By: A.M.Eskandary
March 2012
"Injustice anywhere
is a treat to justice everywhere"
Martin Luther king
Humanitarian
Intervention
(From Theory to
Practice)
Introduction;
In this essay we shall examine the concept of humanitarian intervention. Though to date no single universally accepted definition of the term
exist (nor are its parameters agreed on), the more frequently cited definitions
include that of Ian
Brownlie, who described it as “the threat
or use of armed force by a state…with the object of protecting human rights”[1],
and Wil D. Verwey’s assertion that it entails the “coercive action taken by states, at their initiative, and involving the
use of armed force, for the purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious
and wide-scale violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right
to life, inside the territory of another state".[2]
The broad view
adopted in this essay is that essentially, in today’s global community states
cannot stand back and witness governments participate in genocide, ethnic
cleansing and other mass atrocities, or to observe other internal ethno- religious conflicts, from
famine and epidemic diseases spread. History has
proven that the state is not always the ultimate guarantor of its citizens, and
therefore it is the responsibility
of the international community as a whole and especially the democratic forces
to take appropriate measures to solve these conflict and crises in the shortest
possible time. Unfortunately, however, we shall also observe throughout this
paper that in practical terms, cases of humanitarian intervention in the
past few decades or so (especially since the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’),
illustrate that the real motives of intervening states are not always based on
altruistic desires to bring peace and stability into conflict zones, but rather
it is personal desires and interests that play the leading role. The concept
has arguably been used as a pretext for powerful countries to pursue their own
economic, political and strategic interests in under developed and war-torn
countries. There is therefore great difference between so called ‘humanitarian
intervention’ and humanism. Humanitarian intervention without humanism
cannot bring peace, stability and prosperity to the war-torn regions, countries
and the international community as a whole.
This paper is essentially divided into two
parts. We shall focus on the theoretical side of the concept in the first half,
examining how and when the terminology came into international security
studies, the principles behind it and arguments for as well as against
recognition of such right. The second
half shall examine humanitarian intervention in practice with regards to recent
conflict zones including Iraq and Afghanistan, though particular attention will
be paid to the intervention of the US, NATO and their allies into the latter.
Theoretical aspects:
There are in general two key perspectives on the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention; restrictionist and liberalist
counter-restrictionist views. The former argue that such concept violates
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and is illegal under the UN Charter as well customary
international law. The latter, on the other hand, argue instead that there is
both a legal and a customary right of humanitarian intervention.
As a starting point, it is necessary to point
out that the traditional non-intervention principle has survived the UN
system under Article 2(1) of the Charter which provides that; “the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its members“[3]. Furthermore a general ban
on force exists under Article 2(4) which provides that; “all Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”[4].
Restrictionists, by adopting a literalistic interpretation of the above,
firmly discredit any suggestion for the existence of a legal right of
humanitarian intervention under the Charter.
Restrictionists also argue against any moral
right of humanitarian intervention. Adopting a realist thinking, the crux of
such argument is scepticism as to the genuineness of humanitarian intervention.
Are there really circumstances in which one state is willing to sacrifices the
lives of its own military forces for sole humanism purposes to save strangers
from major sufferings in other countries? Ian Brownie, a principal
restrictionist, has observed that a right of humanitarian intervention would
inevitably be “an instrument wide open to abuse [and] a general license to
vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial intervention”.[5]
When examining the practical aspects of humanitarian intervention
below, it is observable that such realist standpoint has regrettably been
proven true in recent years. This is especially true with regards to
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan where national interest motives played a
major role in intervention by the US and its allies.
Counter-restrictionists, on the other hand, rely
on the UN Charter (specifically Article 1(3), 55 and 56) as obligating members
to take action and protect basic human rights when grossly violated by a state[6]. This, they believe,
therefore provides a legal exception to the Charter prohibition on the
use of force, given that without adherence to fundamental human rights,
international peace and security is unattainable.[7] Chesterman, in his book Just War or Just
Peace?, has also provided a counter-argument to the restrictionist
interpretation by arguing that in fact, Article 2(4) does not absolutely outlaw
humanitarian intervention at all. This is because, as he argues, the ban on
force only goes as far as interference “in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”[8],
and gross human rights violations are not such internal matters but rather an issue for the
international community to resolve promptly[9].
