, S. 2013. Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and exclusion in post-Bonn institution building. Third World Quarterly, 25 (4), p. 710.

[57] Saikal, A. 1998. Afghanistan’s ethnic conflict.Survival, 40 (2), p. 116.

[58] Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). The World Factbook on Afghanistan. Retrieved September 1, 2013, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html [Accessed: 1 Sep 2013].

[59] Supra, note 3 also cited in Fukuyama, F. 2005. Nation-Building. Baltimore :: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.8

[60] Kofi Annan Millennium Report 2000; http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/responsibility.shtml [Accessed: 2 August 2013]

[61] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Report (Online), p. xi. Available from: http://www.iciss-iise.gc.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [Accessed: 2 August 2013].

[62] Fukuyama, F. 2005. Nation-Building. Baltimore :: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 131

[63] Ibid, p125

[64] Bush address to Congress. 2001. BBC News, [online] 21 September. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1555641.stm [Accessed: 01 September 2013].

[65] Jackson, A. The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009. Oxford International Publication (2009). Available at: http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-cost-of-war-afghan-experiences-of-conflict-1978-2009-112483 [Accessed: 28 August 2013].

[66] Gani, M. and Mathew, P. 2008. Fresh perspectives on the 'war on terror'. Canberra: ANU E Press. p. 1-10

[67] Katzman, K. 2012. Afghanistan. [Washington, D.C.?]: Congressional Research Service.

[68] Afghan troop map: US and Nato deployments. 2010. BBC News, [online] 19 November. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11795066 [Accessed: 27 August 2013].71 Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[70]  Suhkar, A. 2010. Upside Down Nation Building: The Contradictions of the International Project in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. Available online: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3684-upside-down-state-building.pdf

[71] Saikal, A. 2010. Modern Afghanistan (A History of Struggle and Survival). L.B. Trust. p. 86

[72] Azimi, M.N. 1999. Urdo Aa Siyast Dar Afghanistan (Army and Politics in Afghanistan). Kabul Press. p. 75

[73] Goodson, L.P. 1999.  Afghanistan’s Endless War (State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban). Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 51

[74] Hodge, N. 2010. U.S. Builds Afghan Air Base, but Where Are the Planes? Wall Street Journal, [online] 25 July. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577517010230335018.html [Accessed: 01 September 2013].

[75]  A Force in Fragments: Reconstructing the Afghan National Army. 2010. International Crisis Group. Available at: http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/Landay-joint.pdf  [Accessed:13/07/2013]

[76]  Sultanpoor, M. 2006. Afghan Army and Defending Territorial Integrity. Ariana Net [Online] March. Available at: http://www.ariananet.com/modules.php?name=Artikel&op=view&sid=4202#.UiuEApQ1iM8 [Accessed: 12 August 2013]

[77]  AFGHANISTAN: Fifth least developed country in the world. 2007. IRIN Asia, [online] 18 November. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/75365/afghanistan-fifth-least-developed-country-in-the-world [Accessed: 12 August 2013].

[78] Katzman, K. 2013. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and US Policy. Available PDF:   http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. [Accessed: 14 August 2013].

[79] Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p.144

[80] Supra, note 78.

[81] Jalali, A. A. 2002. Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army. Parameters. Available PDF: http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/02autumn/jalali.pd [Accessed: 17 August  2013.

[82] A Force in Fragments: Reconstructing the Afghan National Army. International Crises Group. Asia Report No. 190 (2010). Available PDF: http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf/Landay-joint.pdf. [Accessed 18 August 2013].

[83] Qassem, S. 2009. Afghanistan: Imperatives of Stability Misperceived. Iranian Studies. 42(2). Also: Maley, W. 2006. Rescuing Afghanistan. Sydney: UNSW Press. p. 33-34.

[84] Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. Available at: http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm [Accessed: 18 August 2013].

[85] L.P. Goodson. Lessons of Nation Building in Afghanistan in Fukuyama, F. 2006. Nation Building. Johns Hopkins University Press. pm 157-158.

[86] The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan. National Democratic Institute (2009). Available PDF: http://www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009.pdf [Accessed: 17 August 2013].

[87] Shahrani, M. N. 2004. Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections Spreading Democracy or a Sham?. Middle East Research and Information Project. [Online] 8 October. Available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero100804. [Accessed 18 August 2013].

[88]  Rubin, B. R. 2004. Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy. 15(3). Available in PDF: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.3rubin.pdf.

[89] See Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[90] Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p.167-168. See also: Rahimi, M. 2008. Saqbi Bar Saktari Nezam Dar Afghanistan (A review on Structure of the Political System in Afghanistan. Kabul Press. p. 154-161.

[91]  Rubin, B. R. 2004. Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy. 15(3). Available in PDF: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.3rubin.pdf.

