By:Abdul Majid Eskandary
June 2013
Irregular warfare
Why it is so difficult to defeat
insurgencies?
(The Case of Afghanistan)
Introduction
To grasp the
fundamental concept of this essay, we must first provide working definitions of
the issues at hand. Irregular warfare ‘is the umbrella term used to describe
violence used by sub state actors and includes different forms, including
insurgency’[1]
To understand
why they are difficult to defeat, we must understand how they are created, and
what encourages insurgencies to grow.
States,
militia are led by humans. Humanity has an eternal desire, and greed. Unwilling
to accept personal loss, we go to war often under a pretext of humanitarian causes
but truly driven by personal gain. From an objective, logical point of view,
can one argue that Lockheed Martin [2]and BAE[3] do not
benefit from instability and war?
However
naturally within a state, there are always those who oppose the centralized
government. This is when the theme of insurgencies, terrorism and both
irregular and proxy warfare enter the equation. Feeling crushed under the
policy of the administration, the mentioned types of opposition are very
appealing to those in resistance with the ‘status quo’. The state is infinitely
better equipped, trained and informed.
Asymmetric forms of violence are the only practical methods rebels can
offset the logistical advantage enjoyed by the governmental forces. This type
of warfare will exist as long as there are injustice, exploitation and arms
sales.
In spite of the
similarities there are some differences among the insurgents, guerrillas and
terrorists. According to Hoffman ''guerrillas'' refer to a group of armed
individuals who operate like military units and are able to control a
territory. ”Insurgents”, which earlier were known as “revolutionary guerrillas”
have more or less the same characteristics but with different tactics and
strategy. Insurgents widely use mass media to create psychological warfare in
order to get popularity among the populations and organise them against the
enemy. With these tactics they put huge pressure on governments, or foreign
invaders.[4]
Although globally
there is not a common definition for terrorism, insurgency and
counterinsurgency, but generally terrorism is defined as ‘the sustained use
of violence against symbolic or civilian targets for political purposes, by
inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or
provoking an unsustainable response’.[5]
Insurgency is
defined as “on organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through the use of subversive and armed conflict.’ and Counter
insurgency is defined as ‘those military, paramilitary, political, economic
psychological and civic action taken to defeat the insurgency.’[6]
In this essay we
will mainly focus about Afghan insurgencies; but for answering this question we
require some background information regarding Afghanistan, its geopolitics,
ethnic structure and the back ground of Afghan insurgencies:
***********
Afghanistan as an independent country, after three Afghan-Anglo wars in 1919,
has developed through the modern era to the status as a “buffer state” between
British and Russian empires. In the ‘20th century became the cold
war battlefield and finally its caves offering refuge to international terrorists.’[7]
Afghanistan
which is located in the cross road of the central and south Asia is an Islamic
country with an estimated population of 28 million people. There are living
more than 20 ethnic groups; the major ones are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and
Uzbeks. Afghanistan is one of the unique countries in the world that none of
the resident ethnic groups make the majority (51%) of the population. About 99%
of Afghans are Muslims, 1% being Hindus, and Sikhs. From the Muslims, 80% are
Sunni and 19% are Shia[8].
During the
history this country has been invaded by Macedonians, Arabs, Mongolians,
British Empire, and Russians and now by Americans and their international allies.
All these powerful countries and empires captured this country very easily but
at the end were defeated hardly.[9] Afghanistan
history is the ‘history of struggle for survival’[10].
This country in its whole history had experienced relatively stable monarchy
just for forty years during King Zahir Shah (1933-1973). Zahir shah was
overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daoud Khan in 1973 [11]
President Daoud, as a reformist and in some
extent nationalist figure, established good relations with the Soviet Union.
Daoud Khans’ relations with Soviet Union became tense in 1977, and he sought
support from some Arabic countries, the Shah of Iran and the West.[12] Consequently on 27th April 1978, PDPA, a
pro-soviet party, ceased power through a military coup, and established so
called ‘Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’.[13]
Despite the fact
that Afghanistan from its first day of independence in 1919 had enjoyed good
relation with Soviet Union, but as soon as Pro- soviet party came in power they
faced the resistance. By December 1979 after deteriorating political and
military situation in Kabul, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with some 85,000
strong military forces.[14]
Soviet
aggression and beginning of insurgent Warfare in Afghanistan:
As soon as
Soviets violated the Afghanistan sovereignty and entered Afghanistan soil, the
popular movement against them took shape. Despite the fact that Afghans are not
homogenous and the country history is full of clashes between ethnics, clans
and tribes, but whenever there is the question of foreign invasion, they are
all united.[15]
The cruelty of the regime and later the Soviet Army presence provoked national
resistance which Afghan Islamist groups, who would later become known as the
Mujahedeen, took the leadership of Afghan national resistance[16].