Alternatively, proponents of a legal right such
as M. Reisman[10]
argue that in fact, Article 2(4) of the Charter does not prohibit the use of
military force by one state against another in genuine cases of humanitarian
intervention as they give neither a rise of violation to “territorial
integrity”[11]
of a state, and neither serve a threat to its “political independence”.[12]
As to the existence of a customary right of
humanitarian intervention in international law, counter restrictionists use
pre-Cold War state practice to argue the existence of such norm. The most cited
examples of humanitarian intervention pre-Cold War have been cited as
being India’s intervention into Eastern Pakistan in 1971, Tanzania’s
intervention into Uganda in 1979 and Vietnam into Kampuchea in 1978. It is
argued that these cases in fact provide very weak evidence for the existence of
a customary right to humanitarian intervention, because none of the
invading countries relied on humanitarian grounds, rather playing it safe and
invoking a right of self-defence under Article 51. The underlying motives for
these interventions were therefore anything but altruism and humanism.
A total ban on the existence of humanitarian
intervention for the preservation of state sovereignty is, it is submitted,
frankly intolerable. It is highly immoral and unethical in the 21st
century for those states with the means, courage and genuine incentives to step
in and end gross human rights violations to stand back and observe the death of
thousands of innocent civilians anywhere in the world. Kofi Annan’s reflection
on the failure of the global community to end the atrocious genocide in Rwanda
(1997) which killed more than 40 million civilians furthermore demonstrates
that outright restrictionist views and attitudes towards absolute state
sovereignty are no longer acceptable. Annan affirmed that “the UN Charter
was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and
human dignity”[13].
Humanitarian intervention in practice:
In this section we shall examine the practical aspect of humanitarian
intervention, observing conduct pre and post-Cold War (specifically the post-
9/11 era), and analyse whether the interventions that took place provide a
genuine case for the existence of a right to humanitarian intervention
or not. Though any arguments as to a unilateral
right of humanitarian intervention remains controversial and heated, it has
long been recognized that the Security Council can, invoking its inherent
Chapter VII (Article 39) powers, authorize military intervention where it deems
a situation a a threat to peace and security.
In the period
pre-Cold War, it seems apparent that the principle of state sovereignty and
non-intervention was the overriding factor. M. Akehurst
fairly observed then that “there is a
consensus among states in favour of treating humanitarian intervention as
illegal”.[14] This was
mostly due to the systematic eagerness of Russia and China to use their powers
of veto to block any such practice.
The post-Cold
War era, particularly the 1990’s, has been recognised as a “decade of
humanitarian intervention”[15] as it witnessed a rising
tolerance towards such practice, albeit in its authorised form. Activism was
also apparent from the Security Council’ undoubted eagerness to widen the scope
of the term “to maintain or restore
international peace and security”[16]
to cover crisis’s other than gross atrocities like genocide and mass murder,
therefore increasing its responsibilities in sanctioning intervention, therefore
allowing military action to be taken.
In a statement of 1992 the Council revolutionarily accepted that intrastate conflicts can also pose a
threat to international peace and security, as well as other “non-military sources of instability in the
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields”[17].
An example of an internal issue that warranted military intervention was,
for example, the oppression of Saddam Hussain’s Government of Kurdish refugees
in Iraq[18], which resulted in an
invasion in 1991 and the creation of ‘safe
havens’ for Kurds. Another example was the 1991-2 invasion of Yugoslavia,
where it was held that “the heavy loss of
human life and material damage”[19]
as well as “the consequence for the
countries of the region, in particular the border areas of neighbouring
countries”[20]
constituted a threat to international peace and security also. The same
justification was used for the intervention in Somalia as thousands of refugees
were starving to death during the civil war. Furthermore, disruption of democratic principles
prompted the Council to authorize intervention in Haiti (1994) when it
condemned the “illegal replacement of the
constitutional president of Haiti”[21],
therefore ORD[22]
being invoked to guarantee the reappearance of then elected President J.