[92] Eskandary, A. M. 2003. Nezami Jamhory Ya Empratory (Republic or Empire). Available online: http://www.ariaye.com/dari/qanoonasasi/eskandari5.html [Accessed 28 August 2013].

[93] Dr Shahrani, N. 2001. Not Who? But How?: Governing Afghanistan After the Conflict. Federations. Available in PDF: http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Federations/V1afgh-af-Shahrani.pdf [Accessed: 14 August 2013].

[94] Maley, W. 2006. Rescuing Afghanistan. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 46.

[95]  Suhrke, A. 2011. When more is less. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 230

[95] Ibid p. 153

[96] Rubin, B. R. 2006. Peace Building and State Building in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly 27(1). Available: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436590500370038

[97] Rubin, B. R. 2004. Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy. 15(3). Available in PDF: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.3rubin.pdf.

[98]Sovereignty and legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building by S. Frederick Starr, Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Edited by Francis Fukuyama, Johns Hopkins University press 2006. P 110

[99] Fukuyama, F. 2005. State Building, Governance and World  Order in The Twenty-First Century.  London: Profile Books Ltd ., p 35

[100] L.P. Goodson. Lessons of Nation Building in Afghanistan in Fukuyama, F. 2006. Nation Building. Johns Hopkins University Press. pm 157-158.

[101] Suhrke, A. 2011. When more is less. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 230

[101] Ibid p. 121

[102] Suhkar, A. 2010. Upside Down Nation Building: The Contradictions of the International Project in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. Available online: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3684-upside-down-state-building.pdf

[103]Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 120-21

[104] Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). The World Factbook on Afghanistan. Retrieved September 1, 2013, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

[105] International Monetary Fund report 2012. Available on line: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11330.pdf [Accessed:  28 July 2013].

Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). The World Factbook on Afghanistan. Retrieved September 1, 2013, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

[107] Suhkar, A. 2012. When More is Less: the International Project in Afghansistan. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 128. Also: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction(SIGAR) 2010  Available PDF: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2012-12-11-alert-sp-13-1.pdf

[108] Karzai confirms report of cash payments from Iran. 2010. BBC News, [online] 26 October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11618969 [Accessed: 10 August 2013]. And Karzai: CIA Promises To Continue Cash. 2013. CNN, [Online] 6 May. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/04/world/asia/afghanistan-cia-money [Accessed: 10 August 2013].

[109]  Life in Afghanistan. 2009. BBC News, [online] 14 August. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7741767.stm [Accessed: 12 August 2013].

[110] By Installation Of New Equipment Communication Expands Throughout The Country: MCIT. 2012. Bahltar News [online] 3 September. Available at: http://www.bakhtarnews.com.af/eng/business/item/3844-by-installation-of-new-equipment-communication-expands-throughout-the-country-mcit.html [Accessed: 12 August 2013] and see: Sais, S. 2011. Who is winning the war in afghanistan?. [S.l.]: Xlibris Corp. p.89

[111] Oxfam Calls for Aid to Be More Effective. 2007. IRIN News. [online] 20 November. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/75403/afghanistan-oxfam-calls-for-aid-to-be-more-effective-transparent [Accessed: 02 August 2013].

[112] Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook. 2010. CSO. Available online: http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/8-1.pdf [Accessed 2 August 2013].

[113] Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings. UNODC. Available.http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 5/9/2013].

[114] Most of these projects were built king Zahir, specially during Daoud Khan primer ship with Soviet Union aids.

[115] The costs of war at least 3.7 Trillion and Counting. 2011. Reuters, [online] 29 June. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629 [Accessed on 02 September 2013].

[116] UK to give Afghanistan £10m to fund mining programme. 2013. BBC News, [online] 7 March. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21695037 [Accessed 5 August 2013].

[117] Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings. UNODC. Available.http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 5/9/2013].

[118] Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[119] Nosedive in Afghan-US Relations. 2009. BBC News. [online], 5 February. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7870340.stm [Accessed: 2 August 2013].

[120] AFGHANISTAN: Drug addiction a growing burden. 2010. IRIN News. [online] 21 April. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/report/88872/afghanistan-drug-addiction-a-growing-burden [Accessed 1 August 2013].

[121] L.P. Goodson. Lessons of Nation Building in Afghanistan in Fukuyama, F. 2006. Nation Building. Johns Hopkins University Press. pm 157-158. p. 133

[122] Niland, N. Justice Postponed, the marginalization of Human Rights in Afghanistan, in Donini, A. 2004. Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. Kumarian Press. p,78.

[123] Ali, T. Mirage of the Good War, edited by Turse, N. 2010. The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ferso. 46.