After ten years
of bloody war, Gorbachev, the Leader of the Soviet Union decided to finish with
the “bleeding wound” and withdraw from Afghanistan. In fact, the Soviet Union
were defeated and Afghan Mujahidin and their allies won the war.[17] During
the Afghani Jihad against Soviet Union, thousands of Radical Islamist from all
over the world came to Pakistan to join Islamic Jihad against Communism. One of them was Osama Bin Laden. The
interesting thing is the fact that most of western aids went through the Pakistani
ISI to the most radical, hardliner and fanatic mujahedeen factions.[18] Subsequently
Pakistan later recruited from these extremist groups to set up a new radical
organisation with the name of “Tahrik e Taliban” or Taliban movement.
From 1992 -1996
mujahedeen took power and named the country the ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’,
but because of the luck experience in governing and their factional rivalries
they never succeed to make central and unified government.
From 1996 -2001
the Taliban ruled over 95% of Afghanistan territory under the name of ‘Afghanistan
Islamic Emirate’ with the direct financial and logistical help of Pakistan,
Saudi Arab and Islamic extremists especially Al- Qaida . They made the country
a safe haven for International terrorists and turned it to a poppy yard[19].
After the
falling of the Pro- soviet regime in Afghanistan the international community
especially US and its allies that helped Afghanistan during their Jihad assumed
their job was done and practically had forgotten Afghanistan until the time
that Al-Qaida attacked the United States soil 0n9/11. Some political experts
believed that the rise and strengthening of Taliban was the result of the wrong
policies of the US and western countries. Although the United States didn’t
recognised the Taliban regime in Kabul but in spite all warnings from Taliban
opposition front, in particular commander Ahmad Shah Massoud warned that the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda will be a danger not just for Afghanistan but for the
whole world peace and stability fell on deaf ears. He asked the US, EU and
whole international community to put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting
and arming Taliban and Al-Qaida[20];
but the US never took any firm stance against the Taliban. This is a very
complex and interesting issue but because this is not the theme of this essay,
we shall not focus on the details on it. The 9/11 has not just changed the
policies of US and their allies toward Afghanistan but brought a new phase in
international relations, strategy and international politics. It turned
Afghanistan from a forgotten country to a very important place for the
international security, politics and strategies.
Who are the
insurgents in Afghanistan?
There are
various organizations vying for political and economic motives in opposition to
the Afghan government and coalition forces. Outside the various criminal
elements within both organisations and tribal groups, there are three main
opposing powerbrokers; the Taliban, Hezb-e- Islami and the Haqani network. The
Taliban however represent the most imminent and direct threat.[21] There
are no accurate statistics about the real strength of the insurgencies in
Afghanistan, but the top commander of American Forces in Afghanistan, General
John Allen, told journalists in October 2011.that ‘the numbers of insurgents
may be far fewer than the 25,000 figure assessed previously.’[22]
The Taliban
The word “Talib”
means religious student and the “Taliban” is the plural form of this word. At
present time the Taliban is the most powerful insurgent group which are stationed
in Pakistan under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Later they established the Quetta
Shura of the Taliban which their headquarters are in Quetta city of the
Baluchistan province of Pakistan[23].
The Taliban are
mostly coming from tribal area of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the
Taliban has never identified themselves as a Pashtun group, but the vast majority
of its Leadership, rank and files are Pashtuns. Of course there are conflicting
views about the identification of the Taliban; some western politicians and analysts
are also considering Taliban as a Pashtun movement. Richard Holbrooke the
former America's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan once said: “almost
every Pashtun family has someone involved with the movement”[24]
For some
analysts the Taliban are a national resistance against foreign aggressors and
the freedom fighters, for others they are Pakistani mercenaries and “one can
see the gloved hand of Pakistan”[25]
. Some people call them ‘Afghanistan
lumpen proletariat’[26]. From
my point of view they are neither the representatives of Pashtuns nor through
Muslims; they were and still they are the close associate of Al-Qaida and
international terrorism. In fact they are the Afghani Branch of Al-Qaida.
Hekmatyar
Islamic Party
Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, former prime minister of the Mujahideen government during president
Rabani. He is Sunni and from the Kharoti Tribe of Pashtuns. Although
Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support during Jihad but now he is
active against U.S. and Afghan forces. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “specially designated global
terrorist”.’[27] Hekmayar
has been a close ally of Taliban and Al-Qaida, although his groups have sometimes
clashed with the Taliban.