Bartistide. It stated that the existing situation constituted a threat at
international level because of “mass
displacements of population”[23]
and “a climate of fear of persecution and
economic dislocation”.[24] M. Goulding,
the former Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations said this new
activism of the UN to use its inherent powers "could represent a decisive moment in the development of the
organization"[25]
in pre-Cold War times.
As a counter argument to the apparent existence of activism on part of
the Security Council to take action on humanitarian grounds, the causes
of the unfortunate failure to take immediate affirmative action in response to
the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Kosovo ethnic cleansing of 1999 must be
analysed. The UN’s failure in relation to Rwanda (1994) to end the genocide,
thereby preventing the killing of a staggering estimate of a million innocent
people has truly undermined any argument as to the humanism nature of
humanitarian intervention, and more importantly has led to a loss of respect by
many for the UN. The eventual French operation also became subject to
criticism, Jakobsen concluding that “the French government came under a particularly strong pressure to
intervene in Rwanda because media coverage of the genocide began earlier in
France than in most other Western states” [26],
and “because the Hutu forces committing
the genocide had been trained and armed by France”.[27]
This is another study that sceptics of humanitarian intervention won’t
fail to use in their defence in arguments about the sincerity of interventions
on humanitarian grounds.
With regards
to Kosovo, NATO unilaterally decided to start Operation Allied Force in
Yugoslavia to end an ethnic cleansing mission against Albanian Kosovars, after
the Council astonishingly declared the situation was not severe enough. Debates
circulated once more as to whether there was legal possibility for unilateral
humanitarian intervention in response to obvious situations of wide-scale human
rights violations. Many academics argued
for the immorality of the doctrine of non-intervention being used to defend
such atrocious actions. F. Teson asserted that "a government that engages in substantial violations of human
rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only
its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as well" [28],
suggesting a qualified nature of state sovereignty. Kofi Annan, in his 1999
speech during the war, furthermore made the forceful point that, the UN Charter “was never meant
as a licence for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity”[29].
This has been taken as indirectly supporting military intervention in the
Kosovo war.
Why was there
no immediate response? Ultimately, the reason underlying the complete ignorance
of the situation by countries cannot have been for any other reason than a complete lack of political will. It seems
that no state was selfless enough to risk the lives of its own troops to
protect the victims to the massacre; they were after all mere foreign strangers whom no country saw
self-interest in protecting. It is the same reason why the US lost sympathy for
Somalia when it realized the huge numbers of deaths of its soldiers. An
additional factor worthy of consideration has been highlighted by Peter
Jakobsen[30]. In his
2000 study of modern day cases of intervention, he observed that the media is a
very powerful force in the decision of states to embark on of humanitarian
interventions. The media “drives Western conflict management
by forcing Western governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises
against their will”[31]. He termed
this as the “CNN effect”[32].
Therefore, he concluded that due to an initial lack of media coverage on the situation, there was no sufficient
public pressure to prompt states in taking action. He observed rightfully that “policymakers
are…likely to avoid the difficulties and dangers associated with attempts to
manage [state conflicts] until domestic pressures to do so become compelling”[33].
Following the
Rwandan genocide and the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it seems that worldwide
outrage was felt, and as a result countless debates took place as to when and how the global community ought to react to such systematic
atrocities to prevent them in future. The key issue was whether it was any
longer acceptable to grant states unconditional sovereignty over their internal
dealings. Some still rejected the
recognition of a right to humanitarian intervention; however the general
consensus was that something had to
be done. Kofi Annan, reflecting on the numerous let-downs by the Council, asked
the states in his Millennium Report (2000); “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and
systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common
humanity?”[34]
Canada took on responsibility to establish the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. This has resulted into
the development of a new concept of “responsibility to protect”[35] in international relations,
which provides a much needed linkage between the principle of state
sovereignty and the practice of humanitarian intervention. Under the doctrine,
states enjoy absolute state sovereignty so the duty of protection of citizens is observed, and only where it is
unable or unwilling to do such, “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect”[36].