[124] Ibid p 54

[125] Ibid p 51 and also see Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[126] India offers more aid for Afghanistan. 2013. Aljazeera, [online] 21 May. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/05/2013521193232289819.html [Accessed: 10 Sep 2013].

[127] Afghanistan and India sign “Strategic Partnership”. 2011. BBC News, [online] 4 October. Available at: BBC/World news,4 October 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15161776 [Accessed: 10 Sep 2013].

[128] See Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[129] USA, China and Afghanistan, a  report of centre for strategic and international studies. CSIS 2012 Available online: http://csis.org/files/publication/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf [Accessed 05/09/2013]

[130] China's CNPC begins oil production in Afghanistan. 2012. Reuters, [online] 21 October. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/21/uk-afghanistan-oil-idUKBRE89K07Y20121021 [Accessed: 10 August 2013].

[131] See Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[132] Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. 2013. ISW institute for study of war. Available online:  http://www.understandingwar.org/turkmenistan-and-afghanistan  [Accessed on: 03/09/2013]

[133] The Politics of Water Security between Afghanistan and Iran. Future Directors International 2012.  Available online:  http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/416-the-politics-of-water-security-between-afghanistan-and-iran.html [Accessed on 02/09/2013].

[134] See K Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[135] Shelala, R. M. et. Al. 2013. US and Iranian Strategic Competition. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130626_AfPak_Asia.pdf [ Accessed 29 August 2013]

[136] 2013 UNHCR country operations profile - Islamic Republic of Iran. UNHRC 2013. Available online: UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486f96&submit=GO [Accessed on: 04/09/2013]

[137] Iran, Afghanistan Sign Strategic Agreement. 2013. Press TV, [online] 10 September. Available at:  [Accessed 2 August 2013].

[138]Ibid.

[139] Rubin, B.R and Siddique, A, 2006, 'Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate', United States Institute of Peace, 1 October, 12 February,

[140] Andishmand, M.I. 2007. Ma Wa Pakistan (We and Pakistan). Kabul University Press. p 25

[141] Ibid

[142] Qassem, A.S. 2007, Border controversies as counter-terrorist impediments. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. 61(1),65-80.

[143] Sistani, A. 2003, 'Pahstunistan issue of the Duran Line', Ariaye, 16 October, [http://www.ariaye.com/dari/pak/sistani2.html]

[144] Rubin, B.R and Siddique, A, 2006, 'Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate', United States Institute of Peace, 1 October, 12 February, [http://www.usip.org/publications/resolving-the-pakistan-afghanistan-stalemate]

[145] The Whitehouse. 2012, 'Ensuring strategic partnership agreement between the USA and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan', 5 September, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf]

[146] Azami, D. 2013. How Taliban talks have become deadlocked in Doha. BBC, 6 September. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23274081 [Accessed: 2 August 2013]

[147] See Kenneth Katzman, 2010, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance ,Security, and U.S. Policy, available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535457

[148] Pascual, C. 2008, 'Afghanistan and NATO: Forging the 21st century alliance', The Brookings Institution, 4 September, [http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/02/29-nato]

[149]Suhrke, A. 2011. When more is less. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 230

[150] Ibid p. 231

[151] Ali, T. Mirage of the Good War, edited by Turse, N. 2010. The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ferso. p61

[152] Eskandary, A. M. Dar Masi e Aahdati Melli (Afghanistan'sPath to National Unity, Part one). 2003. Available online:  http://www.ariaye.com/dari/qanoonasasi/eskandari2.html [Accessed: 2 August 2013]

[153] Eskandary, A.M. Hambastagi Estrategic ya Ishghal dayemi? (Strategic Partnership or Permanent Occupation?). 2005. Available online: http://www.ariaye.com/dari2/siasi/eskandari.html#top. [Accessed: 1 August 2013]

[154]  Eskandary, A. M. Dar Masi e Wahdati Melli Bakhsh Sewum (Afghanistan'sPath to National Unity, Part Three, Federalism). 2003. Available online: http://www.ariaye.com/dari/qanoonasasi/eskandari4.html [Accessed: 2 August 2013]

[155]Masir, N. 2013. Howyat melli ya howyat Qaumi( National or Ethnic Identity) Available on line: http://www.khawaran.com/ســـــیاسی/هــویت-قـــومی-یا-هـــویت-مــــلی؟.html [Accessed: 23 August 2013].

[156] Eskandary, A.M. 2005. Hambastagi Estrategic ya Ishghal dayemi? (Strategic Partnership or Permanent Occupation?). Available online: http://www.ariaye.com/dari2/siasi/eskandari.html#top [Accessed on: 02/09/2013]

[157] Ali, T. Mirage of the Good War, edited by Turse, N. 2010. The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ferso. p62