Haqqani
Faction:
Jalaludin
Haqqani was former fighter of Hezbi-Islami (Hekmatyar). When Hezb-e Islami split
in late 1970s, Haqqani joined Yunis Khalis faction, and became one of the most
important commanders in that faction.[28]
Later he joined the Taliban movement and became the Minister of Tribal Affairs
in the Taliban regime from 1996-2001.Now his sons Sirajudin and Budrudin
Haqqani are usually leading their terroristic operations of the “Haqqani Network”.[29]
War on terror and Afghanistan after 9/11:
The terrorist
attacks of 9/11 shock the world and it was for the first time after cold war the
US, EU, UN and the whole world realised that the Taliban and their
international terrorist allies are the real threat for international peace and
security.
Immediately
after 9/11, Gorge W. Bush the president of the United States declared ‘War on
Terror’ and emphasised that Al-Qaida has influence over Taliban in Afghanistan
and that is why the Afghanistan should be the first battle ground on the ‘war
on terror’. ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed
these acts and those who harbour them’.[30] The Taliban in Afghanistan is not ‘just
supressing their own people, but by sponsoring and supplying terrorists, they
threatening the whole world’.[31]
Gorge W. Bush also warned all the governments over the world that they should
stand either with USA or their enemies. [32]
The U.N. Security Council immediately announced its readiness to take’ all
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks’ with resolution 1368. [33]
Under the
supervision of the UN the Bon Conference (December 2001) was held and approved
an Afghan interim government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai and later
based on the UN Security Council
Resolution, the International Security assistance Forces (ISAF) led by
NATO stationed in Afghanistan.[34]
By the end 2011, there were130, 386 international forces present in
Afghanistan, now after the partial withdrawal of American according to NATO
sources there is some 100,330 in manpower comprising of forces from 50
countries .[35]
According to
some estimation the total costs of the war in Afghanistan in ten years reaches
between 2.3 to $2.7 trillion and the final bill of war may reach up to $4.4
trillion.[36] Despite
the presence of more than 150,000 international forces and growing of Afghan
armed forces from 20,000, to nearly 300,000, losing of thousands of life of
Afghan and international soldiers and spending trillions of dollars, they cannot
defeat less than 25,000 insurgents,[37]on
the contrary the security situation is getting worse by every passing year. Why?
Because: From
the first days of American invasion in Afghanistan it was clear that the US had
seriously miscalculated the nature of afghan warfare, their goals in
Afghanistan following the attack of 9/11, became muddled.[38]
George W. Bush
and his administration took the decision to invade Afghanistan not with calm
minds but Influenced by feelings of revenge after 9/11. They entered
Afghanistan with less than one thousand Special Forces and rolled out the
Taliban regime without human loss and causalities. The real reason for this
unexpectedly successful military operation was: first, the hatred of the
majority of Afghans from Taliban and their tyrannical regime that is why
Afghans for the first time in their history welcomed foreign armed forces in
their own land. Secondly, the cooperation of anti-Taliban front with
20,000 strong armed men and thirdly, horrific bombardment by US air
forces. Under the shadow of their easy success they forgot to realise the fact
that ‘aircraft cannot hold ground.’ and didn’t learn from Afghan history that
‘overrunning Afghanistan is not the same as keeping and controlling it.’[39]
In reality they made the same mistake as Soviet Union had done before.
Why it is so
difficult to defeat Afghan insurgencies?
A-
Definition of the enemy:
According to Sun Tzu good information and
knowing the enemy is the essential step for defeating the enemy. As he
emphasizes: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself, in hundred battles you will
never be in peril.’[40] One
of the main difficulties in war against insurgencies is the lack strategy and
clear distinction between friends and foe.
Afghan
Government doesn’t have clear policy in war against insurgents. Hamid Karzai
the president of Afghanistan, sometimes called the Taliban Terrorist and
associate with al-Qaida, sometimes deceived brothers and sometimes the noble
sons of Afghan nation. It is now clear to most Afghan intellectuals that Mr
Karzai in considering of his previous ties with Taliban[41]
is not honest and determined in waging war against terror in Afghanistan.
US policy toward
the Taliban and other insurgent groups also has never been clear. after 12
years fighting against them, last year Joe Biden the US vice president said
that the Taliban are not their enemy and recently president Obama declared on
his joint statement with Karzai that their main objective of defeating Al-Qaida
is nearly fulfilled going on to state that they are entering with direct talks
with Taliban by opening an office for them in Qatar[42].It
is right in politics to negotiate with the enemy but it is completely wrong
politics to render them diplomatic recognition. These wrong and vague policies
are the main reason of the struggle to defeat Afghan Insurgents.