The Responsibility to protect is focussed on the victims, and has three
elements to it. Firstly, it puts responsibility on a state to protect citizens
from mass atrocity crimes. Secondly,
it emphasises international community’s duty to provide assistance to a state
through actions such as providing stand by forces, and eventually, it puts
responsibility on the international community to take the responsibility to
intervene into a state where the above two stages fail. The community must not
rush to the usage of military force; first diplomatic intervention is approved,
then a more coercive form where circumstances require such, and at last
military force where other methods fail. In this sense, the doctrine is wider
than humanitarian intervention.
The United Nations adopted much of the Report’s at the World Summit of
2005, and the Security Council supported this report by passing a resolution in
2006[37] to formalize this new norm.
It is now clear that the right to protect applies to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”[38],
and that main responsibility falls on states to prevent such mass atrocity. The international
community’s role is to assist states in their role of protection, which entails
the early “use [of] appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other means”[39]
and use of military force can be used as last resort. Responsibility to rebuild
comes after responsibility to react; according to the ICISS report, “it is the
moral responsibility and obligation of the interveners to help intervened
country to rebuild it especially in security, justice and reconciliation and
development areas”[40].
Humanitarian Intervention in Iraq &
Afghanistan:
Now we shall turn to the post 9/11 era. The World Trade terroristic attacks changed world
diplomacy, seeing the rise of the US led “war on
terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq, as soon followed by the rest of the
leading nations. Questions of legitimacy and genuineness of humanitarian
intervention following these invasions has proven more dubious now than it
already was.
Both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were
justified by the Bush and Blair administration on humanitarian grounds, but the
truth came out soon that the invasions were not
immediately motivated by altruistic concerns. Bush
initially placed much emphasis on the hunt for weapons of mass destructions as
justification for the invasion in Iraq, relying on the weakest of evidence. “The doctrine of humanitarian intervention
was used as a pretext”[41]
when this proved ill-founded by
then signalling that the liberation of the civilians in from their oppressor
was the key motive in the intervention. Bush said that “America and our allies are called once again
to defend the peace against an aggressive tyrant, and we accept this
responsibility. ….We will liberate the people of Iraq from a cruel and violent
dictator”.[42]
In relation to Iraq, the US can be heavily
criticized for discarding international law principles. The US was too ready to
take pre-emptive strikes, failing to demonstrate that there was an immediate
threat to international peace and security as required by the Charter, and that
military force was absolutely
necessary as a last resort according
to ICISS principles. The US at no time sought to pursue diplomatic means of
providing assistance, but rather embarked on a full force military mission as
it saw fit. Further evidence of a lack of concern for the welfare of civilians
in Iraq has been provided by the Human Rights Watch Report[43],
which provided that US was too ready to drop bombs following single suggestions
of Saddam or his associates being “somewhere
in the community”[44].
This resulted in the death of thousands of civilians. The US furthermore felt
no issue in bombing water and electricity stations regardless of apprehensions
of international organisations like Amnesty International that it would have
devastating consequences for civilians. Boggs states that the Bush
administration was trying to “override
the UN Charter and international law in pursuit of higher ends justified by the
war on terrorism.”[45]
This seems an accurate observation, as it is submitted US used humanitarian
reasons for the preservation of national self-interest. The US was not at all concerned with the welfare of
Afghan and Kurdish people, rather a strong reason for its invasion being to
have geographical and strategic
control over large areas for financial
motives, so as to get closer to its aim of controlling Iraq’s oil production.
Equal lines of arguments can be made for the
invasion of Afghanistan as well. Securing the welfare of the Afghans was a subordinate concern, the
primary aim being the removal of the Taliban regime and defeating the Al-Qaida,
which obviously had a huge positive impact on the weakening of international terrorism
and strengthening of global peace and security as well.