B- The
nature of Guerrilla warfare:
Time and
space: it is obvious fact that the gorilla and
insurgency warfare is war between weak and strong. In this game Time is the
most important factor for insurgencies success. Mao Tse Tung in his military
writings divides the Time Scale in guerrilla warfare into three interrelated
phases: the strategic Defence, stalemate and strategic Offence[43].
Afghan Insurgencies obviously knew that they cannot defeat the international
forces in Afghanistan, the only thing they can do is use hit, run and hide
tactics. With these tactics they earn more time and increase chance of
survival. Every government would like to defeat its enemies as soon as
possible, but on the contrary it is in insurgents favour to prolong the war as
long as possible. An extended duration of time incurs any government force with
significant economic costs, but for the insurgencies it the golden opportunity
to gain popularity. ‘The dimension of space works with time, providing with the
leeway to manoeuvre and demonstrate their superior legitimacy to the
population’.[44]
Taliban and other insurgencies in Afghanistan using complex tactics of Irregular
warfare, it include from laying road side bombs in remote areas in the
countryside to attacking military posts and bases and hide among the civil
population. It means the insurgents use the people as human shelter. In the
cities they usually commit suicide attacks. It is practically impossible for
Afghan and ISAF forces to be present in every village and secondly if the
international forces try to clean some area from them, it is very difficult to
recognise who is the insurgent and who is ordinary Afghan villager? During the
night they are fighters and during the day they are like ordinary villagers.
Taliban Widely uses the ‘hit-and-run, hide-and-seek, quick ambushes’[45]
tactics. So the nature of irregular
warfare is in favour of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan.
The wider battle field and longer guerrilla warfare is in favour of Afghan
Insurgents.
C- Wining
Heart and Minds:
Support and
Legitimacy:
It is an axiom
that the support of the people or ‘wining the hearts and minds’ of the
population is an essential for the success of any counterinsurgency
program. Clausewitz suggested that ‘support,
in form of public opinion is one the centres of gravity in a popular uprising.’[46]Insurgents
are normally looking for domestic and foreign supports. In the whole history of
wars including anti-colonial and revolutionary wars we may not be able to find
any example (except the Cuban revolution) that the insurgents or revolutionary
forces had a victory without External or International support. It goes without
saying that if the insurgent needs popular support for their survival and
success, the counterinsurgents also need the same. Mao correctly said that the
relation between the guerrillas and the people is like a ‘fish and the sea;’[47]as
fish cannot survive without sea water, insurgents also cannot survive without
public support. Taliban, Haqqani Group and Hikmatyar faction has popular
support in south of the country and mostly among tribal Pashtun areas. This
support comes first from ethnic problems that Afghanistan suffers for
centuries; secondly this support has root in tribal way of life or so
called Pashtunwali traditions and tribal interpretation of Islam. The wrong
policies and blind fighting tactics by Afghan and international forces is
another reason for growing the popularity of Afghan insurgents.
External
Support: It is hard to believe that the Taliban is
a spontaneous popular movement. Usually popular or national movements and also
the political parties take shape during long period of time, but the Taliban
emerged suddenly in the politics of Afghanistan. In fact when the Pakistani
ruling circles had disappointed to see their strategic ally Gulbuddin Hikmatyar
in power in Kabulin 1992, [48]brought
a new force with in the name of Taliban. Taliban are the deadly legacy of
Benazir Bhutto and General Hamid Gull the former head of ISI.[49]
From mid-2004 up now Pakistan Support, arm and train Taliban and other
terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Of course Afghan insurgents
receive in some extent financial and moral support from some circles in Iran,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, but their main supporter is Pakistan ISI. One
of the big mistakes of US and their allies was that they believed and trusted
Pakistan as partner on their ‘war against terror’ and still nothing is changed
in Pakistani policies regarding harbouring Taliban and Al-Qaida. Now it is an
undeniable fact that the Taliban leadership, Hikmatyar and Haqqani network are
living not in tribal area but deep inside Pakistan cities like Quetta,
Islamabad and Karachi. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as its safe backyard and this
have never changed.[50] It
has been around 12 years that American and ISAF forces are searching for Taliban
militias in Afghanistan villages, every day killing or capturing tens of them
but they don’t realise this simple fact that the ISI produce hundreds of them
through Pakistani madrassas and send them to fight in Afghanistan. In reality ‘it is a war between a
Pakistan-supported militant group and the rest of the world.’[51] The
central command of Afghan insurgency is laying in Pakistan; as far as Pakistan
arm and support them; it should be very hard to defeat them.
Poppy
Cultivation and Drugs as Financial resources of Afghan Insurgents: Terrorist organization and insurgencies need stable economic sources
to carry out their everyday activities and implement them. Afghan Insurgents
beside the financial supports they receive from some terrorist organizations
and intelligence circles in neighbouring and Islamic countries; their main
source of income is poppy cultivation and drug trafficking.
UN document show
that in spite of the presence of the UK and US forces in southern Afghanistan
especially in Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan; these provinces are the main poppy
yards and the “homeland” of the Taliban. The poppy cultivation (from 2001 to
2012) has grown from 8,000 to 154,000 Hectares, which produced 5,800 tons of
Opium in 2011.[52]
Taliban earning from opium trade was $155Million. Beside that the Taliban and
other insurgents group making money through 10% Taxation over opium products,
taxing the Vehicles and taking ransoms. In total the Taliban may have been
benefited from Afghan Opiate trade including their local commander’s
involvement in drug trafficking the sum exceeds 2.2 Billion$[53].
With having such a huge source of income it is no surprise that the Taliban pay
their militants monthly twice more the salary that Afghan Government pays to
the national army and police soldiers and officers.
The Terrorism
and Narco-trade are like the twins - one cannot survive without other. If the
International forces get genuine in their desire to defeat the Taliban, they
have to dry up their financial sources. But it seems neither the Afghan
government nor their international allies are serious and honest in the fight
against Poppy cultivation and Norco-trade. Many observers believe that most of
the high ranking Afghan officials are involved in the narcotic trade, even the
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's called Afghanistan a "Narco-State"[54]. If
their desire to combat terrorism becomes genuine it is very easy to replace the
poppy cultivation with some replacement crops like cannabis or saffron that had
already produced with great result in some province of Afghanistan.
Bad
Governance and corruption: Generally a state has
three essential tasks: providing security, representation and welfare of the
people. If a state cannot fulfil these functions than it can be considered to
be a ‘fragile’, ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ state.[55]
Governance
defines as ‘the set of institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised; effectively manage resources, to establish law and order and
implement policies’[56].
One of the key aspects of good governance is the enforcement law and order.
Another key feature in good governance is to have citizens that trust in
government institutions; such as the police and courts?[57]
Normally if any government lack the above mentioned criteria, it will lose its
legitimacy among the population. In fact unlawful and corrupt government push
the people to the side of insurgencies. Today’s Afghan government cannot
provide security for its population; it doesn’t represent the vast majority of
Afghan people and practically doesn’t care about the welfare of Afghan society.
According to United Nation Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) Afghanistan
government is among the most corrupt state in the world. The UNODC survey shows
that the cost of corruption in 2012 was amounted $3.9Billion[58].It
means that ordinary Afghan citizens bribed government officials twice the
country's domestic revenue and one fourth of the $16billion the Tokyo Summit
pledge in aids over four years.[59]
Although
Afghanistan cannot be regarded as a failed or collapsed state, it is surely a
‘fragile’ state on the brink of failure. Since its existence, Afghanistan has
never experienced such corrupt government. Over 12 years the international
community has aided Afghanistan to the sum of $100billion, but from an
infrastructure point nothing has seriously changed. Afghan people lost their
trust to governmental institutions especially low enforcement bodies like
police and judiciary organs. In the countryside Afghans prefer to refer to the
Taliban rather than the governmental institutions for solving their legal
problems.[60]
Therefore bad Governance and corruption is another reason, that insurgencies
cannot be defeated.
Lack of Coordination
and Lack of Respect:
NATO and American forces are operating in
villages and mostly in southern Afghanistan. These are tribal areas with their
own traditions and way of life. In Afghanistan as whole it is socially
unacceptable for individuals to enter and search your house without permission.