The Taliban controlled over 90 per cent of the
Afghan territory, and with its radical- Islamic fundamentalist views and ethnic
hatred left the worst form of governance on show for the world to witness. They not only
committed crime against the country’s citizens, including ethnic cleansing and
the destroying of historical and
cultural values, but they made Afghanistan a safe haven for International terrorist organizations
including al-Qaeda.
The term war
against terrorism itself suggests the underlying principles of humanitarian
intervention not being based on altruism any longer, but rather hatred and
revenge. Bush immediately following the 9/11 attacks
declared that; “The search is underway for those who are behind
these evil acts. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbour them.”[46] Soon
after, Tony Blair 16th September 2001 said: “the fact is that we
are in war with terrorism… it is the war between the civilised world and
fanaticism”. [47]
On 21st September 2001Bush
went further and in his speech addressed to both houses of the US congress said
that the Taliban “ is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening
people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists”. He
warned all the countries over the world with strong words that “either you
are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation
that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United
States as a hostile regime.”[48]
With coming of Barak Obama in power, the
US policy in relation to the war on terrorism was left unchanged. Obama,
while announcing his policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 2009, clearly
said “We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its
future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the
United States… the terrorists who planned and supported the
9/11 attacks are in Pakistan and Afghanistan… Al
Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe
haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows
Al Qaida to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for terrorists
who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly
can”.[49] Obama proved critics right
with this declaration; the interventions were all motivated by national
interest motives. Americans came primarily into Afghanistan not to end
the suffering of the Afghan people, but because the Taliban refused to hand
over Osama Bin Laden.
Despite the fact that Afghan people have
always firmly rejected any kind of foreign aggression and intervention during
their long history, this time at least 90% of the population welcomed
intervention by America and other international forces, albeit at the start[50].
It is an obvious fact that if the support Afghan people, and especially United
Fran against Taliban (Northern Alliance) were not there, the limited American
forces at that time would not have been able to deflate Taliban and al-Qaida so
easily.
The
Achievements:
Unquestionably, America and its International alliances have had its
achievements. After the collapse of Taliban and the 2001 Bonn Conference[51],
a new interim government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai was established.
In June 2002 the national assembly Loya Jirga established the
transitional Afghan Government. Following this, in January 2004, a new
Constitution of Afghanistan was approved by another Loya Jirga. In spite of all
the challenges, Afghanistan held a presidential election in 2004 and 2009.
Besides this, for the first time in 30 years an election was held for the National
Assembly in 2005 and Provincial councils later in 2010. Regardless of all
frauds and irregularities these are big steps for a country which for more than
a decade was ruled without law and legal authority, and unquestionably would
not have happened without international aid.
During the Taliban regime schools were
mostly either destroyed or closed and there was a ban for girls to attend school,
and for women to go out of their home without the company of their close male
relatives, or go to work. But now, thanks to the international community
support, thousands of schools are rebuilt and reopened. According to some
estimates in 2001, just after the fall of the Taliban, 1.2 million children
attended school, but today more than 7 million (of which two million are the
girls) attend school and tens of universities including some newly opened
private universities have been opened in Kabul, Nengarhar, Balkh ,Herat and
Kandahar.[52]
In the public health area there are also
substantial improvements. In 2000, only 9% of the population had access to
basic health services but in 2010 this increased to 90%. According to the
Ministry of Public Health in 2006, 77% of Afghan children under the age of five
were vaccinated, and it is predicted that this has risen up 90% in 2010-11.[53]
In transportation and
communication, more than 5000km roads were either repaired or newly built.
Radio Television of Afghanistan (RTA) and 8 other major TV networks operate in
Kabul and other provinces. Furthermore an estimated 175 private radio and TV
station and about a dozen international broadcasters were present in 2010.