NATO and American Special Forces usually raid Afghan villager’s houses during
the night in search for Taliban fighter which is regarded totally unacceptable
by Afghans. According to William Dalrymple, when an American officer asked an
old Afghan man during a Jirga in Jalalabad ‘why they hate Americans?’ the old
man replied: 'because you blow down our doors, enter our houses, pull our women
by the hair and kick our children. We cannot accept this. We will fight back,
we will break your teeth and when your teeth are broken you will leave, just as
the British left before you. It is just a matter of time’.[61]
With these kinds of irresponsible
operations they drive Afghan people to the Taliban’s side. The international
forces should coordinate their operation with Afghan forces and leave the
searching job to Afghan forces. Blind air attacks which killed thousands of
innocent Afghan civilians and a lack of respect to religious and traditional
values of the people make the fight against the insurgency harder in
Afghanistan.[62]
Conclusion: If we accept that the “war is an act of force to compel your enemy
to do your will.[63]” Then
we shall find an explanation for these two terminologies. Why should an
individual or a state be considered as an enemy and what is the adversary
seeking to impose? Over human history we are witness to Ideological or even
religious wars but in general the main reason for wars has been the
distribution or redistribution of wealth. The stronger tried to pre-empt the
wealth but the weaker denied. All colonial wars, world wars even the revolutionary,
anticolonial and so called patriotic wars are affected by this rule. The
insurgency and counterinsurgency wars are not exceptional from this normative.
Terrorism and
insurgency war is the fight of the weakest against the stronger power. That is
why some scholars believe that ‘unconventional war is a state of mind as well
as a mission and distinctive set of tactics[64]’
and the small wars are ‘about polities rather than between polities’.[65]According
to Sun Tzu for military success the commanders should adopt ‘brain rather than
brown’ approach.[66]
This kind of approach is very essential for success in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency fights, because the insurgents are living among the people
and it is impossible to defeat them just by military means. In every war it is
essential to have a clear strategy. In “war against terror” the US and their
allies were lacking a clear strategy and their commanders on the field also
lacked and still lack effective tactics against insurgencies.
Firstly, Americans never defined their enemy in Afghanistan. The Afghan and
US officials lack a clear stance on the Taliban; friend or foe? Opening a
diplomatic mission in Qatar legitimises the Taliban’s resistance. In such a case there will not remain any
incentive for American and Afghan soldiers to fight against them. With their
ineffective military tactics which are usually heavy air bombardment of the
villages and raiding of villager’s houses during the night they lose the hearts
and minds of the Afghans.
Secondly, Americans were miscalculated the nature of Afghan warfare and did not have a good understanding of the
social and ethnic composition within Afghanistan.
When in the end
of 2001 American forces with the help of Afghan former National front (known as
Northern Alliance) ousted Taliban and its ally Al-Qaeda without suffering a
single fatality, the Bush administration thought they had won the war. Based on
this inaccurate calculation they moved the main bulk of their forces to Iraq.
He obviously ignored the well-known fact that overrunning Afghanistan is very
easy but controlling and keeping it is very difficult. In addition they imposed
and kept their own man (Hamid Karzai) as the head of Afghan government for 12
years. Afghan people ultimately always refused to submit to outside conquest
and see Karzai as a corrupt puppet of the Americans and will naturally oppose
it.
Thirdly, Pakistan never changed its policy toward Afghanistan. Taliban is a
creation of Pakistan and it’s the god father of all Afghan insurgencies. The
bases and leadership of Afghan insurgencies including some Al-Qaeda leaders are
located in Pakistan. It is a very obvious fact that no one can doubt it.
Americans rather than pressurising Pakistan to not support terrorist groups and
destroy Taliban and Al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan instead bomb afghan villages. As
long as Pakistan arm and support the Afghan insurgencies, it should be very
difficult to defeat them.
Fourthly, Winning the hearts and minds: According to Carl von Clausewitz
defeating the enemy requires destroying its centre of gravity; where is
the centre of gravity of Afghan insurgencies? Economically their gravity centre
is lying in poppy cultivation and Narco-trade and morally in their Islamic
believes and tribal traditions. If the international forces and Afghan
government genuinely wish to defeat the Afghan insurgencies, they have to
eradicate the poppy business and fight against fanatic militant Islamic
extremism by helping, supporting and encouraging moderate Islam which has been
practiced in Afghanistan for centuries. These are the realities which are
absent in Afghan and American policies. Another reason for Afghan youth joining
in the rank of the Taliban is the problem of unemployment. When a young man is
unemployed, there is no opportunity for him to build his future, normally he
seek for some paid job. The Taliban offer him the double monthly pay of the
government armed forces. In this case logically he joins the Taliban. Americans
and allied forces should bear in mind that there is only one way to win the
heart and mind of Afghans: let the Afghan people to democratically choose their
government and regime system, encourage moderate Islam and rebuilding
Afghanistan, especially in Agriculture, industries and Education fields. These
are the ways to win the hearts and minds of Afghans and to win the war against
terror!