There are around 140, 0000 land line telephones, 13million mobile phones, and
internet is available for more than one million people.[54]
With regards to the economy, figures
show that the GDP growth of 3.6% (2008 est.), 20.9% (2009 est.) and 8.2% (2010
est.) and income per capital has risen from 100$ in 2000 up to 900$ in 2010.[55]
More than 4 million refugees returned back home and the Afghan people are
finally able to enjoy fundamental freedoms more, and there is better equality
of opportunity for men and women in Afghanistan than its other neighbouring
countries.
What
Are the Challenges: the main challenges are Security, Poppy
cultivation and narcotics trade, Corruption and bad governance.
Regardless of these apparent
improvements that were most definitely aided by international aid, the security
situation of the country has continued to deteriorate since 2004 once more. The
Afghan government has been losing control over many districts and Taliban are
regaining increasing control. The years 2008 to 2011 were the bloodiest years
for international and Afghan armed forces, but not to forget also for innocent
Afghan civilians.[56]
Despite the presence of international
forces in Afghanistan, especially British and American troop’ presence in
Helmand and Kandahar provinces, poppy cultivation is rising steadily. The UN
report shows that in 2011 nearly in 131, 000 hectares of poppy cultivation took
place, which is a 7% increase compared to 2010. Around 95% of cultivation took
place in the nine southern and western provinces with heavy presence of
American and British troops. The opium production was estimated 5,800 MT in
2011, which shows a 61% increase compared to 2010. [57]
Corruption
and bad governance is one of the main problems of Afghanistan. According to
some Afghan intellectuals and critics, in the whole history of Afghanistan we
have never had such corrupt government. According to watchdog Transparency International's
2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan is ranked 172nd in
the world, with a score of 1.8. The index scores range from 0 (highly corrupt)
to 10 (highly clean). [58]
The US Secretary of state Hillary Clinton in her written statement very
properly called Afghanistan a “narco-state” that was “plagued by
limited capacity and widespread corruption”.[59]
In conclusion, theoretically it seems very just and
fair that when somewhere in the world genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other
large scale mass atrocities are taking place, the democratic world has strong
moral duty to interfere and to somehow
stop it and defend the human dignity. During Cold War, international relations
were based on ‘State Sovereignty’ and ‘non-intervention’ but
after Cold War this orientation was changed. The General Secretary of the UN in
2000 described the new strategy as a “more human-centred approach to
security, in distinction of previous ‘state-centred’ approach”[60]
From a practical perspective, it is
very difficult to believe that the powerful countries use their national
budgets and put the life of their soldiers in danger simply for humanitarian
causes. “As we have seen in the Middle East, Africa, The Balkans and Afghanistan,
the development of new international relations has heralded a return to the
system open Great Power domination over state which are too week to prevent
external claims against them.” [61]
In the case of Afghanistan, the
intervention was more a part of the ‘war on terror’ than to be a genuine
humanitarian mission. It is very obvious now because, after ten years of
fighting against the Taliban terrorist groups, killing thousands of
insurgencies and in some occasion’s hundreds innocent Afghan people, and losing
thousands of soldiers as well as spending billions of dollars of the tax payers
of the US, NATO and EU countries, Joe Biden The voice president of the United
States recently said in a controversial interview that “the Taliban is not
our enemy”. Hereafter the White House spokesman Jay Carney in support of
voice president said; “it is a simple
fact that we went into Afghanistan because of the attack on the United States
on Sept. 11, 2001. We are there now to ultimately defeat Al Qaeda, to stabilize
Afghanistan and stabilize it in part so that Al Qaeda or other terrorists who
have as their aim attacks on the United States cannot establish a foothold
again in that country,"[62]
American has gone further than these baffling claims, having been in continuing
talks with the Taliban, and is due to open office for the Taliban in Qatar.
From a diplomatic point of view, this means that the US is on its way to
recognising the Taliban as a legitimate and lawful force in Afghanistan, and
maybe very soon will surrender power to them.