Finally, the Americans and its allies should understand that there is a big
difference among secular and religious terrorism. The Taliban’s ultimate
political purpose is an Islamic Caliphate, which Mullah Omar whom Osama bin
Laden pledged allegiance to has already chosen as “Amir-al-Momenin”.[67]
The democratic
world after sacrificing thousands of life and trillions dollars should not
surrender the power to the fanatic religious and primitive forces like the
Taliban in a dirty political deal. It will be grave danger not just for peace
and stability in Afghanistan and surrounding region, but a danger for the
security of the whole world.
**********
Ideally what the
people globally want is peace. But regrettably it seems an unattainable dream
in our time. It requires a redistribution of the world wealth from ‘the haves
to have-not’s’. It requires ‘religious and political movements among Muslims,
Christians, Hindus, Jews, atheists, Communists and Capitalists to tolerate and
respect each other’[68].It
requires that we accept the reality of our world which is multi ethnic,
multi-racial, multi-state, multi culture and multi civilization. In contrary to
Huntington I don’t believe that the civilizations will clash, because war is an
act of violence and civilised people are eager not to violate the humanitarian
norms and values. The words of M.K Gandhi should be remembered in particularly
by the civilized and democratic world; ‘the democracy becomes unholy when their
hands are dyed red with innocent blood’ [69]
War is not the
nature of human beings. Sooner or later the human race will reach a point of
true humanity -a world without conflicts and wars of any kind. At least I hope
and believe on it!
********
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[1] Strategy In the Contemporary world, John Baylis, second edition,
oxford press 2007, p165
[2] American global aerospace, defence, security, and advanced
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[3]- British Aerospace and Defence Company.
[4] Inside Terrorism: Defining Terrorism. By: Hoffman, 2006, 2nd Ed. New
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[5] STRATEGY in the contemporary World, John Baylis ,James, Writz,
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Irregular warfare: terrorism and insurgency, by JAMES D. KIRAS
[6] security studies, by Paul D Williams, Routledge press, New
York,2008 From the Article
(Counterinsurgency) by Joanna Spear,p392
[7] AFGHANISTAN: A Military History from Alexander the great to the war
against the Taliban, by StephenTanner,
Da CAPO press 2009,revise edition,
USA, p1
[8] CIA fact book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (acc:
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[9] Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War
Against the Taliban by S.Tanner, p3
[10] Modern Afghanistan, by Amin Saikal, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd,2010
[11] Who is Winning the War in Afghanistan?, by Sayed Zia Sais: Xlibris
Corportation, 2001,p21
[12] Peter Marsden: Afghanistan
Aid, Armies and Empires, I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009, p42
[13] John Cooley: Unholy Wars:
Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, third edition, Pluto Press,
2002, p1-9
[14] Peter Marsden: Afghanistan Aid, Armies and Empires, I B
Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009, p43
[15] Radical Islam, the Taliban and Western hegemony: by A.M.Eskandary, Leicester University.
[16] Jackson, A. (2009) THE COST OF WAR: Afghan Experiences of Conflict,
1978 – 2009. Research by nine independent organisations, available from :
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-the-cost-of-war.pdf> accessed on:20/03/13
[17] AFGHANISTAN: A Military History from Alexander the great to the war
against the Taliban, Tanner Stephen,
Da CAPO press 2009,revise edition,
USA p 267-270
[18] ibid S p273-4
[19] BBC: Afghanistan's turbulent history: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1569826.stm.(
Acc:25/03/13)
[20] BBC, Thursday, 5 April, 2001, Anti-Taleban leader calls for
support, available on line:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1262599.stm
(accessed on: 10/04/13)
[21] Thier, E. J. A. (2003) ' The Politics of Peace-building Year One:
From Bonn to Kabul. Nation-building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. ed. by
Antonio, D., Niland, N. and Wermester, K. Bloomfield, USA: Kumarian Press,
Inco: 39-60
[22] Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
Kenneth Katzman , February 8, 2013, : www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf .
Acc.on 12/04/13
[23] Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Congressional Research by Kenneth
Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs April 4, 2012.avialible: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf
[24] Global Post:
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/100305/holbrooke-afghanistan-pakistan:
(as accessed on 25/04/13)
[25] Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War
against the Taliban, By Stephen Tanner; Revised edition, Da Capo Press, 2009, p281
[26] Taliban: the Story of the Afghan Warlords. By Ahmad Rashid, London,2nd Ed, Pan Macmillan Ltd ,
P32
[27] Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Kenneth
Katzman , February 8, 2012, : www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf , acc. On
25/04/13
[28] Institute for studies of war: Haqqani Network, available on line: http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani-network
[29] Global Security 2011: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/haqqani.htm
, acc.on: 25/04/13
[30] CNN: Gorge Bush speech, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/index.htm.