In
this respect some very serious questions arise: If the Taliban was not a US
enemy, why did they fight against them for a decade? Is there are any other
force or organization in the region more fanatic, radical, against human and especially
women’s rights than the Taliban? And finally what has changed in Taliban
behaviour or ideology that led the US to change their policy toward them? The conclusion
to be drawn is that the US and its allied forces didn’t come to Afghanistan for
humanitarian purposes to end the war, building democracy or preserving human
rights but they came to defend their own selfish interests. If it is in their
interest to bring the Taliban back in power, they will surely do it. The rise
in poppy cultivation in the areas controlled by the British and American does
nothing for a case of genuine humanitarian intervention either.
Nevertheless, regardless of the US and western
governments policies, there are hundreds of American and European NGOs that are
operating in Afghanistan and helping the country in its rebuilding, education,
health, creating job opportunities and doing real humanitarian aid to suffering
Afghans. As a concluding phrase one
could say that “instead of a new humanitarianism, we need a new humanism, a
positive approach to problem solving that makes the most of people’s capacity
for autonomy and collective rational decision making.”[63]
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A-M
Johannes; “Humanitarian Intervention and
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after September 11”, 3 July 2008
·
Marrack
Goulding; "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping" in
International Affairs, Volume 69, No.3 (Winter 1993)
·
Peter
V. Jakobsen; “Focus on the CNN Effect
Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and
Indirect”, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 2000
Journal of Peace Research,Vol. 37, no. 2, 2000
Regulations
·
UN
Charter Article 1(3)
·
UN
Charter Article 2(1)
·
UN
Charter Article 2(4)
·
UN Charter
Article 2(7)
·
UN
Charter Article 42
·
UN
Charter Article 51
·
UN
Charter Article 55
·
UN
Charter Article 56
UNSC Resolutions
·
UNSC
Resolution 688 (1991)
·
UNSC
Resolution 713 (1991)
·
UNSC Resolution
46/7 (1991)
·
UNSC Resolution
(S/RES/1674)
Reports
·
AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007
·
CIA: the world fact book
·
Human
Rights Watch Report 2004 (Belloni R. 2006)
·
Ministry of the Public Health of Afghanistan, Annual Report 1387
·
United Nation office for drug and crime
(UNODC), Afghanistan Opium survey 2011
Websites
(All accessed on 02/01/2012)
Speeches;
·
G.W. Bush, “Text: Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Speech”,
Washington Post, January 29, 2003.
·
Kofi
Annan; In his Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXV, at Ditchley Park,
Oxfordshire (June 1988)
[1] Ian Brownlie: “Humanitarian Intervention” in John
N. Moore: “Law and Civil War in the Modern World”, the Johns Hopkins
University Press (1974), page 134
[2] Wil D. Verwey:
“Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An International Law
Perspective”, in Jan Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), World Orders in the Making,
London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 180.
[3] UN Charter, Article 2(1)
[4] UN Charter Article 2(4)
[5] Ian Brownlie,
as mentioned in O.Ramsbotham & J.Woodhous: “Humanitarian Intervention in
Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization”, Polity Press, Cambridge,
(1996), page 64
[6] Alex J. Bellamy & Nicholas
J. Wheeler; “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics”, in J. Baylis,
S. Smith & P. Owens; “The Globalization of World Politics, An
Introduction to International Relations” (Chapter 31), 5th edition, Oxford;
Oxford University Press (2011), Page 512
[7] Alex J. Bellamy & Nicholas J. Wheeler; Humanitarian
Intervention in World Politics, as mentioned in J. Baylis, S. Smith & P.
Owens; “The Globalization of World Politics (An Introduction to
International Relations)”, 5th edition, OUP (2001), page 512
[8] UN Charter, Article 2(7)
[9] Simon Chesterman; Just War or Just Peace?
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press (2001), page 89
[10]W. M. Reisman: “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos”,
mentioned in Lillich: Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, University Press of Virginia, (1973),
page 177
[11]UN Charter, Article 2(1)
[12] Ibid.
[13] In his Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXV, at Ditchley Park,
Oxfordshire (June 1988), as mentioned in Annan, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, United Nations General
Assembly, Official records, Fifty-fourth session, Suplement No. 1 (A/54/1),
September 1999, page 4
[14] M. Akehurst, as mentioned in the Charlotte Bretherton and Geoffrey
Ponton; “Global Politics; an Introduction” (Blackwell, oxford, 1996),
chapter 6; C.Bretherton: “Security after the Cold War: Towards a Global
paradigm?”, page 144
[15] M.Kaldor; “Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and
Intervention” (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007), page 16
[16] UN Charter, Article 39
[17] Note by the Security
Council President, S/23500, 31 January 1992
[18] UNSC Resolution 688 (1991)
[19] UNSC Resolution 713 (25 September 1991)
[20] Ibid.
[21] UNSC Resolution 46/7 (1991)
[22] Operation Restore Democracy
[23] UNSC Resolution 841 (1993)
[24] Ibid.
[25] Marrack Goulding; "The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping" in International Affairs, Volume 69, No.3 (Winter
1993), page 461.
[26] Peter V. Jakobsen; “Focus on
the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management
is Invisible and Indirect”, Institute of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen, 2000 Journal of Peace Research,Vol. 37, no. 2, 2000, Sage Publications page 135
[27] Ibid. page 135
[28] Fernando Teson: “Humanitarian Intervention”, 3rd
edition, Transnational Publishers, (2005), page 15
[29] Kofi Anan quoted in Sir Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and
Humanitarian Intervention,’ in Jennifer M. Welsh ed. Humanitarian
Intervention and International relations (Oxford University Press, New York,
2006), p. 86.
[30] Peter V. Jakobsen; “Focus on
the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management
is Invisible and Indirect”, Institute of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen, 2000 Journal of Peace Research,Vol. 37, no. 2, 2000, Sage Publication, page 135
[31] Ibid. page 131
[32] Ibid. page 131
[33] Ibid. page 133
[34] Kofi Annan Millennium Report 2000; http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/responsibility.shtml (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[35] December 2001 ICISS Report, Responsibility
to Protect. Available online in PDF; www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[36] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
Report (Online), p. xi. Available from: http://www.iciss-iise.gc.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[37]UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1674) 2006
[38] 2005 World Summit Outcome Document; www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf,paragraph
139. (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[39] Ibid.
[40] Paul D. Williams; Security Studies; an Introduction, Routledge; 1st
edition, (2008), page 427-431
[41] A-M Johannes; “Humanitarian
Intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ after September 11”, 3
July 2008
[43] Human Rights Watch Report 2004 (Belloni R. 2006)
[44] Ibid.
[45] C. Boggs; “Imperial Delusions; American Militarism and Endless
War, first edition, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; edition (2004),
page 42
[49]Italics added. March 27, 2009 - Washington, D.C available on line; http://projects.washingtonpost.com/obama-speeches/speech/40/ (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[51] December 2001, Germany
[53]Ministry of the Public Health of Afghanistan, Annual Report 1387)
available in PDA; http://moph.gov.af/en/Documents?DID=114 (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[54] CIA, the world fact book available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[55] Ibid.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[57] United Nation office for drug and
crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium survey 2011, available on line: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[58] Radio Free Europe, available on
line: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079143.html (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[59] BBC news 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7870340.stm (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[60] (David Chandler: “From Kosovo to Kabul
and Beyond; Human Rights and International Intervention”, 2nd Revised
edition, Pluto Press, (2005), page 172
[61] David Chandler: “From Kosovo
to Kabul and Beyond; Human Rights and International Intervention”, 2nd
Revised edition, Pluto Press, (2005), page 155
[62] (Fox news http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/19/white-house-stands-by-biden-statement-that-taliban-isnt-us-enemy/) (as accessed on 02-01-12)
[63] David Chandler: From Kosovo to Kabul and
Beyond; Human Rights and International Intervention, 2nd Revised edition, Pluto
Press (2005), page 236
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