Acc.25/4/13
[31] ibid
[32] ibid
[33] UN Security Council, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement. As accessed on 26/04/13
[34] Radical Islam, the Taliban
and Western hegemony, by: A.M.Eskandary, Leicester University.
[35] ISAF, available on line: www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php
[36] Reuter: The costs of war, available on line
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629,
accessed on 02/04/2013.as accessed on:01/05/13
[37] The top commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen, told
journalists in October
2011 that the numbers of insurgents
may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed in summer of 2011.
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy
Congressional Research by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs, February 8, 2013
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf ,
as accessed on:02/05/13
[38] Afghanistan: A Military History by S Tanner p223-236
[39] Ibid p239
[40] Strategy in the contemporary world, John Baylis, p77
[41] See: Bio: Hamid Karzai, Fox News.23January 2003,avialable http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,44641,00.html and Also BBC news,5 January2010.Profile:Hamid Karzai, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3135938.stm
[42] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/11/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-president-karzai,
as accessed on: 02/05/13
[43] Strategy in the Contemporary world, By John Baylis,James Wirtz
,Oxford UnI press ,Second edition,p 165-170
[44] Ibid 168
[45] Modern Strategy, by Colin S. Gray, oxford UNI press 1999, p288
[46] Strategy in the Contemporary world, By John Baylis, Oxford UNI
press ,2nd Ed, p 165-171
[47] Ibid
[48] Instead Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was against Pakistan politics
influence in Afghanistan, captured the Kabul. Hikmatyar with the help of
Pakistani Militias fought for four years in and round Kabul, but failed.
[49] The new York Times, January 4, 2008, Bhutto’s Deadly Legacy,
available on line: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/opinion/04dalrymple.html,
as accessed on: 07/05/13
[50]FP magazine:What Went Wrong IN Afghanistan Seth G. Jones: Allowing a
sanctuary in Pakistan, and Amrullah
Saleh: Believing Pakistan could change, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/opinion/04dalrymple.html
[51] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/what_went_wrong?page=0,4, access: 05/05/13
[52] UNODC ,Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, Available on line in
PDF: www.unodc.org/.../Afghanistan/Summary
[53] UNODC, THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE, 2011. www.unodc.org/...analysis/.../Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-...
[54] BBC, Nosedive in Afghan-US relations, online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7870340.stm
[55] Understanding State-Building and Local
Government in Afghanistan, by Sarah Lister, available on line in PDF.
Crisis States
Research Centre. www2.lse.ac.uk/.../research/crisisStates/.../wp142.... access:05/05/13
[56] Sayed Zia Sais: Who is Winning the War in Afghanistan?, Xlibris
Corportation, 2011,p 44
[57] The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad; Jones,
S. G. Available on line in PDF: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18240/rise_of_afghanistans_insurgency.html
[58]UNODC Afghanistan http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/frontpage/afghanistan-survey-on-corruption.html
[59] BBC NEWs, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21364557,
as accessed on: 05/05/13
[60] Foreign Policy Research institute What Afghans Want By Andrew
Garfield ,November 2009, available on line: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.garfield.whatafghanswant.html access: 05/05/13
[61] New Statesman, Why the Taliban are winning
in Afghanistan by William Dalrymple, Published 22 June 2010
http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2010/06/british-afghanistan-government.
Acc05/05/13
[62] During Soviet intervention never it happened that soviet forces
interring the villages and searching houses. At that time it was always done by
Afghan police and Army.
[63] STRATEGY In the Contemporary world, by, Baylis,Wirtz and Cohen,
Oxford press,2nd Ed.2007,p71
[64] Modern Strategy, by Colin S. GRAy, oxford UNI press 1999, p285
[65] Ibid p285
[66] Strategic studies, by Ken Booth and Eric Herring, Mansell Poblishing
Limited, New York 1994, p4
[67] Combatting terrorism centre, Bin Laden’s Dubious Pledge to Mullah
Omar, available on line: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-facade-of-allegiance-bin-ladin%E2%80%99s-dubious-pledge-to-mullah-omar,
as accessed on:07/05/2013
[68] STRATEGY In the
Contemporary world, by, Baylis,Wirtz and Cohen, Oxford press,2nd Ed.2007,p39
[69] Just WAR or Just PEACE, Humanitarian Intervention and International
Law, Simon Chesterman, Oxford press 2001 ,p88
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